a. Suppose that you took part in a lottery that has a chance to increase, decrease or have no effect on your level of income. With probability 0.5, your income remains at it original level K500; with 0.2 probability, your income increases to K700; and with probability 0.3, your income decreases to K400. The utility function is.u（1） =I^0.7where I denote income leveli.Using the utility function show that the consumer's risk preference is averse. (2marks)ii.Calculate both the EU and EV of the income. (4marks)iii.Using the results in (il) above, indicate the attitude to risk of this consumer. (2marks)

a. Suppose that you took part in a lottery that has a chance to increase, decrease or have no effect on your level of income. With probability 0.5, your income remains at it original level K500; with 0.2 probability, your income increases to K700; and with probability 0.3, your income decreases to K400. The utility function is.u（1） =I^0.7where I denote income leveli.Using the utility function show that the consumer's risk preference is averse. (2marks)ii.Calculate both the EU and EV of the income. (4marks)iii.Using the results in (il) above, indicate the attitude to risk of this consumer. (2marks)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

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the video link is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqEz6kvXhc8please give me detailed solutions and calculations, thank you!
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Your utility function is given by M1/2. You have $100 and are planning to invest in a venture where you can win or lose 50 with equal probability. Will you accept the venture? What is the minimum gain you need to make in the good scenario such that you will invest in the venture?
# 4 Consider an individual with a utility function of the form u(w) = √w. The individual has an initial wealth of $4. He has two investments options available to him. He can eitffer keep his wealth in an interest-free account or he can take part in a particularly generous lottery that provides $12 with probability of 1/2 and $0 with probability 1/2. Assume that this person does not have to incur a cost if he decides to take part in the lottery. (a) Will this individual participate in the lottery? (b) Calculate this individual's certainty equivalent associated with the lottery. What is his risk premium?
Y5 Alfred is a risk-averse person with $100 in monetary wealth and owns a house worth $300, for total wealth of $400. The probability that his house is destroyed by fire (equivalent to a loss of $300) is pne = 0.5. If he exerts an effort level e = 0.3 to keep his house safe, the probability falls to pe = 0.2. His utility function is: U = w0.5 – e where e is effort level exerted (zero in the case of no effort and 0.3 in the case of effort).a. In the absence of insurance, does Alfred exert effort to lower the probability of fire?HINT: Calculate and compare the expected utility i) with effort, and ii) without effort. If effort is exerted, then the effort cost is paid regardless of whether or not a fire occurs.b. Alfred is considering buying fire insurance. The insurance agent explains that a home owner’s insurance policy would require paying a premium α and would repay the value of the house in the event of fire, minus a deductible “D”. [A deductible is an amount of money that the…
Monty Burns, the owner of the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant, owns many real estate properties. His last acquisition is a house worth €1,000, 000. Monty Burns considers purchasing an insurance for this new property. With probability 0.1, he will face damage reducing his property' value to €640, 000 while with probability 0.9 his property will not be damaged and thus will remain at its current value. Burns' vNM utility for wealth is given by u°(w) = Vw. Miss b runs an insurance company in Springfield and is willing to insure Monty Burns. The insurance contract says the following: if Burns' new property is damaged, she will pay an amount q (the coverage) to Monty Burns in exchange for a payment r (the premium) that is due independently from the occurence of the damage. Miss b's vNM utility over her income y is u°(y) = y. 1. Considering that Monty Burns actually buys insurance from Miss b, express the wealth of Monty Burns and the income of Miss b as functions of q and r. You have of…
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Hello can any one help with this Economics question: A contractor spends Dollar 3,000 to prepare for a bid on a construction project which, after deducting manufacturing expenses and the cost of bidding, will yield a profit of dollar 25,000 if the bid is won. If the chance of winning the bid is ten per cent, compute his expected profit and state the likely decision on whether to bid or not to bid?
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