A bunch of cookies should be divided among students by a teacher. Each student writes secretly on a sheet of paper his name and the amount of the cookies (his bid) he wants to get (other students cannot see this number). Then the teacher sorts these bids in ascending order and gives cookies to the students starting from the bid with the smallest amount. If cookies are finished at some point the rest of the students get nothing. If there are several equal bids that cannot be satisfied simultaneously with the current amount of cookies, cookies are equally divided among the students who named these bids. If there are extra cookies, the teacher keeps them. You should assume that cookies are perfectly divisible. Find a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. Explain why the set of strategies you propose is indeed a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. Explain why there are no other Nash equilibria.

A bunch of cookies should be divided among students by a teacher. Each student writes secretly on a sheet of paper his name and the amount of the cookies (his bid) he wants to get (other students cannot see this number). Then the teacher sorts these bids in ascending order and gives cookies to the students starting from the bid with the smallest amount. If cookies are finished at some point the rest of the students get nothing. If there are several equal bids that cannot be satisfied simultaneously with the current amount of cookies, cookies are equally divided among the students who named these bids. If there are extra cookies, the teacher keeps them. You should assume that cookies are perfectly divisible. Find a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. Explain why the set of strategies you propose is indeed a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. Explain why there are no other Nash equilibria.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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