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WEEK 3 DIVINE COMMAND THEORY October 10, 2021: Divine Command Theory (Lesson 5) Readings Divine Command Theory, Waluchow pp. 95-103 EThical Theory, G & H pp. 114-129 Lectures Divine Command Theories of Morality A. Waluchow on Divine Command Theory B. G&H on Divine Command Theory C. The Euthyphro D. The (Biblical Story of Abraham Divine command theory allows for the possibility of objective moral truth Divine command theory in its simplest form says moral rules are a product of the commandment of god So whatever god says, is God says don't kill so dont kill Skeptical because we need someone to tell us what these morals are but ofc god cannot, we need some sort of authority to tell us Not independently knowable Mind independent but not knowable Waluchow on Divine Command Theory - No philosopher accepts that morality is merely a function of the commands of a God - Most skeptical to least skeptical about the existence of/human ability to discern our freely chosen behaviour towards others - Non-cognitivism → relativism → DCT → ethical egoism → “The Ethical Theories” (utilitarianism, deontology, deontological pluralism, feminist ethics) - Note that non-cog to ethical egoism hold that there are no objective moral truths
- “The Ethical Theories” hold that there is an objective moral truth - Mind dependent vs. mind independent - DCT is the theory that the moral rules, norms, and principles are so because God said so - “Ethics depends on a being that is independent of any human and objective” - Why is it skeptical? - Is skeptical in an epistemological sense (episteme, knowledge; logo, study of) - “There are objective moral truths but humans cannot come to know them using their rational faculties; we must rely on an omnipotent/omniscient being in order to determine what the moral rules are” - Philosophers want to believe it is within human capabilities to come to know what the moral rules are independent of a divine authority - “The attractive aspect of DCT is that it has the potential to establish an objective morality– if morality is a set of commands issued by a divine authority, it follows that morality is both universal and objective” - According to Thomas Quinas, the rules in the bible are not the rules of morality - DRT can be seen a commonsensical view, a view that people arrive at without having to put too much thought into where moral rules come from - Live life based off of religious rules - There are 2 version of DCT; both provide the same objective motivation for being moral - “Why should I be good?” “Cause God said so” - The two versions differ in the source of morality - We are supposed to follow moral rules because God says so, but where do these rules come from? - Moral ground theory - “The morally right action is that action commanded by God.That is, the fact that God has commanded some act is the lone cause of the act being morally right: - So like, murder is wrong because God made the universe in such a way that murder is wrong - Some set of rules that have been commanded by god are the lone source of moral obligation - God is responsible for saying that this is the right action - Problems with this version - This version allows for the possibility that God is both omniscient and omnipotent because it leaves total control of morality in his hands; - There are two problems with his omnipotence: 1. There is no standard by which we can assess the choices of of God as “morally good” - His acts cannot be said to be morally good
- omniscient = god knows everything , science 2. God is all powerful/knowing/good; he only does the right thing ever. - Omnipotent: power , all powerful all knowing - If what God says is the right thing because he said it, there is now way you can evaluate the actual goodness of an action - When the metric system was first introduced it was based on a set of standard measures; they took a stick and made it a standard (a metre); it would be weird to say like is the standard metre bar really a metre? - A metre is a metre, because that is how long the stick was; so God is the standard metre bar (that which determines right and wrong) - So “is what God did good?” = “is the standard metre bar a metre?” - Morality is wholly arbitrary; if God said that torture was morally right, it would have to be - We can assess his actions by a standard which exists independently of him - We say morality is whatever god say it is - So if god just wakes up one day and says killing is good, we just abide by it without reason - Bc god is right ? - Divine index version - God commands us to do the morally right thing in all circumstances because it is the right thing to do; he is not causally responsible for the moral rightness of an act; rather, God just has privileged knowledge of morally right acts - God has privilege awareness and is not responsible for the rules of “don't kill” - God is interpreting these rules - God is not responsible for these rules but just know that these are the rules - So morality is legit objective truth in the sense that not even God could make murder permissible; he has privileged access to the
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moral rules but he does not have the power to change these moral rules - Sustaining this theory requires that we be able to accurately identify and interpret God’s commands (at minimum); tasks that give rise to the central problems within this version of DCT - Problems with the moral index version of DCT - “Which God, which religious text, which prophet?” 1. There are so many interpretations of “God”; which one is meant to be the objective truthful one? 2. Example: what is the scope of the commitment that you are required to fulfil in the context of your mother and father? - Even if you identify God’s commands, how are they to be reliably interpreted and applied? 1. Even if this is the more plausible theory, we still have to engage in moral reasoning to interpret God’s commands, which means that we’ll need to turn to a moral theory independent of those commands - So it isn’t independently sufficient; there needs to be some kind of moral philosophy to back it So this leaves us with the Moral Index version, where morality is independent of God, but He has complete knowledge of its character. We might not always be able to grasp the reasons behind God's commands, but at least we know that He has directed us in the morally correct manner. Sustaining the Moral Index version of D.C.I. requires, at a minimum, that we be able to accurately identify and interpret God's commands, tasks that give rise to the central problems with this version of D.C.T. INTRO TO DIVINE COMMAND THEORY - GEIRSSON AND HOLMGREN Geirsson and Holmgren on Divine Command Theory - There are two claims that constitute DCT - God commands certain actions” - Which God do these commands come from? - Bible, new vs. old testament - old testament is very angry and bitter - New one is loving and forgiving - How do we interpret the Bible, and how accurate is it as a historical text?
