4. Consider the following game. There are four distinct glasses of wine on a table: threeare red wine, and one is white. Two players must pick a glass of wine at the same time.If they choose the exact same glass of wine, then they each earn $1,000. Otherwise, theyearn nothing.Draw the payoff matrix. What is this game's Nash equilibrium (or equilibria)? What isthis game's focal point? Explain. (20%)5. Rational ignorance poses a serious problem for democracy, but can be partiallyresolved by implementing Skin in the Game policies. For example, consider the followinglaw: politicians who vote for war must enlist in the military, or have a family memberenlist. How does this law (a) fall under Skin in the Game; and (b) Resolve the problemof Rational Ignorance when it comes to foreign policy? (20%)

Red white White 0,0 1000,1000 Red 1000,1000 0,0

4. Consider the following game. There are four distinct glasses of wine on a table: three are red wine, and one is white. Two players must pick a glass of wine at the same time. If they choose the exact same glass of wine, then they each earn $1,000. Otherwise, they earn nothing. Draw the payoff matrix. What is this game's Nash equilibrium (or equilibria)? What is this game's focal point? Explain. (20%)

4. Consider the following game. There are four distinct glasses of wine on a table: three are red wine, and one is white. Two players must pick a glass of wine at the same time. If they choose the exact same glass of wine, then they each earn $1,000. Otherwise, they earn nothing. Draw the payoff matrix. What is this game's Nash equilibrium (or equilibria)? What is this game's focal point? Explain. (20%)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Refer to Table Left-Right-ZigZag. How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does this game have? Table: Left-Right-ZigZag Player 1 Drive left Driver right Zigzag 1) 1 2) 2 3) 3 4) 4 5) None of the above. Drive left (1,1) (-1,-1) (0,0) Player 2 Driver right (-1,-1) (1,1) (0,0) Zigzag (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
1. Consider the following N-player game. Each agent has a choice of strategy A or B. The state variable is x, the proportion of agents choosing strategy A. For every agent, the utility of choosing strategy A is U(A) = 10 +2x and the utility of choosing strategy B is U(B) = 10+3x. What is the Nash equilibrium to this game? Explain.
8) Consider the following game: There are 10 players. Each player is asked to write a number between 0 and 100. The player whose choice is closest to half of the average is the winner. Describe the game and discuss what would you expect to be the average number if the game were played in class with your colleagues. Do you expect them to play the Nash equilibrium strategy? Explain.
2. Consider the following "centipede game." The game starts with player 1 choosing be- tween terminate (T) and continue (C). If player 1 chooses C, the game proceeds with player 2 choosing between terminate (t) and continue (c). The two players choose be- tween terminate and continue in turn if the other player chooses continue until the terminal nodes with (player l's payoff, player 2's payoff) are reached as shown below. TTTT Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2 (3, 3) t (1, 1) (0, 3) (2, 2) (1, 4) (a) List all possible strategies of each player. (b) Transform the game tree into a normal-form matrix representation. (c) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (d) Find the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
John and Jane usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections. A. Diagram a game in which John and Jane choose whether to vote or not to vote.
You suspect that you are a price leader in the market. Moreover, you are considering expanding your operations. H.R. Shovenstuff will observe your moves and then follow, but he is more secretive so you will not know whether to price high or low after his pricing decision has been made. Using the following game tree, solve for the Nash equilibrium. High Price Shovenstuff High Price Low Price You High Price (2,1) (6,2) Invest Low Price Invest, High Price, High Price O Invest, Low Price, High Price Invest, Low Price, Low Price O Don't Invest, High Price, High Price Don't Invest, Low Price, High Price LOW Price (2,4) You High Price (4,4) Don't Invest High Price Low Price Shovenstuff Low Price You High Price (8,1) (2.6) Low Price (2,1)
1. Consider a game of chicken: two players approach a narrow bridge with room only for one, and each chooses either to go through and hope the other guy backs off (call this action H, for "hawk"), or backs off to let the other go through (call this action D, for "dove"). If both players are normal, then each gets a payoff of -1 from a collision (i.e. if both choose H), 1 if they choose H against D, 0 if they choose D (regardless of what the other player chooses). Now perturb the game as follows: there is a chance p > 0 that P2 is a “violent type", who gets 1 from playing H regardless of Pl's action, and -1 from playing D, again regardless of P1's action. (a) Illustrate the game tree corresponding to the Harsanyi transformation of this game (i.e. the dynamic game of imperfect information in which nature moves first). (b) Illustrate the extended game (i.e. the normal form game corresponding to your game tree in part (a)). (c) Find all values of p for which there is a BNE in which P1…
John and Jane usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections. A. Diagram a game in which John and Jane choose whether to vote or not to vote. B. Suppose John and Jane is in agreement not to vote during the election. 1.) Would such an agreement improve utility? Justify your answer. 2.) Would such an agreement be an equilibrium? Justify your answer.
Consider the payoff matrix for a game depicted below. Player 1 selects the row and Player 2 selects the column. Up Down Left 1, -1 -1, 1 Right -1, 1 1, -1 What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria)? Question 18Answer a. Player 1 plays right; Player 2 plays down b. Player 1 plays left; Player 2 plays down c. Player 1 plays down; Player 2 plays left d. Player 1 plays right; Player 2 plays up e. Player 1 plays up; Player 2 plays left f. There is no Nash equilibrium g. Player 1 plays down; Player 2 plays right h. Player 1 plays up; Player 2 plays right i. Player 1 plays left; Player 2 plays up