1. When both Player 1 and Player 2 set their prices at $15 per hour, can Player 2 improve her situation by changing her price? a. no b. yes c. cannot be determined with the given information 2.When both Player 1 and Player 2 set their prices at $15 per hour, which of the following occurs? a. Both Player 1 and Player 2 want to change their actions. b. Neither Player 1 nor Player 2 wants to choose a different action. c. Player 1 wants to change her price to $10 per hour, but Player 2 still wants to charge $15 an hour. d. Player 1 does not want to change and Player 2 does want to change. 3. What is Player 2 dominant strategy? a. $10 b. $15 c. First charge $10 and then later switch to $15 d. Player 2 does not have a dominant strategy 4.The Nash equilibrium in the babysitter game is: a.($10, $10) b.($15, $15) c.($15, $10) d.($10, $15)
1. When both Player 1 and Player 2 set their prices at $15 per hour, can Player 2 improve her situation by changing her
a. no
b. yes
c. cannot be determined with the given information
2.When both Player 1 and Player 2 set their prices at $15 per hour, which of the following occurs?
a. Both Player 1 and Player 2 want to change their actions.
b. Neither Player 1 nor Player 2 wants to choose a different action.
c. Player 1 wants to change her price to $10 per hour, but Player 2 still wants to charge $15 an hour.
d. Player 1 does not want to change and Player 2 does want to change.
3. What is Player 2 dominant strategy?
a. $10
b. $15
c. First charge $10 and then later switch to $15
d. Player 2 does not have a dominant strategy
4.The Nash equilibrium in the babysitter game is:
a.($10, $10)
b.($15, $15)
c.($15, $10)
d.($10, $15)
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