Philosophy Section 1 Guiding Questions
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Week of January 15
What is an amoralist? What challenge does the amoralist pose to morality?
The amoralist is a figure proposed by Bernard Williams that is a sort of attractive alternative to morality.
The amoralist is someone who seems indifferent to moral requirements, living outside of morality, rather
than having a genuine desire to treat others with consideration and respect. Might think of some of
Tolentino’s scammers, who don't really seem to care at all about whether they are taking advantage of
others to get ahead in their own lives. The challenge that the amoralist poses to morality concerns is
surrounding the idea that human social life presupposes cooperation, and this is possible only because
people by and large comply with basic moral standards in their interactions with each other. We need to
be able to count on people to speak truthfully, keep their word, etc. without trust, we can't effectively
achieve our individual ends. The amoralist doesn't deny this but asks: why should I care about being
trustworthy myself, so long as enough other people are willing to invest trust in each other to keep
cooperation going? (ex. Tolentino's definition of the scam “the abuse of trust for profit” which only works
if other people are by and large trustworthy)
Why can’t amoralists experience resentment, or take pride in how courageous they are?
The amoralist is someone who seems indifferent to moral requirements, living outside of morality, rather
than having a genuine desire to treat others with consideration and respect. Someone genuinely
impervious to moral considerations will ex. not see it as a problem with scamming that it takes advantage
of the vulnerable, or enables them to amass wealth through fraud or exploitation. Williams thinks if this is
your position, then you are also not entitled to resent others when they exploit or defraud or take
advantage of you, or when they treat you unfairly. Resentment presupposes that it is wrong to treat people
unfairly or exploitatively (objectivism about moral standards), and that its being wrong is a strong reason
not to act in these ways (objectivism about moral reasons). Our natural tendency to resent it when we are
treated unfairly or taken advantage of suggests that most of us acknowledge that there are reasons to
respect moral standards in our interpersonal relations. Some scammers and the like might take an attitude
of self-congratulation, thinking that they are admirable or heroic in some way in virtue of their rejection
of (bourgeois) moral standards—may be courageous in facing up to the fact that our conduct isn’t really
subject to moral constraints (“YOLO!”). Williams thinks this too is a potentially incoherent thought,
presupposing objective moral standards of virtue that everyone has good reason to care about.
Williams thinks that, if amoralists are all psychopaths, that wouldn’t pose much of a challenge to
morality. Explain this suggestion.
The psychopath does not have the potential for morality, and is completely indifferent to the welfare and
suffering of other people (including those who are close to them). This is a coherent possibility, something
that is sometimes depicted in literature and film, and possibly even exhibited in some real or hypothetical
public figures. But the life of a psychopath is not very attractive: it is bleak, devoid of significant
relationships or real joy, containing no achievements that are worthy of admiration or emulation. Williams
says the psychopath is not a threat to morality, because no sane person would
really want to live that way. Since Williams suggests that no sane person would willingly want to live as a
psychopath, and an amoralist interested in self-gain and able to manipulate others must be rational to a
certain extent, so amoralists living as psychopaths wouldn't threaten the moral standards of other people
since they would live a more isolated life.
How is Williams’s amoralist gangster different from his amoralist psychopath? Does the difference make
the gangster a more attractive alternative to the moral agent? Why or why not?
The movie gangster is “the ruthless and rather glamorous figure who cares about his mother, his
child, even his mistress”. The gangster, unlike the psychopath, is capable of having meaningful
relationships and concern for others, rather than living a solely selfish life. Gangsters can still be amoral,
seeing as they don't care for the morality of everyone (only specific people), so they still choose to be
ruthless and even cruel towards others whom they don't love. But they are still outside morality, insofar as
they don’t acknowledge that the interests of all persons count for something; they are willing to be
ruthless or cruel with people they don’t happen to love.Perhaps the scammer is a better example of this
than the gangster someone willing to exploit the vulnerable for gain, but who would not take advantage of
their own mother or their children.This makes gangsters more attractive than psychopaths since the few
valued relationships a gangster has can add meaning to their life, and they can experience genuine love,
whereas a psychopath leads a desolate life.
Explain the difference between partial altruism, and the kind of impartial concern for others
characteristic of morality.
- Partial altruism implies that there is a bias to have altruistic concern only for the people the individual
already cares about or is related to. The scammer just described has some sympathy for others, some
altruistic concern for their interests; but it is partial, limited to people they happen to care about or to be
related to. Note that some degree of partial altruistic concern (for offspring, e.g.) is plausibly part of our
evolutionary heritage and biological nature, something without which we would arguably not have been
able to survive as a species and transmit our genetic information to our descendants.
