BuddhistEthics

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy AtCompanion to Ethics; Edited by PETER SINGER BLACKWELL REFERENCE

Copyright ¢ Basil Blackwe Copyri 1 1g Editorial Organization . P Sin cter Singer 199 First published e . - 291 First published in USA 1991 Basil Blackwell [td 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX 4 IJF, UK Basil Blackwel], Inc. i Cambridge Center Cambridge. Massachusetts 02142, USA A!I ‘rights reserved, Exce crm‘(‘ism and review, no retrieval system, or transmitted, i Except in the Unj ates of i§ shall not, by \Zfiid(}?tti;?e()t ot tis book ; circulated without the publi ' than that in which it is publi condition being impased on British Li N 1 Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A companion to ethics 1. Ethics. - ve thics. — (Blackwell companions to L. Singer. Peter 1916~ PhflOSOPhY)- 170 ISBN 0631~ 1621 I-9 Librar, | 55 C ary of Congress Cataloging in Publication Datg A Companion to cthics / edited by Peter Sin P em—Blackwell compani ger. Includes bibliogranto - LPaRtions ta philosoph - A graphic, A ophy) ISBN ()_631‘1621;)1?:[ references and index 1. Ethics 2. So e S. Singe Peter 1. Ser €s. S 2. Social o k 99 hics 1 mnger, II. § 170—dc20 o CIP Typeset in 10 ! Iy > 0n 123 pt Photj i Frome w102 3 Pl otina and printed i € itai o in Great Britain b y Butler & Tanner Liq Introduction The title A Companion to Ethics may suggest a volume with short entries, in alphabetical order, providing summary information about leading theories, ideas and people in the academic discipline of ethics. As a glance at the outline of the volume (following this introduction) will show, this book is very different. 1t consists of 47 original essays. These essays deal with the origins of ethics, with the great ethical traditions, with theories about how we ought to live, with arguments about specific ethical issues, and with the nature of ethics itself. (In accordance with current usage, in this book ‘ethics’ will usually be used not only for the study of morality {that is, as a synonym for ‘moral philosophy’ but also to refer to the subject matter of that study, in other words as meaning ‘morality’.) I have chosen to organize the book in this way because it is vital that ethics not be treated as something remote, to be studied only by scholars locked away in universities. Ethics deals with values, with good and bad, with right and wrong. We cannot avoid involverhent in ethics, for what we do - and what we don't do - is always a possible subject of ethical evaluation. Anyone who thinks about what he or she ought to do is, consciously or unconsciously, involved in ethics. When we begin to think more seriously about these questions, we may begin by exploring our own underlying values but we will also be travelling over roads that have been trodden by many other thinkers, in different cultures, for well over twc thousand years. For such a journey it is helpful to have a guide with informatior. about the path we shall tread, how it came to be laid out, the major forks where people have taken alternative routes, and who has been there before us. Mort valuable still, however, is the kind of companion who will stimulate our though about the route we are taking and warn us of the traps and culs-de-sac that havt stopped others making progress. So the best way to use this book is to go first to the Outline of Contents. a kinc of map of the book, with explanatory notes at points where the map migh otherwise be unclear to those who do not already know the territory. Then depending on your interests, you may wish to start at the beginning and worl your way through, or you may prefer to read specific essays on subjects tha interest you. To find any subject not mentioned in the Outline of Contents, consul the Index. It is designed to make it easy to find not only specific concepts o theories, for example justice, or utilitarianism, but also particular aspects of topic: Thus under ‘killing’ you will find not a single heading, but also sub-headings tha will lead you to discussions of ethical aspects of killing in Buddhism, Hinduist

PART 11 * THE GREAT ETHICAL TRADITIONS change, destruction and loss. This complex which we consider as an ‘individual’ is Hable to constant suffering, and if we project and anticipate a continuous life of pleasure and joy in terms of our sense of an individual person, we find it difficult to accept that we are liable to sickness, grief and suffering. Thus in this manner the three doctrines of impermanence, suffering and egolessness are interrelated. The Four Noble Truths, and the Noble Eightfold Path as a component of the Four Noble Truths, are related to the diagnosis of the human predicament described by the Pali word dukkha. Reflections on morality and society cannot be severed from this basic concern. Some see the notion of dukkha as