2. 22 Art. 2 Pt. 1 GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES SECOND ARTICLE Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence. of God? We proceed thus to the Second Article:- Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then every thing was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. Obj. 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. Obj. 3. Further, whatever happens of neces- sity does, not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi. 5, 9, 10, 11): Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice. Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. Obj. 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a gov- ernor. But men are left to themselves by God, in accordance with the words: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand, of his own counsel (Ecclus. xv. 14). And par- ticularly in reference to the wicked: I let them go according to the desires of their heart (Ps. Exxx. 13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence. Obj. 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 9): God doth not care for oxen*: and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wis- dom: She reachetk from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly (Wis. viii. 1). I answer that, Certain persons totally de- nied the existence of providence, as Democri- tus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to provi- dence and corruptible things not in their indi- vidual selves, but only according to their spe- cies; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job xxll. 14): The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven. Rabbi Moses, however, ex- cluded men from the generality of things cor- ruptible, on account of the excellence of the Vulg., Doth God take care for oxen? 122 intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in gen- eral, but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causal- ity of the first agent extends. Whence it hap- pens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things cor- ruptible. Hence all things that exist in what- soever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: Those things that are of God are well ordered (Rom. xiii. 1). Since, therefore, as the provi- dence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that God knows all things, both universal and par-.. ticular. And since His knowledge may be com- pared to the things themselves, as the knowl- edge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art. Reply Obj. 1. There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For noth- ing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for in- stance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particu- lar, causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meet- ing of two servants, although to them it ap- pears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely † Vulg. Those powers that are, are ordained of God: Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinate sunt. St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: Que a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. 123 THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. Reply Obj. 2. It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is sub- ject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little de- fect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be con- trary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the genera- tion of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchir. ii): Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to pro- duce good even from evil. It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things-e.g., casual and evil things-as removed from the care of divine providence. Reply Obj. 3. Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in apply- ing art and virtue to his own use. Hence hu- man providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but di- vine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine provi- dence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the an- cients. Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force de- termined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational crea- tures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: In the hand of his own counsel. But since the very Pt. 1 Q. 22 Art. 3 act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happen- ing from the exercise of free will must be sub- ject to divine providence. For human provi- dence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final sal- vation. For to them that love God, all things work together unto good (Rom. viii. 28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to aban- don them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not pre- served in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine provi- dence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. Reply Obj. 5. Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is sub- ject to divine providence in an especial man- ner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it ac- cordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. THIRD ARTICLE Whether God Has Immediate Providence over Everything? We proceed thus to the Third Article:- Objection 1. It seems that God has not im- mediate providence over all things. For what- ever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to Go But it belongs to the dignity of a king, fat he should have minis- ters; through whe mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be with- drawn, 17) that, It is better to be ignorant of some Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchir. things than to know them, for example, vile things: and the Philosopher says the same
2. 22 Art. 2 Pt. 1 GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES SECOND ARTICLE Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence. of God? We proceed thus to the Second Article:- Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then every thing was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. Obj. 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. Obj. 3. Further, whatever happens of neces- sity does, not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi. 5, 9, 10, 11): Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice. Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. Obj. 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a gov- ernor. But men are left to themselves by God, in accordance with the words: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand, of his own counsel (Ecclus. xv. 14). And par- ticularly in reference to the wicked: I let them go according to the desires of their heart (Ps. Exxx. 13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence. Obj. 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 9): God doth not care for oxen*: and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wis- dom: She reachetk from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly (Wis. viii. 1). I answer that, Certain persons totally de- nied the existence of providence, as Democri- tus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to provi- dence and corruptible things not in their indi- vidual selves, but only according to their spe- cies; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job xxll. 14): The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven. Rabbi Moses, however, ex- cluded men from the generality of things cor- ruptible, on account of the excellence of the Vulg., Doth God take care for oxen? 122 intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in gen- eral, but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causal- ity of the first agent extends. Whence it hap- pens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things cor- ruptible. Hence all things that exist in what- soever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: Those things that are of God are well ordered (Rom. xiii. 1). Since, therefore, as the provi- dence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that God knows all things, both universal and par-.. ticular. And since His knowledge may be com- pared to the things themselves, as the knowl- edge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art. Reply Obj. 1. There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For noth- ing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for in- stance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particu- lar, causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meet- ing of two servants, although to them it ap- pears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely † Vulg. Those powers that are, are ordained of God: Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinate sunt. St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: Que a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. 123 THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. Reply Obj. 2. It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is sub- ject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little de- fect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be con- trary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the genera- tion of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchir. ii): Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to pro- duce good even from evil. It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things-e.g., casual and evil things-as removed from the care of divine providence. Reply Obj. 3. Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in apply- ing art and virtue to his own use. Hence hu- man providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but di- vine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine provi- dence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the an- cients. Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force de- termined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational crea- tures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: In the hand of his own counsel. But since the very Pt. 1 Q. 22 Art. 3 act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happen- ing from the exercise of free will must be sub- ject to divine providence. For human provi- dence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final sal- vation. For to them that love God, all things work together unto good (Rom. viii. 28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to aban- don them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not pre- served in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine provi- dence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. Reply Obj. 5. Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is sub- ject to divine providence in an especial man- ner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it ac- cordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. THIRD ARTICLE Whether God Has Immediate Providence over Everything? We proceed thus to the Third Article:- Objection 1. It seems that God has not im- mediate providence over all things. For what- ever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to Go But it belongs to the dignity of a king, fat he should have minis- ters; through whe mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be with- drawn, 17) that, It is better to be ignorant of some Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchir. things than to know them, for example, vile things: and the Philosopher says the same
Social Psychology (10th Edition)
10th Edition
ISBN:9780134641287
Author:Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers
Publisher:Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers
Chapter1: Introducing Social Psychology
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1RQ1
Related questions
Question
Read ST I.22.2. Since every agent acts for an end (a purpose or goal), the ordering of all
agents must extend back to the first cause. Thus, “all things that exist in whatsoever
manner are necessary directed by God to some end inasmuch as they participate in
existence.” Explain what this means. Why does God’s providence permit defects in
created things?
Transcribed Image Text:2. 22 Art. 2 Pt. 1
GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
SECOND ARTICLE
Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence.
of God?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:-
Objection 1. It seems that everything is not
subject to divine providence. For nothing
foreseen can happen by chance. If then every
thing was foreseen by God, nothing would
happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck
would disappear; which is against common
opinion.
Obj. 2. Further, a wise provider excludes
any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those
over whom he has a care. But we see many
evils existing. Either, then, God cannot
then, God cannot
hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or
else He does not have care for everything.
Obj. 3. Further, whatever happens of neces-
sity does, not require providence or prudence.
Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi. 5, 9, 10, 11): Prudence is the right reason
of things contingent concerning which there is
counsel and choice. Since, then, many things
happen from necessity, everything cannot be
subject to providence.
Obj. 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself
cannot be subject to the providence of a gov-
ernor. But men are left to themselves by God,
in accordance with the words: God made man
from the beginning, and left him in the hand,
of his own counsel (Ecclus. xv. 14). And par-
ticularly in reference to the wicked: I let them
go according to the desires of their heart (Ps.
Exxx. 13). Everything, therefore, cannot be
subject to divine providence.
Obj. 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor.
ix. 9): God doth not care for oxen*: and we
may say the same of other irrational creatures.
Thus everything cannot be under the care of
divine providence.
On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wis-
dom: She reachetk from end to end mightily,
and ordereth all things sweetly (Wis. viii. 1).
I answer that, Certain persons totally de-
nied the existence of providence, as Democri-
tus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the
world was made by chance. Others taught that
incorruptible things only were subject to provi-
dence and corruptible things not in their indi-
vidual selves, but only according to their spe-
cies; for in this respect they are incorruptible.
