12. To advertise or not to advertise Suppose that two firms, Hatte Latte and Bean Bruuer, are the only sellers of espresso in some hypothetical market. The following payoff matrix gives the profit (in millions of dollars) earned by each company depending on whether or not it chooses to advertise: Bean Bruuer Advertise Doesn't Advertise Advertise 9,9 Hatte Latte Doesn't Advertise 3,15 15,3 11,11 For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Bean Bruuer advertises and Hatte Latte does not advertise, Bean Bruuer will make a profit of $15 million, and Hatte Latte will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Hatte Latte and Bean Bruuer are both profit-maximizing firms. If Hatte Latte chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ does not advertise. million if Bean Bruuer advertises and a profit of $ million if Bean Bruuer If Hatte Latte chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ does not advertise. million if Bean Bruuer advertises and a profit of $ million if Bean Bruuer If Bean Bruuer advertises, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it chooses If Bean Bruuer doesn't advertise, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it ch not to advertise to advertise Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independency, what strategies will they end up choosing? Both firms will choose not to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose not to advertise. Both firms will choose to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose not to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose to advertise.
12. To advertise or not to advertise Suppose that two firms, Hatte Latte and Bean Bruuer, are the only sellers of espresso in some hypothetical market. The following payoff matrix gives the profit (in millions of dollars) earned by each company depending on whether or not it chooses to advertise: Bean Bruuer Advertise Doesn't Advertise Advertise 9,9 Hatte Latte Doesn't Advertise 3,15 15,3 11,11 For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Bean Bruuer advertises and Hatte Latte does not advertise, Bean Bruuer will make a profit of $15 million, and Hatte Latte will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Hatte Latte and Bean Bruuer are both profit-maximizing firms. If Hatte Latte chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ does not advertise. million if Bean Bruuer advertises and a profit of $ million if Bean Bruuer If Hatte Latte chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ does not advertise. million if Bean Bruuer advertises and a profit of $ million if Bean Bruuer If Bean Bruuer advertises, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it chooses If Bean Bruuer doesn't advertise, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it ch not to advertise to advertise Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independency, what strategies will they end up choosing? Both firms will choose not to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose not to advertise. Both firms will choose to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose not to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose to advertise.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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
Transcribed Image Text:12. To advertise or not to advertise
Suppose that two firms, Hatte Latte and Bean Bruuer, are the only sellers of espresso in some hypothetical market. The following payoff matrix gives
the profit (in millions of dollars) earned by each company depending on whether or not it chooses to advertise:
Bean Bruuer
Advertise Doesn't Advertise
Advertise
Hatte Latte
Doesn't Advertise
9,9
3,15
15,3
11, 11
For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Bean Bruuer advertises and Hatte Latte does not advertise, Bean Bruuer will make a profit
of $15 million, and Hatte Latte will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Hatte Latte and Bean Bruuer are both
profit-maximizing firms.
If Hatte Latte chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of $
does not advertise.
million if Bean Bruuer advertises and a profit of $
million if Bean Bruuer
If Hatte Latte chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $
does not advertise.
million if Bean Bruuer advertises and a profit of $
million if Bean Bruuer
If Bean Bruuer advertises, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it chooses
not to advertise
If Bean Bruuer doesn't advertise, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it ch
to advertise
Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act muependently, what strategies will they end up choosing?
000
Both firms will choose not to advertise.
Hatte Latte will choose to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose not to advertise.
Both firms will choose to advertise.
Hatte Latte will choose not to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose to advertise.
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