1. Suppose simultaneous moves are introduced into a two-stage game of complete and perfect information. How does the description of the game change? a. One-stage game b. Three-stage game c. Incomplete Information d. Imperfect Information 2. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we denote the Nash equilibrium of stage 2? a. (aż (a₁, a₂), a4 (α₁, α₂)) b. (az (aj, aż), a4(a₁, a₂)) c. (a3(a₁, A₂), a4 (α₁, α₂)) d. (az (a₁, a₂), a¹(a₁, až)) 3. How come players in stage 1 can anticipate the Nash equilibrium in stage 2? a. Perfect Information b. Complete Information c. Imperfect Information d. Incomplete Information 4. Which of the following is a solution of a static game of complete but imperfection information? a. Iterated Elimination b. Nash Equilibrium c. Backwards Induction d. Subgame Perfection 5. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we denote the subgame-perfect outcome? a. (a₁, a₂, až (α₁, α₂), a(α₁, α₂)) b. (a, a, a, (a₁, a₂), a (a₁, ₂)) c. (a, a, a3 (a₁, a₂), a4 (α₁, α₂)) (a₁, a₂, a (a₁, a₂), a (a₁, ₂)) d.

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1. Suppose simultaneous moves are introduced into a two-stage game of complete and
perfect information. How does the description of the game change?
a. One-stage game
b. Three-stage game
c. Incomplete Information
d. Imperfect Information
2. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we
denote the Nash equilibrium of stage 2?
a. (az (a₁, a₂), a (α₁, α₂))
b. (az (a₁, a₂), a4 (α₁, α₂))
c. (az (a₁, A₂), a4 (α₁, α₂))
d. (a(a₁, a₂), a (a₁, ₂))
3. How come players in stage 1 can anticipate the Nash equilibrium in stage 2?
a. Perfect Information
b. Complete Information
c. Imperfect Information
d. Incomplete Information
4. Which of the following is a solution of a static game of complete but imperfection
information?
a. Iterated Elimination
b. Nash Equilibrium
c. Backwards Induction
d. Subgame Perfection
5. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we
denote the subgame-perfect outcome?
a. (a, a, a (a₁, a₂), a (α₁, ₂))
b. (a, a, a, (a₁, až), α₁ (α₁, ₂))
c. (a, a, a3 (a₁, A₂), α₁ (α₁, α₂))
(a₁, a, a (a₁, a₂), a (a₁, a₂))
d.
Transcribed Image Text:1. Suppose simultaneous moves are introduced into a two-stage game of complete and perfect information. How does the description of the game change? a. One-stage game b. Three-stage game c. Incomplete Information d. Imperfect Information 2. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we denote the Nash equilibrium of stage 2? a. (az (a₁, a₂), a (α₁, α₂)) b. (az (a₁, a₂), a4 (α₁, α₂)) c. (az (a₁, A₂), a4 (α₁, α₂)) d. (a(a₁, a₂), a (a₁, ₂)) 3. How come players in stage 1 can anticipate the Nash equilibrium in stage 2? a. Perfect Information b. Complete Information c. Imperfect Information d. Incomplete Information 4. Which of the following is a solution of a static game of complete but imperfection information? a. Iterated Elimination b. Nash Equilibrium c. Backwards Induction d. Subgame Perfection 5. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we denote the subgame-perfect outcome? a. (a, a, a (a₁, a₂), a (α₁, ₂)) b. (a, a, a, (a₁, až), α₁ (α₁, ₂)) c. (a, a, a3 (a₁, A₂), α₁ (α₁, α₂)) (a₁, a, a (a₁, a₂), a (a₁, a₂)) d.
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