Answered: A duopoly in which two identical firms…

A duopoly in which two identical firms are engaged in Bertrand competition will not distort prices from their competitive levels.

Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)

16th Edition

ISBN:9781305506893

Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Publisher:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Chapter11: Price-searcher Markets With High Entry Barriers

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8CQ

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Two firms produce identical products at zero cost, and theycompete by setting prices. If each firm charges a low price,then both firms earn profits of zero. If each firm charges ahigh price, then each firm earns profits of £30. If one firmcharges a high price and the other firm charges a low price,the firm that charges the lower price earns profits of £50, andthe firm charging the higher price earns profits of zero. (a) Which oligopoly model best describes this situation?(b) Write this game in normal form.(c) Suppose the game is infinitely repeated. Can theplayers sustain the "collusive outcome" as a Nashequilibrium if the interest rate is 50 percent? Explain. Please answer the a, b and c parts.
Rawlding is a manufacturer in the oligopolistically competitive market for footballs. Two other manufacturers, Spaldon and Wilke, compete with Rawlding for football consumers. Rawlding faces the demand curve for footballs depicted on the graph. Initially, Rawlding charges $30 per football, producing and selling 7 million footballs per year. PRICE (Dollars per ball) 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 O 7 8 FOOTBALLS (Millions of balls) 9 10 G As an oligopolist, Rawlding is a price maker. If Rawlding raises the price of its football from $30 to $32 per ball, the quantity of Rawlding footballs demanded by million footballs per year. If Rawlding reduces the price of its football from $30 to $28 per ball, the quantity of by million footballs per year. (Hint: Click on the points on the graph to see their coordinates.) footballs demanded If Rawlding raises the price of its football above $30, the kinked demand curve model suggests that Spaldon and Wilke will respond by The portion of Rawlding's…
16:04 AM • ll l 16%! eclass.uonbi.ac.ke/mod/qu 2 If a duopolist has a linear demand curve of the form Q=400 – P. Assuming each firm has total cost (TC=3000+100Q). Calculate the profit- maximizing price-quantity combinations using the following four oligopoly pricing models listed below demonstrating that: а. Under the Cournot model, both firms will earn same level of profit and determine industry profit and explain why this is would be the case. b. Under the Cartel model each firm earns a higher profit than under Cournot. Under the Quasi-competitive model, the firm will make a loss equivalent to fixed cost. С. d. Under the Stackelberg's model the leader will earn more than twice the profit of the follower and that total industry profits will be lower than under both Cournot and Cartel models. Explain why this is would be the case. I + II II !!!
What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q= 1,800 - 1,000p. and each firm's marginal cost is $0.28 per unit? The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q, equals and 92 equals (Enter numenic responses using real numbers rounded to two decimai places.) Furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of $ (Round your answer to the nearest penny.)
The graph below shows a demand curve for a firm operating in an oligopolistic market. Kinked Demand Price 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 MR Quantity D 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MC O relatively more elastic. O relatively more inelastic. O perfectly elastic. O perfectly inelastic. Compared to a price of $75, at a price of $60 demand is O
1. Consider two duopolists who each have a constant marginal cost c = e2 = 3 and face inverse demand P = 15 – Q,where Q = Q1 + Q2 is the total output of both firms. 1. Find the Cournot equilibrium quantity for each firm, the resulting market price, and the profits for each firm. 2. Find the Stackelberg equilibrium quantities for each firm, and the price, and the profits for each firm supposing that Firm 1 is the industry leader. 3. Suppose that Firm 2 figures out a way to lower its marginal cost to ez = 0 while firm 1 still has a marginal cost equal to 1: c = 3. How does this affect the Cournot equilibrium quantities, price, and profits? 4. How does this affect the Stackelberg equilibrium (with Firm 1 still as the leader) quantities, price, and profits?
The inverse demand function in a market is given by P = 500- Q. The fırms that operate in this market have zero fixed costs, and constant marginal costs equal to MC = 2O. %3D
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The graph below shows a demand curve for a firm operating in an oligopolistic market. Kinked Demand Price 100 90 80 70 MC 60 50 40 30 20 10 MR D 10 20 30 40 60 70 80 90 100 Quantity Compared to a price of $75, at a price of $60 demand is O relatively more elastic. O relatively more inelastic. O perfectly elastic. O perfectly inelastic.
1) Calculate the equilibrium of linear asymmetric Cournot duopoly. That is, assume that P = a - (q1 + q2), that there is no fixed cost, but the marginal cost of each firm differs, i.e., Firm 1 (Eau) has a cosntant marginal cost of c1, and Firm 2 (Neu) has a constant marginal cost of c2 with c1 < c2. Calculate the consumers' suprlus, each firm's profit as well the as total profit, and the deadweight loss due to oligolpoly. 2) How does the existence of fixed cost change the best-response (reaction) functions in a symmetric Cournot duopoly?
Consider the Cournot duopoly with linear demand function ? = 2000 − 2Q, where P is the price and Q = q1 + q2 is the total supply. Firm 1 and firm 2 has constant marginal cost of 600. Just answer the E, F and G, thank you bartleby! a. If firm compete in price, draw in detail the best response of each firm.b. Determine and explain the Bertrand equilibrium.c. What is the equilibrium quantity and how much profit for each firm?d. Explain the Bertrand Paradox in (c)!e. If firm 1 has capacity of production 450 and firm 2 has capacity of 200. Determine the Bertrand equilibrium.f. What is the equilibrium quantity, and how much profit for each firm?g. Is there any paradox in (f)?