indicating a pessimistic outlook. Yet the ideal that the Buddha offers for man in following the ethical system is an ideal of happiness. While nibbana represents the ideal of ultimate happiness for man as a moral ideal, the Buddha also offers a qualified notion of happiness for the house- holder who lives a harmonious and righteous life. Just as there are various expressions of pain, there are also diverse grades of pleasure and well-being. While the righteous and harmonious life permits the householder to seek wealth by lawful means, without greed and longing, to get ease and pleasure for him or herself and do meritorious deeds, the recluse exercises a more stringent control over desires and wants and is more earnestly committed to the ideal of release from all suffering (nibbana). Both the life ideals of the householder as well as those of the recluse are highly critical of the life of pure sensuality devoid of any ethical constraints. A life of pure pleasure by its inner nature ends up in boredom and dissonance, and interferes with the healthy functioning of family and community life. The Buddha condemned pure hedonism on psychological and ethical grounds. The Buddha was also critical of some materialists who did not believe in an afterlife and thus supported a hedonistic lifestyle without any moral values. The Buddha was critical of the way of pure sensuality and the way of self- mortification, and considered his own way as the middle path. The first Noble Truth is the truth of suffering, the second deals with the arising of suffering, the third deals with the cessation of suffering (nibbana), and the fourth with the way to end suffering (the Noble Eightfold Path). The Noble Eightfold Path has the following aspects: (1) right understanding; (2) right thought; (3) right speech; (4) right bodily action; (5) right livelihood; (6) right effort; (7) right mindfulness; (8) right concentration. An important point about the path is that the items fall under three divisions: items 3—5 come under ethical conduct (sila), items 6—8 come under mental training (samadhi), and items 1 and 2 come under wisdom (parina). Thus it is a threefold scheme of moral training, consisting of the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices, the practice of meditation and the development of wisdom. It is through the Eightfold Path that one can attain the ultimate moral ideal of Buddhism. iii The moral philosophy of Buddhism Philosophically, the first prerequisite for a system of ethics, according to the Buddha, is the notion of free will, secondly the distinction between good and 60 I e s S R = T a5 T T g T o e ST e e Lt T gt e T gl T g T gt T g 1 T g 5 * BUDDHIST ETHICS bad, and thirdly the notion of causation in relation to moral action. The third concept, as indicating the good and bad consequences of actions which can be morally assessed, is also related to a specifically Buddhist notion, survival after death. Of these, the most crucial concept necessary for the evaluation of human action is the notion of kamma, based on the notion of moral causation. The Pali term kamma is used to refer to volitional acts which are expressed by thought, speech and bodily action. The oft-quoted statement ‘I call the motive to be the deed’ provides a focus for the evaluation of human action from a moral point of view. Volitional acts which come within the purview of moral evaluation can be good, bad or neutral, and could also be of a mixed nature. When we evaluate an action, we can look at its genesis. If the action has as its roots greed, hatred and delusion, it is an unwholesome or bad action, and if it was generated by the opposite roots of liberality, compassionate love and wisdom, it is a good action. But we have also to see its consequences to others as well as oneself, as they also play a part in moral evaluation. The Pali word ‘cetana, usually translated as motive, is a complex term covering intention and motive as well as the consequences of action dependent on the motive or intention. According to the law of moral causation, if a person gives some money to a needy person several consequences follow in the form of psychological laws: it is a good thought and stabilizes the tendency to repeat such thoughts, it is a good action, and it is said that the greatest blessing of a good action is the tendency to repeat it, that it becomes a part of one's character. This psychological dimension is believed to extend over several births and to be carried over to another life. ' There is another aspect to the consequences of good and bad actions. According to the law of moral causation, a person who gives for charity expects to get something in return, comforts in future life, and a person who steals or is miserly will be repaid by being subjected to poverty. These are two aspects of the moral consequences of action. We may