A movie theatre (a local monopolist) caters to students and other adults. The demand function for students is Qd = 2,700 – 150 P and the demand unction for other adults is Qd = 2,500 – 50 P . Marginal cost is 2 per ticket. Assume that the monopolist can discriminate. What price will the monopolist set for students? Pg = $ What price will the monopolist set for other adults? PA = $

A movie theatre (a local monopolist) caters to students and other adults. The demand function for students is Qd = 2,700 – 150 P and the demand unction for other adults is Qd = 2,500 – 50 P . Marginal cost is 2 per ticket. Assume that the monopolist can discriminate. What price will the monopolist set for students? Pg = $ What price will the monopolist set for other adults? PA = $

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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**Practice**
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