Consider the following sequential game:Player 1 plays first and can choose between L and R.Player 2 plays second and can choose between U and D.• If player 1 chooses L, player 2 does not get to play and both players get £1.If player 1 plays R, player 2 gets to play.If player 2 plays U then both players get £2.If player 2 plays D then player 2 gets £3 and player 1 gets £0.What the the outcome of the subgame perfect equilibrium?O a.£3-£0O b. £1-£1O c. This game does not have a subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium.O d. £0-£3O e.£2-£2

Subgame perfect nash equilibrium is one of the way to solve the game to get nash equilibrium.

Answered: Consider the following sequential game:…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

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3. Find ALL Nash equilibria of the following game: Nature begins by choosing one of the 2x2 games. It chooses the left game with probability a, and the right game with probability 1- a. Player 2 is INFORMED about nature's choice but player 1 IS NOT informed. L KR R 0,0| 5, 0,0 U 2, 2 0, 3 U D 3, 1, 1 D 1 Are there values of a for which there exists a mixed strategytequilibrium?
Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
Use the following game table to answer the question: Player 2 Y 6, 3 1, 3 A 10, 5 0,0 Player 1 B 2,6 0,0 3,5 3, 4 3, 3 Is the Nash equilibrium of this game for Player 1 to choose A and Player 2 to choose X? Why or why not? O It is; if Player 2 chose B or C they would get less than 10, and if Player 1 chose Y or Z they would get less than 5. It is not; Player 2 could get 6, instead of 5, if they chose B. O It is; if Player 1 chose B or C they would get less than 10, and if Player 2 chose Y or Z they would get less than 5. It is; if Player 2 chose B or C they would get less than 5, and if Player 1 chose Y or Z they would get less than 10. It is not; Player 1 could get 6, instead of 5, if they chose B.
Which of the following is NOT an example of a coordination game? O deciding whether to grow tomatoes or flowers coordination with customers O deciding whether to use the same technology as others you are connected to interpersonal relationships
2. Consider the following "centipede game." The game starts with player 1 choosing be- tween terminate (T) and continue (C). If player 1 chooses C, the game proceeds with player 2 choosing between terminate (t) and continue (c). The two players choose be- tween terminate and continue in turn if the other player chooses continue until the terminal nodes with (player l's payoff, player 2's payoff) are reached as shown below. TTTT Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2 (3, 3) t (1, 1) (0, 3) (2, 2) (1, 4) (a) List all possible strategies of each player. (b) Transform the game tree into a normal-form matrix representation. (c) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (d) Find the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
2
Consider the following simultaneous game. a. b. C. d. Player 1 U Player 2 L 8,8 3,0 R 3,3 8,3 What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria? Identify. Find whether there are any mixed-strategy equilibria. Assume now the game above is being modified as a sequential game where player 1 would move first and player 2 second. Find all Nash and subgame perfect equilibria for the game. Would a Nash equilibrium always be Pareto efficient? Use your answer in (a) to explain.
7
Question 28 Suppose the following game: I Player 1 nice nice Player 2 50, 50 mean 90,20 Which of the following is true? mean 20,90 30, 30 O Both players play "mean" with a 70 % chance, and "nice" with a 30% chance. O There is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, there is only one Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies. Both players play "nice" with a 70% chance, and "mean" with a 30% chance. There is no Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies, there is only one Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.

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