4.10 Consider a market for electrical energy that is supplied by two generating com- panies whose cost functions are CA = 36 - PA $/h CB = 31 - PB S/h The inverse demand curve for this market is estimated to be л=120-DS/MWh Assuming a Cournot model of competition, use a table similar to the one used in Example 4.8 to calculate the equilibrium point of this market (price, quantity, production and profit of each firm). (Hint: Use a spreadsheet. A resolution of 5 MW is acceptable) 104 4.11 4 PARTICIPATING IN MARKETS FOR ELECTRICAL ENERGY Write and solve the optimality conditions for Problem 4.10. 4.10 PA = 25 MW; PB = 30 MW; D = 55 MW; л = 65 $/MWh; NA = $725; B = $1,020 4.11 PA = 26.33 MW; PB = 31.33 MW; D = 55 MW; л = 57.66 $/MWh; 2A = $694; B = $982

4.10 Consider a market for electrical energy that is supplied by two generating com- panies whose cost functions are CA = 36 - PA $/h CB = 31 - PB S/h The inverse demand curve for this market is estimated to be л=120-DS/MWh Assuming a Cournot model of competition, use a table similar to the one used in Example 4.8 to calculate the equilibrium point of this market (price, quantity, production and profit of each firm). (Hint: Use a spreadsheet. A resolution of 5 MW is acceptable) 104 4.11 4 PARTICIPATING IN MARKETS FOR ELECTRICAL ENERGY Write and solve the optimality conditions for Problem 4.10. 4.10 PA = 25 MW; PB = 30 MW; D = 55 MW; л = 65 $/MWh; NA = $725; B = $1,020 4.11 PA = 26.33 MW; PB = 31.33 MW; D = 55 MW; л = 57.66 $/MWh; 2A = $694; B = $982

Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)

16th Edition

ISBN:9781305506893

Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Publisher:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Chapter11: Price-searcher Markets With High Entry Barriers

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9CQ

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