2) Suppose $50,000 was bet in total on a race. $15,000 of this was place $2,000 was bet for Bella to place, and $1.200 was bet for Bubbly to place. The track's take is 15% a) What are the payout odds on Bella to place? b) If you bet $20 on Bella to place, what is your profit if you win? c) What are the payout odds on Bubbly to place? d) What is the $2 payout on Bubbly to place?

2) Suppose $50,000 was bet in total on a race. $15,000 of this was place $2,000 was bet for Bella to place, and $1.200 was bet for Bubbly to place. The track's take is 15% a) What are the payout odds on Bella to place? b) If you bet $20 on Bella to place, what is your profit if you win? c) What are the payout odds on Bubbly to place? d) What is the $2 payout on Bubbly to place?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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