- Reliable because its written by many authors ? - We question its accuracy - How do we explain the interpretive divisions within Christianity (or any religious tradition)? - Catholicism vs. Anglicism vs. whatever - The actions that god commands are morally required because they are commanded by god now? - Not a defensible view tho bc its hard to identify the sorts of arguments that allow any given scholar to explain the reasons of morality - “These actions are morally right because they are commanded by God” - Two general problems G&H maintain emerge from their understanding of D.C.T 1. D.C.T is likely not defensible 2. Even if it were defensible, it denies it supporters are morally responsible agents a. DCT is problematic bc it makes us not free, not free to make our own choices abt how we are going to behave in certain situations - Reasons to think DCT is not defensible: - Which God do these commands come from? - Reasons to think DCT undermines the status of its followers as responsible moral agents - “If morality is nothing more than a command, and the command always presents us with the right thing to do, it follows that morality consists of nothing more than blindly following commands, like a robot” - Why we don’t blame tigers for eating gazelle; because they are just doing what they do (it isn’t morally wrong because they don’t have a choice) - G and H argue that we are just like tigers, following orders blindly - But humans have free will and so we can attempt to investigate the reasons that underwrite any command - As soon as we start investigating “why God said so”, we stop following DCT because now we are questioning the validity of God’s commands using moral reasoning - It doesn't allow us to investigate why that is morally right - We are not responsible for the reasoning behind it - DRT says we have free will, freedom to choose whether we should listen to these commandments from god - Cant investigate why its correct - We are just following rules - G and H say we don't have free will - it's not that we are acting in the morally correct way, its that we are acting in the morally correct way bc we are capable of recognizing its the morally correct way - We can reason why its correct - Not just following rules, we can articulate why those are the rules Comment from the lecture Student: Hi Dr. Robb, before the 18-minute mark, you mention that the human ability to investigate the reasons behind God's commands is a direct contradiction of DCT, as for the DC
theorist, the reason is simply that God(s) commands it. But couldn't the DC theorist make the claim that the fact we have not been able to firmly establish a set of moral rules (although there has been progress, there is so far no hint of a finite, objective set of rules) serves as evidence that we cannot in fact conceptualize moral reasoning at the extent to which we may justify "objective" moral principles? I know this wouldn't save DCT from its other objections, but I feel like this is a relatively natural response to Geirsson and Holmgren's objection at that part of the video. (I also note that I know we use specific types of moral reasoning to attempt to investigate God's commands, but I'd argue that - along the lines of the last lectures on the different kinds of moral reasoning - there is a certain kind that allows us to justify God's commands which we are unable to use; so even though we are using some kind of moral reasoning, its not necessarily the kind that tells us that God's commands are morally right.) Ryan : Thanks for the insightful question. I see now that the point I was trying to make in those last few minutes was not made as clearly as I could've done it, so I'll try to clarify. I'm going to do so by relying heavily on Waluchow's distinction between the Moral Ground and Divine Index versions of DCT (so make sure you're familiar with those as you read my reply). The first point to make is that I altered the particular target of the critique G&H present at the end of their discussion in my video. They maintain the Divine Index version of DCT undermines our common understanding of moral agency because it implies we're just robots. