to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But "more" and "less" are predi- cated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is some- thing which is truest, something best, some- thing noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God. The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intel- ligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all nat- ural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. Reply Obj 1. As Augustine says (Enchir. xi): Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, un- less His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good. Reply Obj. 2. Since nature works for a de- terminate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change and fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article. QUESTION 3 Of the Simplicity of God Lauradatio(In Eight Articles) WHEN the existence of a thing has been ascer- tained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we can- not know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not. Therefore, we must consider (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named. Waidjourde Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying of Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him-viz., composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in ma- terial things is imperfect and a part of some- thing else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity. ver Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body? (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? (3) Whether in Him there is composi- tion of quiddity, essence or nature, and sub- ject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? (6) Whether He is com- armee of reb uito dal motore Jaz s posed of subject and accident? (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things? idismes to b to galds UR FIRST ARTICLE Whether God Is a Body? กรม We proceed thus to the First Article:- Objection 1. It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimen- sions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea (Job xi. 8, 9). Therefore God is a body. Este Obj. 2. Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen. i. 26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: Who being the bright- ness of His glory and the figure, i.e., the image, of His substance (Heb. i. 3). Therefore God is a body.tes Obj. 3. Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes cor- THIRD ARTICLE Whether God Exists? We proceed thus to the Third Article:- Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be in- inite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few prin- ciples has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, suppos- ing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is na- ture; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence. On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: I am Who am (Exod. iii. 14). I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.. The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evi- dent to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for noth- ing can be in motion except it is in potential- ity to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the re- duction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and there- by moves and changes it. Now it is not pos- sible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be poten- tially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, be- cause then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in mo- tion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to it- self, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any in- termediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. There- fore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in exist- ence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have be- gun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence-which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some be- ing having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. The fourth way is taken from the gradation