describe the first aspect of character-building as the craftsmanship model of action and the second aspect, which focus on rewards and punishments, as the judicial model of action. Another dimension of these two models is that disinterested character-building may be nibbana-oriented, as it is basically an attempt to rid oneself of greed, hatred and delusion, and the attempt to accumulate merit is directed towards a better life in the future. It has been observed by scholars who have gone into the terminology that ‘good’ and ‘bad’, used in the context of nibbana-oriented action, may be translated by the words kusala and akusala, and ‘good’ and ‘bad’, when speaking of the wish for a better existence in the future lives, may be translated by the terms purinia and papa. If punina is rendered as merit and papa as de-merit, a meritorious action paradoxically helps us to collect more fuel for a longer journey in samsara (the wheel of existence), while a good action in the form of kusala shortens our journey and speeds our approach to nibbana. The Buddha will not limit the evaluation of actions to the narrow concept of a motive alone, as the act has to be performed, and the manner in which it is 61

PART Il * THE GREAT ETHICAL TRADITIONS done and the consequences are important. In this sense this is a consequentialist or a teleological ethics. (See Article 19, CONSEQUENTIALISM.) Within the consequentialist orientation, Buddhist ethics lays very great empha- sis on working towards the material and spiritual welfare of others. The Buddha himself was described as a person concerned with the well-being and happiness of mankind. In general, Buddhist ethics has a utilitarian stance, but the Buddhist utilitarianism is not a hedonistic utilitarianism. (Varieties of utilitarianism are discussed in Article 20, UTILITY AND THE GooD.} Certainly the Buddha would be critical of the pursuit of pure sensuality and also of any attempt to reduce human pleasures to a hedonistic calculus. As one proceeds on the path of meditation, the jhanas (states of deep meditative absorption) are associated with states of pleasure and happiness, not of a mundane nature but rather states of joy, zest and rapture. There are certain refinements in these states which go beyond the pleasures we normally associate with hedonism (the view that pleasure is or ought to be the goal of all our actions). Against the background of these jhanic states, concepts like hedonism and eudaimonism (in which ‘happiness’ plays the role that ‘pleasure’ does in the hedonistic doctrine) used in the context of Western ethics may lose clear application. Buddhism may be described as a consequentialist ethic embodying the ideal of ultimate happiness for the individual, as well as a social ethic with a utilitarian stance concerned with the material and spiritual well-being of mankind. In keeping with this stance, Buddhism also has a strong altruistic component, specially embodied in the four sublime virtues of lovingkindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity. The Buddha also emphasizes the role of duties and obligations in relevant contexts. The Sigalovada Sutta discusses the duties and rights of parents and children, husband and wife, teachers and pupils as well as one's obligations to friends and recluses. But what is described here are reciprocal relations of mutual obligations, rather than any concept of human rights. First, the Buddhist approach to duties and rights is more a humanistic than a legalistic one. Second, while considering duties and rights as important, the Buddha never elevated them into an ethic of duty and obligation as found in Western ethical systems. (See, for example, Article 18 AN ETHIC OF PRIMA FACIE DUTIES.) In ethical systems emerging in the Judeo-Christian tradition, a breach of duties is tied to the notion of feeling guilty about wrongdoing. Sin and guilt and worry over past offences are not concepts that fit into the Buddhist analysis of wrong-doing. In fact it is a difficult task to find a Pali equivalent in the discourses for notions like guilt in the context of wrongdoing. In general wrongdoing is described as unskilled action, as unwholesome, as a defilement etc. In fact, worry and restlessness, as well as unhealthy fears regarding wrongs done, are considered as obstructions to the leading of a morally good life. Thus while concepts of duty and obligations, as well as of justice and righteousness, play a part in Buddhist ethics, they are integrated within the broader humanistic and consequentialist ethics of Buddhism. o388 g s g g S * BUDDHIST ETHICS iv A Buddhist perspective on the place of knowledge and truth in ethics In ordinary everyday situations, statements like ‘There is a red book on my table’ can be checked regarding their truth and falsity. But in ethics we get statements like ‘Killing is wrong', ‘Stealing