Sarah's current disposable income is £90,000. Suppose there's a 1% chance that Sarah's house may be flooded, and if it is, the cost of repairing it will be £80,000, reducing her disposable income to £10,000. Suppose also that her utility function of income M is: U = VM (a)Calculate Sarah's expected income and expected utility given the risk of flooding. (b)For her to take an insurance that fully insures her in the event of house flooding, Sarah would have to pay a price for such an insurance, which would reduce her disposable income. What would be the minimum certain disposable income required for Sarah to take an insurance that fully insures her in the event of house flooding? Explain your answer.

Sarah's current disposable income is £90,000. Suppose there's a 1% chance that Sarah's house may be flooded, and if it is, the cost of repairing it will be £80,000, reducing her disposable income to £10,000. Suppose also that her utility function of income M is: U = VM (a)Calculate Sarah's expected income and expected utility given the risk of flooding. (b)For her to take an insurance that fully insures her in the event of house flooding, Sarah would have to pay a price for such an insurance, which would reduce her disposable income. What would be the minimum certain disposable income required for Sarah to take an insurance that fully insures her in the event of house flooding? Explain your answer.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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