4. Firm A and firm B must decide whether to sell product X at a sales or a regular price. If both firms sell the product at a sales price, both firms earn a profit of 5. If both firms sell the product at the regular price, each firm earns a profit of 20. If firm B charges the regular price while firm A charges the sales price, firm A earns a profit of 60 while firm B has a loss of 15. If firm A charges the regular price while firm B charges a sales price, firm B earns a profit of 60 while firm A has a loss of 15. (a) Use the information to construct a payoff matrix for firms A and B. (b) Does firm A have a dominant strategy? (c) Does firm B have a dominant strategy? d) What is the Nash Equilibrium for this game?

4. Firm A and firm B must decide whether to sell product X at a sales or a regular price. If both firms sell the product at a sales price, both firms earn a profit of 5. If both firms sell the product at the regular price, each firm earns a profit of 20. If firm B charges the regular price while firm A charges the sales price, firm A earns a profit of 60 while firm B has a loss of 15. If firm A charges the regular price while firm B charges a sales price, firm B earns a profit of 60 while firm A has a loss of 15. (a) Use the information to construct a payoff matrix for firms A and B. (b) Does firm A have a dominant strategy? (c) Does firm B have a dominant strategy? d) What is the Nash Equilibrium for this game?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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