is bad’, ‘He did wrong in not going to the appointment’ and so on. Though these statements are grammatically similar to the other statement cited above, they appear to lack any cognitive content. Thus it is said that it is illogical to apply notions like knowledge and truth in the field of ethics. (For further discussion see Articles 35 and 38, REALISM and SUBJECTIVISM.) Such problems did not disturb the Buddha and there is no explicit discussion in his discourses of the relationship between facts and values. Yet the Buddha upheld the relative objectivity of moral utterances as crucial to his system against the sceptics and the relativists of his time. There is a broad-based naturalistic stance in Buddhist ethics, and it can be said that certain types of facts are relevant as support for moral utterances. Thus in Buddhist ethics, there is no relationship of logical entailment between facts and values, but a relationship of specific kinds of relevance according to which facts will provide a kind of grounding for values. But yet from another perspective it appears that a concept like dukkha seems to lie at the point of intersection between a range of facts and their evaluation. A word like dukkha is a description of a state of affairs, the nature of the human predicament, but in the context of the Four Noble Truths, it carries with it the notion that it has to be known, abandoned and realized. The first Noble Truth suggests that dukkha has to be realized, the second that it has to be abandoned, the third that it has to be realized and the fourth that knowledge about dukkha has to be developed and gradually refined so that it culminates in knowledge of dukkha. Thus in Buddhist ethics, in one sense facts are relevant for understanding values, but in another sense some of the central concepts like that of dukkha seem to lie at the point of intersection between values and facts. It is also necessary to point out that the Buddha's use of the notion of ‘fact’ goes beyond its usage in Western ethical reflections. A ‘fact’ for the Buddha can be found out by the avenues of our normal senses, but he also upholds the acquaintance with facts through extra-sensory perception. Let us take an example like ‘Killing is bad’. Killing is considered bad or wrong for several reasons. (1) The genesis of the action show that it is clearly associated with the effective root of hatred, sometimes with greed and also with the cognitive root of having wrong views; (2) It has harmful consequences to oneself and is an obstruction to attaining nibbana or will have bad consequences in another life; ( 3) Here and now, it hardens one’s character in transgressing the ideal of non-injury, makes one develop a heavy conscience, comes into conflict with other people and can be punished by the law. Now, some of the information relevant to the normal utterances may be had by sensory observation, by self-analysis, by the observation of others, etc. But certain types of information like the consequences for a future life go beyond our normal powers. Buddhism also accepts that there are levels of spiritual develop- 63

PART IT - THE GREAT ETHICAL TRADITIONS vii Buddhist perspectives on practical ethics If one is to search for the existence of any core moral values in Buddhism, they are to be found in the five precepts: abstention from killing and hurting living creatures, abstention from stealing, abstention from wrong indulgence in sensual pleasures, abstention from lying and abstention from taking intoxicants. These precepts embody basic requirements for the living of a good life and the estab- lishment of a good community. The respect for life and property, the acceptance of a lifestyle which rejects excessive, illegitimate and harmful pleasures, truth- fulness and an awareness of the danger of certain social evils like alcoholism and drug addiction are the basic moral concerns of a Buddhist society. During the time of the Buddha as well as during later debates, questions 'relating to these precepts have been discussed. We shall briefly take two of these Issues, questions concerning the respect for life in relation to animals and the accumulation of wealth, Even kings were expected to provide protected territory not only for human beings but also for beasts of the forests and birds of the air. Deliberate infliction of torture and hurt to animals and killing were condemned by the Buddha. There are four topics in the discourses which are relevant to issues pertaining to the values of life: animal sacrifices, warfare, agriculture and meat-eating. The Buddha did not hesitate to condemn both the performance of animal sacrifices and the pleasures of hunting. He also pointed out the futility of warfare. He prohibited the monks from joining the army and also from digging the ground, as in this process there was the danger of injuring insect