They are represented as saying (Job xxll. 14):
The clouds are His covert; and He doth not
consider our things; and He walketh about the
poles of heaven. Rabbi Moses, however, ex-
cluded men from the generality of things cor-
ruptible, on account of the excellence of the
Vulg., Doth God take care for oxen?
122
intellect which they possess, but in reference
to all else that suffers corruption he adhered
to the opinion of the others.
We must say, however, that all things are
subject to divine providence, not only in gen-
eral, but even in their own individual selves.
This is made evident thus. For since every
agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects
towards that end extends as far as the causal-
ity of the first agent extends. Whence it hap-
pens that in the effects of an agent something
takes place which has no reference towards
the end, because the effect comes from a cause
other than, and outside the intention of the
agent. But the causality of God, Who is the
first agent, extends to all being, not only as to
constituent principles of species, but also as
to the individualizing principles; not only of
things incorruptible, but also of things cor-
ruptible. Hence all things that exist in what-
soever manner are necessarily directed by God
towards some end; as the Apostle says: Those
things that are of God are well ordered
(Rom. xiii. 1). Since, therefore, as the provi-
dence of God is nothing less than the type of
the order of things towards an end, as we
have said; it necessarily follows that all things,
inasmuch as they participate existence, must
likewise be subject to divine providence. It
has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that
God knows all things, both universal and par-..
ticular. And since His knowledge may be com-
pared to the things themselves, as the knowl-
edge of art to the objects of art, all things
must of necessity come under His ordering;
as all things wrought by art are subject to the
ordering of that art.
Reply Obj. 1. There is a difference between
universal and particular causes. A thing can
escape the order of a particular cause; but
not the order of a universal cause. For noth-
ing escapes the order of a particular cause,
except through the intervention and hindrance
of some other particular cause; as, for in-
stance, wood may be prevented from burning,
by the action of water. Since then, all particu-
lar, causes are included under the universal
cause, it could not be that any effect should
take place outside the range of that universal
cause. So far then as an effect escapes the
order of a particular cause, it is said to be
casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause;
but if we regard the universal cause, outside
whose range no effect can happen, it is said
to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meet-
ing of two servants, although to them it ap-
pears a chance circumstance, has been fully
foreseen by their master, who has purposely
† Vulg. Those powers that are, are ordained of God: Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinate sunt. St. Thomas
often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: Que a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.
Transcribed Image Text:123
THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
sent them to meet at the one place, in such a
way that the one knows not about the other.
Reply Obj. 2. It is otherwise with one who
has care of a particular thing, and one whose
providence is universal, because a particular
provider excludes all defects from what is sub-
ject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one
who provides universally allows some little de-
fect to remain, lest the good of the whole
should be hindered. Hence, corruption and
defects in natural things are said to be con-
trary to some particular nature; yet they are
in keeping with the plan of universal nature;
inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to
the good of another, or even to the universal
good: for the corruption of one is the genera-
tion of another, and through this it is that a
species is kept in existence. Since God, then,
provides universally for all being, it belongs
to His providence to permit certain defects in
particular effects, that the perfect good of the
universe may not be hindered, for if all evil
were prevented, much good would be absent
from the universe. A lion would cease to live,
if there were no slaying of animals; and there
would be no patience of martyrs if there were
no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine
says (Enchir. ii): Almighty God would in no
wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless
He were so almighty and so good as to pro-
duce good even from evil. It would appear that
it was on account of these two arguments to
which we have just replied, that some were
persuaded to consider corruptible things-e.g.,
casual and evil things-as removed from the
care of divine providence.
Reply Obj. 3. Man is not the author of
nature; but he uses natural things in apply-
ing art and virtue to his own use. Hence hu-
man providence does not reach to that which
takes place in nature from necessity; but di-
vine providence extends thus far, since God
is the author of nature. Apparently it was this
argument that moved those who withdrew the
course of nature from the care of divine provi-
dence, attributing it rather to the necessity of
matter, as Democritus, and others of the an-
cients.
Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that God left
man to himself, this does not mean that man
is exempt from divine providence; but merely
that he has not a prefixed operating force de-
termined to only the one effect; as in the case
of natural things, which are only acted upon
as though directed by another towards an end;
and do not act of themselves, as if they directed
themselves towards an end, like rational crea-
tures, through the possession of free will, by
which these are able to take counsel and make
a choice. Hence it is significantly said: In the
hand of his own counsel. But since the very
Pt. 1 Q. 22 Art. 3
act of free will is traced to God as to a cause,
it necessarily follows that everything happen-
ing from the exercise of free will must be sub-
ject to divine providence. For human provi-
dence is included under the providence of God,
as a particular under a universal cause. God,
however, extends His providence over the just
in a certain more excellent way than over the
wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything
happening which would impede their final sal-
vation. For to them that love God, all things
work together unto good (Rom. viii. 28). But
from the fact that He does not restrain the
wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to aban-
don them: not that He altogether withdraws
His providence from them; otherwise they
would return to nothing, if they were not pre-
served in existence by His providence. This
was the reason that had weight with Tully,
who withdrew from the care of divine provi-
dence human affairs concerning which we take
counsel.
Reply Obj. 5. Since a rational creature has,
through its free will, control over its actions,
as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is sub-
ject to divine providence in an especial man-
ner, so that something is imputed to it as a
fault, or as a merit; and there is given it ac-
cordingly something by way of punishment or
reward. In this way the Apostle withdraws
oxen from the care of God: not, however, that
individual irrational creatures escape the care
of divine providence; as was the opinion of
the Rabbi Moses.
THIRD ARTICLE
Whether God Has Immediate Providence over
Everything?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:-
Objection 1. It seems that God has not im-
mediate providence over all things. For what-
ever is contained in the notion of dignity, must
be attributed to Go But it belongs to the
dignity of a king, fat he should have minis-
ters; through whe mediation he provides
for his subjects. Therefore much less has God
Himself immediate providence over all things.
Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to providence to
order all things to an end. Now the end of
everything is its perfection and its good. But
it appertains to every cause to direct its effect
to good; wherefore every active cause is a
cause of the effect of providence. If therefore
God were to have immediate providence over
all things, all secondary causes would be with-
drawn,
17) that, It is better to be ignorant of some
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchir.
things than to know them, for example, vile
things: and the Philosopher says the same
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ISBN:
9780134641287
Author:
Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers
Publisher:
Pearson College Div
Introduction to Sociology (Eleventh Edition)
Sociology
ISBN:
9780393639407
Author:
Deborah Carr, Anthony Giddens, Mitchell Duneier, Richard P. Appelbaum
Publisher:
W. W. Norton & Company
The Basics of Social Research (MindTap Course Lis…
Sociology
ISBN:
9781305503076
Author:
Earl R. Babbie
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Social Psychology (10th Edition)
Sociology
ISBN:
9780134641287
Author:
Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers
Publisher:
Pearson College Div
Introduction to Sociology (Eleventh Edition)
Sociology
ISBN:
9780393639407
Author:
Deborah Carr, Anthony Giddens, Mitchell Duneier, Richard P. Appelbaum
Publisher:
W. W. Norton & Company
The Basics of Social Research (MindTap Course Lis…
Sociology
ISBN:
9781305503076
Author:
Earl R. Babbie
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic Scien…
Sociology
ISBN:
9780134477596
Author:
Saferstein, Richard
Publisher:
PEARSON
Sociology: A Down-to-Earth Approach (13th Edition)
Sociology
ISBN:
9780134205571
Author:
James M. Henslin
Publisher:
PEARSON
Society: The Basics (14th Edition)
Sociology
ISBN:
9780134206325
Author:
John J. Macionis
Publisher:
PEARSON