- Impartial concern means some degree of care is given for the interest of anybody, even if you don't have
a personal relationship with them. Moral standards, by contrast, require some degree of impartial
sympathy or concern for the interests of anybody; that’s why it is wrong to abuse the trust of a person for
gain, even if they aren’t your friend or your mother.
Week of January 22
What is the Euthyphro problem? Relate this problem to Kretzmann’s distinction between
Theological Subjectivism (TS) and Theological Objectivism (TO).
Is what our god tells us to do good just because god has told us to do it, or does god tell us to do what is
good for some other reason? This theory deals with the question of why does god command or approve of
what he does? Plato's Euthyphro essentially creates the dilemma of, "Do the gods love piety because it is
pious, or is it pious because they love it?". "Does god command morally right actions because they are
morally right (T.O.); or are they morally right because God commands them (T.S.)?" Does something
exist as such prior to god acknowledging it, or is it created once god states so? Theological Objectivism:
assumes that actions are morally right or morally wrong, independent of whether God commands it;
objective moral standards (they do not change); presupposes moral standards. Theological Subjectivism:
moral standards depend on god's will or attitude of approval; moral standards DEPEND on god's opinion
(subjective opinion).
What is Theological Subjectivism (TS)? Why does Kretzmann think that (TS) leads to the
“destruction of the basis of morality” (5)?
Theological Subjectivism is the perspective that God's will or attitude is what makes something morally
right or wrong. If God commands it, then it must be morally right because he said so. Moral standards are
entirely dependent on whether or not it is approved or rejected by God himself, making it a subjective
opinion. T.S. denies the existence of moral standards outside of what god commands, but in doing so,
makes moral standards objective to us, since they are independent of our beliefs and attitudes. So long as
God commands something as right or wrong, it will exist as such, regardless if we believe it to be right or
wrong. T.S. makes the content of morality to be arbitrary. Kretzmann argues that to believe T.S. would
then be to believe in the idea that literally any action can be deemed morally correct, so long as god
commands or approves it. T.S. would then be morally accepting of a father to sacrifice his son if god
commanded it, like in Abraham and Isaac; or for rich people to scam the vulnerable for profit. Because of
the way T.S. allows for the distortion of moral standards, by simply excusing behaviors as "god's will,"
Kretzmann argues that T.S. leads to the "destruction of the basis of morality".
Kretzmann writes (6): “if (TO) is right, the answer to the question ‘What does God have to do
with morality?’ is ‘Nothing essential’.” Explain this claim.
Theological Objectivism is the stance that moral standards are objective, in that what is right and wrong
exists independently of whether God says so or not. A basic problem with this option is that it doesn’t
really explain the objectivity of moral standards. It is assumed that certain kinds of actions would be
morally right and wrong, prior to and independently of God's commands. We do not explain objective
moral standards by appeal to god’s commands, rather we explain why god commands what he does by
appeal to objective moral standards.So this claim is merely stating that God does not influence morality,
according to (T.O.). "Nothing essential", as in God is not the essential component in dictating what is
moral or immoral. God is the messenger of morality, but is not the determinant behind morality.
If god commands that we comply with moral standards, does that give everyone a good reason
for complying with them?
God's commands are backed by the threat of divine punishment, which does give some kind of reason for
people to care about morality (assuming they subscribe to the idea of god). Ex. going to hell if diverging
from what god's will or intention commanded to be morally right or wrong, this is what “recommends” or
“speaks in favor” of doing the right thing”. However, the threat of punishment is a prudential, or
self-interested, reason to behave a certain way. So while God's commands might come with a reason for
some people to behave a certain way, this would constitute Kretzmann's idea of prudent behavior as
opposed to truly moral behavior. In short, yes God's commands give a certain reason, but should we
follow that reason, it basically cancels out the morality of the action. Not the RIGHT kind of reason to
behave or act in a moral way, so not a GOOD reason to do so.
What is “veneer theory”? What is de Waal’s basic objection to this way of thinking about
morality and human nature?
