Short paper GOVT322

docx

School

George Mason University *

*We aren’t endorsed by this school

Course

322

Subject

Sociology

Date

Apr 3, 2024

Type

docx

Pages

5

Uploaded by hilliardmika

Report
Hilliard 1 Mika I. Hilliard Professor Kayser GOVT 332 17 March 2024 "Understanding Why War Occurs: An Analysis of Fearon's and Jervis's Theories" Understanding why war happens is important to preventing it from occurring. Fearon’s theory discusses how miscommunications and lack of information can be a trigger point for war while Jervis’s theory centers on the offense-defense balance and how military power can influence state interactions. The theories and arguments offered by both Fearon and Jervis on why conflict begins in states both offer valuable insight into the roots of wars, however, Fearon’s theory is more applicable and flexible to most situations and has a more comprehensive and realistic understanding of how complex state to state communications and diplomatic negotiations can be. Jervis’s theory deals with miscalculations in offense-defense balance and capabilities. It is only confined to looking at a state’s military capabilities, making it more narrow in scope compared to Fearon’s theory. Comparing both theories will make it clear that Fearon’s theory is broader and is more flexible and is a more rational argument for the causes of war. According to Fearon's theory, war often starts when a state lacks the necessary information, causing it to wrongly judge other countries' power and resolve, leading to conflict between the two (Fearon 381). The independent variable in Fearon’s theory is the lack of information and miscommunication while the dependent variable is war, this is all rooted in rationale. Fearon subscribes to the rationalist explanation which posits a few things: war is sometimes the rational choice for leaders as the benefits outweigh potential losses and
Hilliard 2 neorealism and rational beliefs are the same thing (Fearon 380). However, Fearon states that the theory has a few flaws as states continue to engage in military action even when both would prefer to end the fight, this is chalked up due to miscalculations in bargaining (Fearon 382). Leaders in prewar bargaining situations tend to misrepresent their capabilities and intentions to the other party to gain a better deal for themselves. States have an interest in over exaggerating the information given to others in order to hold on to the upper hand, or at least perceive to hold on to it. Deliberate strategies are made by leaders to mislead other states into thinking the information that was given to them is correct (Fearon 381). Additionally, even though both states and leaders may desire peace their inability to trust each other is another barrier to achieving peaceful conflict resolution for both. Fearon states that even if war is beneficial to both sides to secure an agreement, both states would almost always rather not engage in conflict as it is always associated with some losses (383). The current arguments surrounding the causes of war of anarchy, rational preventative war, and expected benefits exceed expected costs all don’t explain why conflicts can’t be resolved through means of diplomatic communication or other negotiation tactics. According to Fearon, the main sources of military conflict aren’t necessarily wrong information but rather that states are incentivized to misrepresent themselves to secure the best bargain. This misrepresentation or exaggerations by states can make it seem like they are more willing and more capable to fight as they believe by acting in this kind of behavior the other side may be more willing to make concessions or prevent future fighting. The opposite is true as well, states may downplay how willing they are to fight in order to deter and mislead their opponents. An example of this is Jervis’ main argument for the roots of conflict stems from a state’s military power and capabilities.
Hilliard 3 Fearon and Jervis both have compelling theories about why states choose to engage in war rooted in miscalculation, however, Fearon’s argument is more convincing due to its versatility in situations as well as the insinuations implied of how states function with each other. Fearon’s model centers on the strategic nature of information and trust/mistrust during state to state negotiations. Misrepresentation of information can lead to misperceptions about the intentions and capabilities of adversaries, while commitment problems undermine the ability of states to trust one another of states to properly stick to agreements, and issue indivisibilities can create situations where states believe that their current bargains are unable to come to a consensus. Wars often begin not because one state genuinely wants to engage in conflict, but because diplomatic negotiations have failed - due to negotiations miscalculations or an inability to accurately assess the other side’s intentions and capabilities. Fearon’s theory works well with the complicated nature of current global wars and offers more in-depth insights into today's intricate international relations. Both Fearon and Jervis contribute unique perspectives to the study of international relations and conflict analysis field. While Jervis's offense-defense balance theory provides a great framework for understanding some military conflicts, Fearon's model more broadly applies to more conflicts overall. When looking at the versatility and depth of each one, Fearon's theory of miscalculations in negotiations stands out as more convincing and rooted in rationale. Its versatility and attention to the complexities of state-to-state interactions provide a better comprehensive explanation for why states might start a war despite being able to maintain peace as well as the huge potential consequences of loss from conflict. In understanding the causes of war and working towards global peace, Fearon's reflections on the shortcomings in negotiation
Your preview ends here
Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version
  • Access to all documents
  • Unlimited textbook solutions
  • 24/7 expert homework help
Hilliard 4 processes offer the international community a different perspective on how to engage in more effective diplomatic engagements in order to secure peace for all.
Hilliard 5 Work Cited Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July. Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics , vol. 30, no. 2, 1978, pp. 167–214. JSTOR , https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958. Accessed 22 Mar. 2024.