life. But regarding meat- eating he left it as an open possibility that if one practises compassion one would be inclined to practise vegetarianism. Also there is a social context where the Buddha himself and other monks went for their food with the begging bowl and walked silently through the streets and the marketplace. The Buddha had asked the monks not to ask for any particular food unless the monk was sick but collect what was offered. As far as the rules are concerned the monk may accept meat that is offered for a meal if the monk is convinced that it was not specially killed and prepared for a monk’s meal. Though the Buddha rejects professions like the selling of armaments and the killing and selling of animals, he did not restrict the monk's food, unless it was forbidden because it was poisonous. It is also important that the Buddha did not want to make eating into a fad or a fetish through which recluses would seek purification, It appears that vegetarianism is a positive practice that can emerge through the practice of compassion, but in the context of the monks collecting the food that was given to them, there was no rule forbidding them from taking meat under all conditions. The problem about the accumulation of wealth is of course well understood in terms of the lifestyles recommended by the Buddha. While the monk lives with 1o possessions except the robes and the begging bowl, the layman is encouraged to contribute to his economic stability. The layman is asked to concentrate on the production of wealth through skilled and earnest endeavour, and protecting weaith through savings and living within one's means. The Buddha condemned 66 5§ * BUDDHIST ETHICS both miserliness and extravagance and provided the guidelines for contented living. The layman has a right to property and to accumulate wealth to ensure a decent existence for his family, but not to develop greed and avarice for wealth. Also, the idea that the needy should be helped and that wealth should be given to the have-nots was accepted even by the kings who ruled according to the advice of the Buddha. Whatever moral values we take in terms of the five precepts, there was a pragmatism and realism in the Buddha's outlook, which provide useful resources for dealing with conflicts between human needs and moral ideals. viii Contributions to ethics in the later Buddhist traditions The later Buddhist traditions of Mahayina, the Tantrayana and Zen Buddhism are all rooted in the original teachings of the Buddha, and with the Hinayana tradition share his basic doctrines of egolessness, impermanence and suffering. But their techniques of communication and points of emphasis took different directions. In relation to the ethics of Buddhism a central point on which both the Mahayana and the Tantrayana traditions opened up a fresh line of inquiry was on the question whether everyone should aspire to be a Buddha or whether one should be contented with the cessation from suffering by attaining the state of perfection called the arahant. The Mahayanist felt that instead of attaining enlightenment as a disciple of the Buddha, everyone should aspire to be a Buddha, so that one could help others. The Mahayanist felt, like the followers of Tantrayana, that there was a higher ideal, that of the Bodhisatva, which indicated an infinite commitment to others and was an expression of the widest limits of altruism. The Buddha is an enlightened one and a Bodhisatva is one who aspires to be a Buddha. The different lives of the Bodhisatva are dedicated to the practice of special virtues like charity, patience, effort, meditation and wisdom. The Bodhisatva attempts to identify himself with the liberation of others. The Tantrayana added a strong devotional strand into the religious practices with an emphasis on symbolism and rituals. As these were associated with esoteric teachings they do not appear to have any specific contribution to ethics which differs from the Mahayanist perspective. The word Zen is an equivalent of the Sanskrit word dhyana meaning meditation. It emerged from the Chinese soil and was deeply centred on the practice of meditation. But it was critical of moral codes and rituals which were practised through the force of convention. When a tradition gets too much stuck in rules, codes and procedures an intended ‘means’ can become an ‘end’ in itself. Also, the prolific philosophical and scholastic distinctions which emerged in the Indian tradition after the Buddha seemed to submerge the deep meditative tradition which the Buddha initiated. Thus the Zen masters used stories, paradoxes, parables, and meditational exercises called koans to shock the conventional mind stuck in rules and procedures. This is a useful perspective for the practice of morality rather than a theory of ethics, but it does emphasize that the practice of morality is intrinsically related to the inner transformation of the individual. Thus the Zen masters come out with the paradox that Zen begins where morality ends. 67