The idea that humanity is inherently "selfish and brutish [in] nature," and any observable moral conduct
we see among each other in society is merely a thin "veneer" of civilization that is actually resting on and
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masking our true nature. States that we are egoistic animals at our core, but unlike other animals in the
animal kingdom, we exhibit "cultural overlay" of cooperative conduct so that we may get along with each
other. De Waal's basic objection lies in his belief that humanity is not inherently egoistic. He thinks it's in
human nature to have "pro-social tendencies" which we display via our social emotions (empathy,
sympathy, reciprocity, retribution).
He sees these pro-social emotions as the source of morality.
Cites
primate relative behavior like in chimps. Morality is thus a tenuous opposition to our own fundamentally
egoistic nature. Morality also distinguishes us radically from the rest of biological nature, involving
behavioral and emotional tendencies that are not found in other creatures — the “veneer” is a uniquely
human phenomenon. DeWaal thinks this is a false opposition.
How does sympathy differ from empathy, in de Waal’s account? Is sympathy a form of altruistic
concern? Why or why not?
Empathy is a "more cognitively structured emotional tendency," in which one is self-aware that they
themselves are not suffering, but when observing someone who is suffering, one can put themselves
emotionally in that position, and feel what the one is suffering is feeling— to a certain extent. One can
feel the same emotional suffering as another, despite not being in the same position, simply because they
can emotionally connect themselves there. Sympathy is different, in that someone can feel sorrow or
concern for another who is suffering, but they do not necessarily feel the same negative emotions
themselves. One can feel concern for another's suffering, without suffering themselves. Altruism is the
selfless concern for the welfare of others, so doing something purely because it benefits someone else
rather than for self-motivated interests. Sympathy, then, would be considered a form of altruistic concern,
since there is no personal suffering that would also be subsided by helping someone else. An empath
would also be feeling negative feelings, so helping one person can also resolve their own discomfort
What is the distinguishing mark of reciprocity or gratitude? What are the limits of reciprocity
when it comes to explaining altruistic regard for strangers?
The idea behind reciprocity or gratitude is that we are inclined to advance the interests or benefit others
who have done something for us previously. We will feel positive emotions towards them and will thus
exhibit gratitude. This requires us, however, to keep track of individuals who have given us something or
performed a service for us. Cognitively requires us to bond emotionally with them, similar to how
someone does with their relatives. While reciprocity can explain concern for others who are not our
relatives, it is limited in altruistically explaining humans' moral tendencies. Impartial vs. partial altruism
(reciprocity would not be genuinely impartial concern). Ex. we don't think it would be morally okay to
scam an elderly person, even though that person has never done anything for us in the past, and despite us
having no expectation for them to reciprocate that kindness to us in the future. De Waal suggests this is
because humans consider the greater good and extend our concern as such. Humans develop a sense of
belonging and "Community concern," which is promoted when we "band together against adversaries".
Consistent with evolutionary perspective that states social animals depend on flourishing in their
communities for their own survival and to thrive.
De Waal writes that “our noblest achievement—morality—has evolutionary ties to our basest
behavior—warfare” (55). Explain this suggestion.
De Waal makes this remark, noting its ironic meaning. Due to evolutionary pressures, humans have
developed a tendency of negative group identity formation. We identify an "Other," and we band together
to oppose the Other as a united front (primitive and powerful) so our community can both survive and
flourish. Brings unity! Can be in big forms, or smaller scales like college rivalries. Humans are parochial
(we care more about members of our own communities than about members of our groups). Despite this,
morality requires at least some impartial concern for the interests of everyone. However, morality was
used a tool to strengthen social bonds and uniting together during times of warfare in order to flourish as a
community. "[Morality became the tool to strengthen social fabric!!!]". "The sense of community required
by the former [morality] was provided by the latter [warfare behavior]" This is at least consistent with the
evolutionary perspective, since social animals are dependent on the flourishing of their communities for
the realization of their ends.
Week of January 29
“According to Kant, morality demands that we treat other people as ends in themselves, never
merely as means to our own ends” (Korsgaard, 101). Explain this idea in your own words.
In this quote, Korsgaard is paraphrasing Immanuel Kant's idea on how humanity has to go about treating
one another in what is seen as a moral way. In this context, treating someone as a means to an end is
saying that we are just exclusively using somebody how we see fit in order to achieve our own goals, or
"our own ends." By treating people as ends, we are discounting the idea of being motivated by using them
to our benefit. To say people are an ends themselves is to say that morality requires we do not behave
selfishly, and rather treat people correctly just because we should (objective reasoning), and out of
non-selfish, or altruistic, concern, not just because they have something that can benefit us and help us get
what we want. People are not tools or obstacles for us to use and manipulate, whether intentionally or not.
