1) Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price p1 and firm 2 charges price p2, then their respective demands are q1 = 12 – 2pi + P2 and 92 = 12 + P1 – 2p2. So this is like Bertrand competition, except that when pi > p2, firm 1 still gets a positive demand for its product. Regulation does not allow either firm to charge a price higher than 20. Both firms have a constant marginal cost c = 4. (a) Construct the best reply function BR1(p2) for firm 1. That is, Pi the optimal price for firm 1 if it is known that firm 2 charges a price p2. Construct a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for this game. Are there any Nash equilibria in mixed strategies? If yes, construct one; if no provide a justification. BR1 (P2) is || (1) N

1) Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price p1 and firm 2 charges price p2, then their respective demands are q1 = 12 – 2pi + P2 and 92 = 12 + P1 – 2p2. So this is like Bertrand competition, except that when pi > p2, firm 1 still gets a positive demand for its product. Regulation does not allow either firm to charge a price higher than 20. Both firms have a constant marginal cost c = 4. (a) Construct the best reply function BR1(p2) for firm 1. That is, Pi the optimal price for firm 1 if it is known that firm 2 charges a price p2. Construct a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for this game. Are there any Nash equilibria in mixed strategies? If yes, construct one; if no provide a justification. BR1 (P2) is || (1) N

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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