3. Consider a monopoly that sells a product to consumers with a constant marginal cost of $13.There are two potential consumers. As a prior belief, each consumer thinks that the product isworth either $29 or $19 with equal probability, and he/she learns the true value of the productafter trying it out. Each consumer may have a different perception of the value of the product,and these perceptions are independent events. The product is non-durable. Suppose thereare two periods, and each consumer demands at most one unit of the product in cach period.After the first period, a company named InfoteX could conduct an online marketing surveyto learn consumers' perceptions of the product. By purchasing the survey from InfoteX, themonopolist knows whether a consumer is happy with the product (i.., he/she thinks theproduct is worth $29 instead of $19 after trying out) or not, and can offer personalized pricesto customers in the second period. Then the monopolist should charge $_first period, and will be willing to pay up to $in theto buy the survey from InfoteX.

Monopolistic competition describes an industry in which a large number of enterprises compete for…

Answered: 3. Consider a monopoły that sells a…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Three consumers who want to buy a TV and a sound system have the following valuations for options offered by the store: (a) Assume that the dealer can charge only individual prices, one price for TV and one price for the Sound System. The goods are sold individually and are not bundled together, and any of the consumers may purchase either one or both goods separately. The store does not charge each consumer the price they are willing to pay but must charge the same price for all TV and the same price for all Sound Systems. What prices will the store charge for each item separately to maximize its total revenue from these three consumers, and what will be its total revenue? Please explain. Suppose that the store bundles TV and Sound Systems together and sells them as a bundle and does not sell them separately any longer. The consumers can no longer buy the goods separately, they will either have to buy a bundle containing both goods or buy nothing. The prices that the consumers…
4. An auctioneer holds a second-price auction for two bidders, Ann (A) and Bonnie (B), who have independent private values of the good 0, and 0g If a bidder wins, her payoff is her value 0 minus the price she pays, and if she loses, her payoff is 0. The values are independently and identically distributed, but otherwise you don't need to know the specific distributions to solve the problem. Ann and Bonnie's respective strategies are to bid some value b0), that is, bid given their privately-known value (type). e. Suppose the good had one true value for both bidders equal to the average of 0, and e, (signals that are still i.i.d.); hence, the good's true value has a common component. Suppose Ann knows Bonnie is going to bid her own evaluation 0, no matter what, but like normal, Ann doesn't know 0g. Explain why bidding 0, is now a strictly dominated strategy for Ann.
4. An auctioneer holds a second-price auction for two bidders, Ann (A) and Bonnie (B), who have independent private values of the good 0, and e, If a bidder wins, her payoff is her value 0 minus the price she pays, and if she loses, her payoff is 0. The values are independently and identically distributed, but otherwise you don't need to know the specific distributions to solve the problem. Ann and Bonnie's respective strategies are to bid some value b (0.). that is, bid given their privately-known value (type). a. Explain what a second price auction is, who wins given some pair of bids b, and bg. and what the winner pays. b. Why is a strategy where Ann bids above her own value 0, weakly dominated by a strategy where she bids her value? c. Why is a strategy where Ann bids below her own value e, weakly dominated by a A strategy where she bids her value? d. Applying the ideas from (b) and (c) to both Ann and Bonnie, what is the Weakly Dominant Strategy Equilibrium for this game?
9
Suppose that a well-known scientific fiction writer finishes a new book. The writer’s publisherfinds the demand curve for this new book is given by Q = 4200 − 200P, where P is its price. It will cost $2000 to set the book in type. This setup cost is necessary before any copies can be printed. In addition to the setup cost, there is a marginal cost of $8 per book for every book printed. Assume that the publisher wants to maximize the profit from this new book, and considers them-selves as a monopoly.(a) Write down the total revenue (T R(Q)), as a function of the quantity (Q).(b) Write down the total cost (T C(Q)), as a function of the quantity (Q).(c) Find the profit-maximizing quantity (Q∗).(d) Find the profit-maximizing price (P ∗).(e) What is the profit? Please just help with c,d,e
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1. One time your company needs cash and plans to auction off subsidiaries to the highest bidder. Mention the type of auction that will maximize your company's revenue from the sale if:a. Bidder is neutral on risk and has independent personal judgment?b. Bidder is risk-neutral and has an affiliated valuation estimate? 2. A manager will use a business strategy so that in the long run the company's profits will increase. The entry of competitors has an impact on the unfavorable profitability of the company. To deal with the entry of new competitors, a manager can consider the limit pricing strategy.a. Explain what is meant by limit pricing!b. How can the limit pricing strategy be effective? 3. It is known that the demand function of "I like" brand dry food companies in the monopolistic competition market is P = 100 - 2Q, while the cost function is TC = 5 + 2Q. in this case P = price level, Q = output level, and TC = total cost.a. Determine the combination of prices and production levels…
Suppose Island Bikes, a profit-maximizing firm, is the only bike rental company in a small resort town. The marginal cost to Island Bikes of renting out a bike is $3, and Island Bikes has no fixed costs. Each day Island Bikes has six potential customers, whose reservations prices are listed in the table. Reservation Price Customer ($/Rental) A B C D D E F O T Suppose Island Bikes knows that customers whose reservation prices are at least $10 always rent bikes before noon, while those whose reservation prices are below $10 never do so. If Island Bikes charges a different price in the morning and in the afternoon, then what will be its dally economic profit? O Multiple Choice O $27 $32 22 16 12 ē 8 $33 6 A 4 $39

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