What does Korsgaard mean by “normative self-government”? How does it differ from the kind of
agency that intelligent animals (such as primates) are capable of?
Rational autonomy!!!People have the capacity to reflect on our desires and instincts. Korsgaard is
referencing how intentional our actions are. Requires a strong sense of control over our actions. We
CHOSE to behave a certain way on purpose. We CHOSE to govern ourselves a certain way because we
thought about it and intentionally decided to do so. Intelligent animals, like primates, have enough agency
to make decisions based on their instincts and desires, and they even have the capacity to learn from
experience. But they do not have the ability to REASON. People can reflect on what we ought to do or
feel or think. This requires us to assess the reasons for or against something, which animals cannot do.
E.G. We contemplate whether we should get out of bed or not based on what we have to do like going to
class. Animals would wake up because their instincts tell them to or to go hunt for food or the like. People
can consider the pros and cons of an action before making their decision.
How does reason differ from intelligence, according to Korsgaard?
Korsgaard has a very different take on the relation between primates and people, one informed by her
study of philosopher kant. Korsgaard thinks that reason is distinct from intelligence. Korsgaard
acknowledges that animals can be intelligent. Animals can have the capacity to problem solve, figuring
out solutions to the problems posed by their instincts and desires, and learn from experience. For example,
a chimp can learn to solve a Rubix cube or other puzzles. Reason includes reflecting on questions about
what we ought or ought not to do, feel, or think. Reason includes assessing rationality, showing an extra
level of thought given to a certain situation. Reason gives the "ability to be motivated by an ought".
Reason also enables people, unlike animals, to be "governed by principles and values". Ultimately, this
form of self-consciousness (on the grounds of our beliefs and actions) is the source of reason, a capacity
that is distinct from intelligence.
Why does Korsgaard think that rational autonomy gives us “a deeper level of control over our own
movements” than intelligent animals have (112)?
Intelligent animals have control over their movements, but not to the same degree as humans. For
example, Apes can choose to swing from tree to tree, as it is not an involuntary movement like simply
breathing. People are capable of normative thoughts and actions, whereas (to our knowledge) animals are
not. People don't just act from desires given to us by instinct or nature; we can step back from desires and
make them objects of reflective scrutiny. We can reflect on decisions before us and contemplate if there
are other considerations we must take into account. For example, getting out of our warm bed because of
responsibilities we must attend to. We reflect on the decision. Rational autonomy— or the intentional
decision making process of reflecting and contemplating something— enables us to genuinely think about
our own movements. Animals, on the other hand, give in to their natural tendencies and instincts, rather
than undergoing the thought process that humans can.
Korsgaard writes: “The morality of your action is not a function of the content of your intentions.
It is a function of the exercise of normative self-government” (112). Explain this passage.
Korsgaard is saying that morality is not defined by intentions. Instead, morality is a result of the conscious
and deliberate choice made to behave a certain way. Morality comes about during the process undergone
when contemplating what we "ought to do" and still making the RATIONAL and PURPOSEFUL
decision to do something, despite other alternatives. Not because it is a pro-social emotional tendency,
which animals might exhibit. Korsgaard also calls this capacity for reflective self-determination
“normative self-governance”. It is “self-governance”, because (as we just saw) it involves not merely
acting for a purpose, but choosing the purposes one acts on; one is governing oneself, in a sense, as
opposed to being governed by one’s instinctual nature. It is “normative”, furthermore, because it involves
responsiveness to reasons. These reasons are the considerations that one takes into account when ex.
thinking about whether to act on the desire that one has reflected on.
If an ape helps another ape achieve its ends, is it acting morally? Why or why not?
Not according to Korsgaard. An ape is not capable of normative self-governance. They don't have the
capacity to reflect on their desires and instincts and contemplate what they ought to do or ought not to do.
Because apes do not undergo this intentional process of rational autonomy, Korsgaard would not regard
their actions as moral, even when they help another ape achieve its ends. The ape would just be following
their pro-social emotional tendencies and instincts, as opposed to weighing the pros and cons of helping
the ape. Also, people are morally accountable for their actions in a way that animals are not. Moral praise
and blame does not exist for animals, so much as it does for humans (e.g. we don't blame animals for
hunting other animals or asserting their alpha dominance, when that's what their instincts tell them to do
in the animal kingdom. But, we would morally blame a human for harming another human in this same
sense)
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