Suicide Terrorism

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Nov 24, 2024

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Running Head: SUICIDE TERRORISM 1 Suicide Terrorism Student's Name Institutional Affiliation Suicide Terrorism
SUICIDE TERRORISM 2 The security dilemma theory or the offense-defense theory is an approach that is commonly used in both the analysis of foreign policy and international relations scholarship. The theory is also employed in various policy and theoretical issues such as conventional arms control, nuclear strategy ad policy, military cooperation and competition, military doctrine, comparative grand strategy, and alliance behavior. During World War I, the offense-defense theory was used to predict the size and number of independent states and the future of political relations in the international system in post-Cold War Europe; to criticize the grand strategy of the US, the explanations of the causes of World War I, revolutionary states' foreign policies, and the causes and possible solutions of civil and ethnic wars (Van Evera, 2019). However, there are several benefits and drawbacks in applying the offense vs. defense theory, particularly in response to maritime and suicide terrorism. Two key variables help define and describe the theory in the offense-defense view. The two variables include the offense-defense distinguishability and the offense-defense balance. The definition of the offense-defense balance from the offense-defense literature may define it through the cost ratio offense to defense. As a result, in the phenomenon of maritime terrorism through the cost ratio offense to defense lenses, the offense may offer several advantages. They include the following: (1) offense model is necessary when a large portion of states' territory change hands due to war; (2) when the costs of capturing territory are less or inadequate than the value of the territory itself; (3) when weapons possess specific characteristics such as mobility and long-range; (4) when there is an incentive to strike first, rather than to absorb the other strike first; (5) when the defender has to offset investment in the offensive forces to outspend the attacker; (6) when its way easier to destroy and take the territory of the opposing army (Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019).
SUICIDE TERRORISM 3 Nonetheless, the offensive approach in the case of suicide terrorism or a phenomenon of maritime terrorism, several considerations have to be outlined while using the offense-defense model. When a government takes advantage of the offensive model in dealing with such terrorism, it becomes impossible for the country to simultaneously enjoy high levels of security if the terrorist group measures up with the government or has equal arms size. An offensive approach will create a situation whereby the terrorist forces can be forced to add to their troops if the government forces are added to restore their ability to defend (Van Evera, 2019). Therefore, an arms and troops race is enhanced and intense with time. In addition, there are a variety of reasons as to why the offense advantage makes war more likely to occur. First, governments will find conflict more attractive if the conflict is decisive, quick, and profitable. Second, countries seeking security will find conflict more attractive if they find valuability in expanding their territories, making the state more insecure. Third, the probability of an increase in crises is likely to escalate through accidents and preemptive attacks. In turn, with offense advantage, the advantage of striking first grows. The offense-defense theory's pros and cons can also be evaluated from the definition of the government's ability to successfully defend, deter, and attack through its military missions. Such definition of the offense-defense theory strikes the partial theory of a country's military capabilities. Two additional variables would make this definition more complete: the state's ability to assess adversaries' strategy and forces and design military strategies through its practical employability of military technology and the country's power, measured by the availability of relative resources (Vego, 2019). Under certain circumstances, each of these variables has the capabilities of overwhelming any party involved in a conflict, especially if the conflict involves a country and terrorists in a maritime terrorism attack. The offense-defense
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SUICIDE TERRORISM 4 variables play crucial roles in structural realism, such as contingent and defensive realism. Such is the case because the two versions of realism focus on military missions and countries' ability to perform them. Moreover, despite its status as a growth industry, the utility of the offense-defense theory can be questioned through several arguments. For instance, one of the critics of this approach is a lack of an agreed definition of the key independent variable in offense-defense balance, implying that the foundations of the approach in tackling terrorism are underdeveloped (Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019). As a result, its application to conflict management and decision-making process to terrorism acts such as maritime terrorism and suicidal terrorism becomes inconsistent and unreliable. Second, offense-defense balance cannot be measured through the offense-defense theory, which is among one of the most notable flaws of the theory and inclusive of many other inherent flaws. Such is the case because of the uncertain nature of the outcomes of conflicts and wars. The long-term and short-term parameters of the offense-defense approach can also be criticized in terms of maritime terrorism acts. Maritime terrorism is defined by the activities and acts of terrorism using fixed platforms, in ports, using or against vessels, coastal settlements or facilities, or any passengers or personnel in the vessel (Vego, 2019). These acts of terrorism occur within the maritime environs and may also occur on international waters where no particular country authorizes or has laws that govern such maritime territory. Therefore, any act of terrorism in such areas makes applying the offense-defense approach impact long-term and short-term success solutions. In the offensive model, the short-term strategies include tactical operations and intelligence. In suicide, terrorism acts, the short-term tactical operations strategy may not be effective since such terrorism tends to happen abruptly without knowing
SUICIDE TERRORISM 5 governments and their preparedness. As a result, tactical operations and intelligence may not prevent such occurrences and may have minimal impacts on the prevention measures. In addition, the short-term strategies of the defensive model include reconstruction, crisis management, and prevention. While coping with suicide terrorism, the short-term defensive model may be appropriate if the acts of suicide are predictable or a state is tipped off of such event before happening. However, most suicide terrorism acts are abrupt and unknown; hence the defensive models of the short-term strategies may not be appropriate. In the long-term offensive model, most strategies coming from the criminal justice model include operations against terrorist infrastructure, law enforcement, trials of leaders, among others. These long-term strategies may be feasible in dealing with suicide terrorism acts because such acts can be mitigated through special operations against the various infrastructures where such acts are planned. Concurrently, the long-term strategies for the defensive model under the reconciliation model include several considerations for the grievances of the constituency, negotiations with moderate leaders, and the creation of a trust. In the case of suicide terrorism, the long-term defensive model strategies may not be feasible due to the circumstances and nature in which such suicide terrorist acts occur. Such strategies may not be effective unless in situations where the suicide terrorist is identified earlier before accomplishing their terror mission. Therefore, governments and those in militaty leadership must focus on an offense-defense balance approach to cope with suicide terrorism (Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019). There is a need to emphasize the close relationship between the feasibility of measuring the offense-defense balance and the feasibility of net assessment to tackle the critical policy, theoretical, and historical questions related to the potentially growing literature of offense-defense theory.
SUICIDE TERRORISM 6 References
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SUICIDE TERRORISM 7 Garfinkel, B., & Dafoe, A. (2019). How does the offense-defense balance scale? Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), 736–763. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631810 Van Evera, S. (2019). Offense-Defense Theory and the Outbreak of World War I. In Causes of War (pp. 193–239). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801467196-009 Vego, M. N. (2019). Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial : Theory and Practice. New York, NY : Routledge.