9. Antitrust laws Cooperation among oligopolies runs counter to the public interest because it leads to underproduction and high prices. In an effort to bring resource allocation closer to the social optimum, public officials attempt to force oligopolies to compete instead of cooperating. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that two American investment banks negotiate a merger agreement because a financial crisis threatens to bankrupt both firms. This merger could potentially be stopped by a lawsuit brought by which of the following American institutions? The Defense Department O The Commerce Department O The Justice Department O The Interior Department

9. Antitrust laws Cooperation among oligopolies runs counter to the public interest because it leads to underproduction and high prices. In an effort to bring resource allocation closer to the social optimum, public officials attempt to force oligopolies to compete instead of cooperating. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that two American investment banks negotiate a merger agreement because a financial crisis threatens to bankrupt both firms. This merger could potentially be stopped by a lawsuit brought by which of the following American institutions? The Defense Department O The Commerce Department O The Justice Department O The Interior Department

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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4. Imagine a market with demand P = 420 – Q in each period. Two firms are thinking about colluding. They each have cost C(Qi) = 60Qi. If they cooperate and behave as a monopoly, then they have a marginal revenue curve, MRm = 420 – 2Q, and a marginal cost curve, MCm = 60. If they are in a cartel, then the firms will split the monopoly production and profits. If they compete, then they face MRi = 420 – 2Qi – Q-I and MCi = 60. a. If the firms stick to their agreement (cooperate), how much per-period profit do they each make? b. If they are not able to maintain their agreement (compete), what is their per-period profit? c. If one firm cheats on their agreement (deviate), how much does each firm make? Be sure to specify both the profit for the cheater and the firm cheated-on. d. Suppose the firms assume that their interaction will last forever (r = 1) and they share the common discount value R. What is the lowest value of R such that both firms are willing to continue with the cartel…
Discuss how oligopoly market structure can help explain some of the decision-making processes by firms?
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Gregor and Haidy, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Gregor and Haidy can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 4.80 4.40 4.00 3.60 3.20 2.80 2.40 2.00 1.60 1.20 0.80 0.40 0 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 35 70 105 140 175 210 245 280 315 350 385 420 Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 $154.00 $280.00 $378.00 $448.00 $490.00 $504.00 $490.00 $448.00 $378.00 $280.00 $154.00 0 Suppose Gregor and Haidy form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is S per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Gregor and Haidy agree to split production equally. Therefore, Gregor's profit is , and Haidy's profit is $ Suppose that Gregor and Haidy have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the…
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2. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.60 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. ? PRICE (Dollars per can) 1.00 Demand 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 MR MC = ATC 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) Monopoly Outcome When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce charge cans and per can.…
16-1. Two equal sized newspaper have an overlap in circulation of 10% (10% of the subscribers subscribe to both newspaper). Advertisers are willing to pay $10 to advertise in one newspaper but only $19 to advertise in both , because they’re are unwilling to pay twice to reach the same subscribers. What’s the likely bargaining negotiation outcome if the advertisers bargain by telling each newspaper that they’re going to reach an agreement with the other newspaper so the gains to reaching agreement are only $9? Suppose the two newspaper merge. What is the likely post merger bargaining outcome?
1. In a homogenous good Bertrand duopoly model with complete and symmetric information the Bertrand paradox arises because the firms compete using _________ as their choice variable. 2. Suppose there is an industry with nine firms where two of them have a market share of 0.2, three of them have a market share of 0.1 and the remaining firms have a market share of 0.075. The 4 firm concentration ratio is______. (two decimal accuracy)
Can you give us another Cinderella company successfully breaking into Oligopoly Jungle in the past and in the near future? Do you think the industry and exchange market of crypto currency (Bitcoin, Ethereum etc.) will be Oligopoly or Monopolistic competition in coming decade?
Sort each of the scenarios as to whether or not they are characteristic of price leadership. Assume that in all of the scenarios, the companies mentioned are the largest in their respective oligopolies. Characteristic of price leadership Not characteristic of price leadership Answer Bank Open collusion occurs between The Big Four accounting firms to fix prices. After a tax on junk food is passed, Cokesi decides to raise prices on soda, the first price increase since high fructose corn syrup prices spiked. A price war breaks out between the two primary detergent companies, UniGamble and Proctlever. Viscard chooses to set interest rates at below profit-maximizing rates in order to block entry of new firms. In a press release, Shell announces that it will be increasing prices on unleaded fuel.
(REAL-WORLD APPLICATION) You are NOT required to read the oligopoly chapter in the textbook, but you already know quite a lot about it from our discussion of strategic interactions using game theory in weeks 2-3. This market structure is between monopoly and monopolistic competition, with only a handful of firms having a high degree of market power. Let's refresh your memory with the following example. Assume that the Australian low-cost airline industry consists of two firms and their situation can be represented by the following payoff matrix. Tigar Air Nothing Low Price More Advertising 0, 16 6, 6 Nothing 10, 10 2, 14 Jetstar Low Price 16, 0 12, 4 More Advertising 14, 2 4, 12 8, 8 a. Before solving the game, put yourself in the position of Jetstar and write down your action. Then independent of that, put yourself in the position of Tiger Air and write down your action. b. State all the dominated strategies in the full game, by which strategy they are dominated, and whether weakly or…
15. Match the description provided in the bank of options with the appropriate concept in the second table. Bank of options Letter A Consumers agree X is prefered to Y when both have equal prices Consumer preferences are changed Consumers obtain more information about product characteristics Consumers are targeted with advertising Characteristic that is consumed as complementary to product itself One time cost to enter an industry changes when the market size increases A firm that is a leader obtains a higher profit in a dynamic game One time cost to enter an industry is treated as a parameter of model A firm that is a follower obtains a higher profit in a dynamic game Consumers do not agree X is prefered to Y when both have equal prices Industry with monopoly and perfect competition characteristics An empirical model used to estimate product differentiation В C E F G H I J K Concept Second mover advantage First mover advantage Vertical product differentiation Horizontal product…