ART 11 THE GREAI’ETHICAL,TRADITIONS B(?ll] the early and later traditions of Buddhism continue as living traditions 1 different parts of the Eastern world and their impact has spread to the West /hile the ethics of Buddhism influence the daily lives of its adherents, there is a' “eat admixture of rituals and conventional practices of each culture, which can ath be an aid to the development of the teachings of the Buddha as well as an struction. Thus Buddhism continues to live in the minds of people at different vels, of routine practice and rituals, intellectual reflection and debate, and a ‘eper personal quest rooted in Buddhist meditation. Y sferences e reader who is interested in readin g the discourses of the Buddh wing the following texts: nicha may follow up by adual Sayings: Vols. 1, 11, V. trans. F. L. Woodwa Pali Text Society, 1932-6). z‘logws of the Buddha: Part I, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids: Parts Il and U, trans. T. W. and -~ A.P. Rhys Davids (London: Pali Text Society, 1956-7). dz)ile Length Sayings: Vols. 1, I, HI, trans. [, B. Horner (London: Pali Text Society, 1954~ EAR ’ ) wred Sayings; Parts [ and 1, trans, C.A.F. Rhys Davids; Parts III, IV, V, trans. F L Voodward (London: Pali Text Society, 1917-56). - rd; Vols. [II, IV, trans. E. H. Hare (London: o referred to: dace, J.: Virtues and Vices tIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978). rther reading wze, .. Buddhism: Its Essence and Development ( stlva, P.: An Introduction to Buddhist Psycholo wmasirt, G.: Fundamentals of Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 19 SI). ' gy {London: Macmillan Press, 1979). Buddhist Ethics (Singapore: The Buddhist Research Society, g86). itilleke, K.N.: Ethies in Buddhist Perspective (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society 9y72). ' nasiri, ]P. D.: "Maral evaluation in carly Buddhism'. Sri Lanka Journal of Humanities, 1 {1975). o jha[issa, H.: Buddhist Ethics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970). aibana, S.: The Ethics of Buddhism (Colombo: The Baudha Sahitya Sabha, 1943). b, R An Analysis of the Pali Canon (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975). This )okl contains information about the sources of the Buddha's teachings used in this ‘ticle. 'sekera, O.H. de A.: Buddhism and Saciety (Colombo: Baudha Sahitya Sabha, 1952). 1 et st e o S e o i T 7 e g+ g g T gt 6 Classical Chinese ethics CHAD HANSEN THIS essay focuses on the classical period of Chinese thought (550200 BCE) which spawned the main Chinese philosophical positions. We will forgo a com- prehensive treatment of the entire civilization's history, which includes both a Buddhist and a neo-Confucian epoch, for a more detailed analysis of the classical views. The differences between Chinese and Western ethics are broad and deep. Our inherited Greek psychology divides the ego into the rational and the ermotional. It explains all human mental processing via belief and desire. Our concept of morality involves reference to the human facuity of reason. Chinese thinkers view human action in a different way. They appeal to no such faculty nor to beliefs and desires as reasons for action. The Chinese approach is initially more social. Humanity is social. A social dao (‘way’) guides us. Chinese ethical thinkers reflect on how to preserve, transmit or change this way — the public, guiding discourse. When modern Chinese writers sought a translation for ‘ethics’, they chose the compound term dao de — ways and virtues. Dao is public, objective guidance. De (‘virtue') consists of the char- acter traits, skills, and dispositions induced by exposure to a dao. De is the physical realization of dao in some part of the human system - a family, a state, or an individual. We may get virtue either by internalizing a way or it may be inborn. ‘ Both dao and de encompass more than morality proper. There are ways of fashion, etiquette, archery, economics, and prudence. Both dao and de can have negative connotations, e.g. when speaking of the ways of one's opponents. Most Chinese writers, however, use dao in speaking of their own system for guid- ing behaviour and most take the social point of view. Translations, as a rule there- fore, treat dao as a definite description. They write ‘The Way' when they find dao in a text. (Classical Chinese has no definite article.) This causes no difficulty if we remember that the different schools disagreed about which way was the way. i The positive Dao period: Confucius and Mozi 1 Confucius and the conventional Dao Confucius (551—479 BCE} was the first and most famous thinker from the classical period. He alleged, however, that he was merely transmitting a code of social 69