1Y You have to decide whether to invest $100 in a friend's enterprise, where in a year's time the money will increase to $150. You have agreed that your friend will split the profits evenly each year with you. Your alternative is to keep at the bank at an interest rate of r. Suppose this game is played repeatedly infinitely often. The rate of interest between any two successive periods is r, the same as that in the bank and the same for you and your friend. What is the cut-off interest rate which will make cooperation possible? KI02

1Y You have to decide whether to invest $100 in a friend's enterprise, where in a year's time the money will increase to $150. You have agreed that your friend will split the profits evenly each year with you. Your alternative is to keep at the bank at an interest rate of r. Suppose this game is played repeatedly infinitely often. The rate of interest between any two successive periods is r, the same as that in the bank and the same for you and your friend. What is the cut-off interest rate which will make cooperation possible? KI02

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider the two-player game depicted below w А 1,5 2,2 0,4 3,11 В 13,0 4,1 2,5 4,2 с 1,3 2,6 5,2 2,0] a. What is Player 2's best response if Player 1 plays B? b. What is Player l's best response if Player 2 plays z? c. What are the pure strategy Nash Equilibria? సా
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