Please correct answer and don't use hand rating 3 Game 3Give me a game (not the one from the lecture!) and a strictly increasing concave transformationsuch that player 1 has a strictly dominated strategy that becomes undominated as he becomesmore risk averse (when his utility is transformed by a strictly increasing, concave )

Reference:Kreps, David M. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton university press, 2020.…

Answered: 3 Game 3 Give me a game (not the one…

Microeconomics: Principles & Policy

14th Edition

ISBN:9781337794992

Author:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Publisher:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Chapter13: Between Competition And Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10DQ

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Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.
Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 Σ R 1 player I's payoff O player 2's payoff O player 3's payoff 000 2 a b 3 a 0 1 1 010 0 222 2 2 1 P 000 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.
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2. Consider the following Bayesian game with two players. Both players move simultaneously and player 1 can choose either H or L, while player 2's options are G, M, and D. With probability 1/2 the payoffs are given by "Game 1" : GMD H 1,2 1,0 1,3 L 2,4 0,0 0,5 and with probability 1/2 the payoffs are according to "Game 2" : G |M|D H 1,2 1,3 1,0 L 2,4 0,5 0,0 (a) Find the Nash Equilibria when neither player knows which game is actually played. (b) Assume now that player 2 knows which one among the two games is actually being played. Check that the game has a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
L 0 4 15.1 X₂ A M R 0 1 4 0 2 B L 4 0 с X3 M R 0 1 3 FIGURE 15.5 Exercise 15.1. Equilibrium Selection: Consider the extensive-form game in Figure 15.5. a. Find all the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game. b. Which of the Bayesian Nash equilibria are also perfect Bayesian equi- libria? Why?
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For the following simultaneous move game, we want to find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. ROWENA Safe 4*q + 4*(1-q) = Risky Safe 1 4,4 1,4 COLIN Risky 4,1 We denote Colin's mixture probability on Safe by q.. To find q in Colin's mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we apply indifference property to player Rowena 's expected payoffs from pure strategies in mixture: 6,6 +q+6 *(1-q)
Consider the following coordination game: Player 2P1 Comedy Show Concert Comedy Show 11,5 0,0 Concert 0,0 2,2 a. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) for this game.b. Now assume Player 1 and Player 2 have distributional preferences. Specifically, both people greatly care about the utility of the other person. In fact, they place equal weight on their outcome and the other person’soutcome, ρ = σ = ½. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) with these utilitarianpreferences.c. Now consider the case where Player1 and Player2 do not like each other. Specifically, any positive outcome for the other person is viewed as anegative outcome for the individual, ρ = σ = -1. Find the Nashequilibrium(s) with these envious preferences.

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3 Game 3 Give me a game (not the one from the lecture!) and a strictly increasing concave transformation such that player 1 has a strictly dominated strategy that becomes undominated as he becomes more risk averse (when his utility is transformed by a strictly increasing, concave )