A monopolist sells a single good in two periods. There are two conumers who want to buy one unit of the good in each period. The willingnessto pay of consumer A is 2, while the willingness to pay of consumer B is 1.5. a) Suppose the monopolist can only set one price in each period and cannot identify consumers at all. What is the optimal price? b) Suppose that the monoplist has indetified which consumers is A and B in period two and can set different prices. What are the optimal prices? c) Would the monoplist want to set a price of 2 in the first period, if he can identify the consumer who bought the product in the next period. That is if he can track who has bought in the first period. Assume for the moment that consumer A buys in the first period at a price of 2.
A monopolist sells a single good in two periods. There are two conumers who want to buy one unit of the good in each period. The willingnessto pay of consumer A is 2, while the
a) Suppose the monopolist can only set one price in each period and cannot identify consumers at all. What is the optimal price?
b) Suppose that the monoplist has indetified which consumers is A and B in period two and can set different prices. What are the optimal prices?
c) Would the monoplist want to set a price of 2 in the first period, if he can identify the consumer who bought the product in the next period. That is if he can track who has bought in the first period. Assume for the moment that consumer A buys in the first period at a price of 2.
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