10. BB has an endowment (E) which she can invest. With probability p, the investment works out well and BB ends up with E(1+r) but, with probability 1-p, BB loses all of her money. a) If BB is risk neutral, what is the lowest value of p for which she should invest? b) What is the expected value of perfect information? c) Now assume BB is risk averse with utility of money function U(m) = m12. What fraction, x, of her endowment should BR invest?

10. BB has an endowment (E) which she can invest. With probability p, the investment works out well and BB ends up with E(1+r) but, with probability 1-p, BB loses all of her money. a) If BB is risk neutral, what is the lowest value of p for which she should invest? b) What is the expected value of perfect information? c) Now assume BB is risk averse with utility of money function U(m) = m12. What fraction, x, of her endowment should BR invest?

Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781337091992

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter19: The Basic Tools Of Finance

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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Similar questions

10. BB has an endowment (E) which she can invest. With probability p, the investment works out well and BB ends up with E(1+r) but, with probability 1-p, BB loses all of her money. a) If BB is risk neutral, what is the lowest value of p for which she should invest? b) What is the expected value of perfect information? c) Now assume BB is risk averse with utility of money function U(m) = m1/2. What fraction, x, of her endowment should BB invest?
3. Sarah's current disposable income is £90,000. Suppose there's a 1% chance that Sarah's house may be flooded, and if it is, the cost of repairing it will be £80,000, reducing her disposable income to £10,000. Suppose also that her utility function of income M is: U = VM (a)Calculate Sarah's expected income and expected utility given the risk of flooding. (b)For her to take an insurance that fully insures her in the event of house flooding, Sarah would have to pay a price for such an insurance, which would reduce her disposable income. What would be the minimum certain disposable income required for Sarah to take an insurance that fully insures her in the event of house flooding? Explain your answer.
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Microeconomics Wilfred’s expected utility function is px1^0.5+(1−p)x2^0.5, where p is the probability that he consumes x1 and 1 - p is the probability that he consumes x2. Wilfred is offered a choice between getting a sure payment of $Z or a lottery in which he receives $2500 with probability p = 0.4 and $3700 with probability 1 - p. Wilfred will choose the sure payment if Z > CE and the lottery if Z < CE, where the value of CE is equal to ___ (please round your final answer to two decimal places if necessary)
3) A risk-loving individual has $1000 to invest. The individual maximizes his/her expected utility and has a monotonic utility function. Show that he/she will never choose a diversified portfolio - that is, show that he/she will either keep the entire $1000 in a safe, or invest the entire $1000 in a risky assesst, for which each $1 invested yields $] with probability p, and SB with probability (1-p), where $B<$1<$J.
# 4 Consider an individual with a utility function of the form u(w) = √w. The individual has an initial wealth of $4. He has two investments options available to him. He can eitffer keep his wealth in an interest-free account or he can take part in a particularly generous lottery that provides $12 with probability of 1/2 and $0 with probability 1/2. Assume that this person does not have to incur a cost if he decides to take part in the lottery. (a) Will this individual participate in the lottery? (b) Calculate this individual's certainty equivalent associated with the lottery. What is his risk premium?
2. Alice believes that her car would cost £12500 to replace if it was stolen or damaged. Based on crime statistics for the area she lives in, she believes that the probability of her car being stolen or damaged is 0.15. (i) Alice's utility function is given by U(w) = ln(w) for w > 0 and she as £35000 in the bank. Calculate how much Alice would be prepared to pay (in a single payment) to insure her car against theft or damage (ii) Repeat the calculation in the previous part but now assume Alice has £500000 in the bank.
5) A person with a current wealth of $100,000 who faces the prospect of 25 percent chance of losing his or her $20,000 automobile through theft during the next year. Suppose this person's utility function is U(Y) = InY. a). If this person takes no action, what is the expected utility? b). What is the actuarially fair premium? What is his expected utility if he purchase this insurance. c). Suppose that now the insurance company provides a new type of insurance. This insurance costs $4900 and requires the individual to incur the first $1000 of the loss from theft would yield. That is expected utility of this new insurance? Will the person choose the insurance in b) or c)?
4. Kate has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(x1,x2) = m7. She currently has $2025. a. Would she be willing to undertake a gamble that involves a gain $2875 with probability + and a loss of $1125 with probability ? Show your work and explain your answer. b. Would she be willing to undertake a gamble that involves a gain $2599 with probability and a loss of $800 with probability ? Show your work and explain your answer.
4) Luke is planning an around-the-world trip on which he plans to spend $10,000. The utility from the trip is a function of how much she spends on it (Y ), given by U(Y) = InY a). If there is a 25 percent probability that Luke will lose $1000 of his cash on the trip, what is the trip's expected utility. b). Suppose that Luke can buy insurance to fully against losing the $1,000 with a actuarially fair insurance. What is his expected utility if he purchase this insurance. Will he purchase the insurance? c). Now suppose utility function is U(Y) = Y/1000 What is his expected utility if he purchase the insurance in b). Will he purchase the insurance?
1. A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the occurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wagers W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and o if it does not. Assume that the Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = -e-rx with r>0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA?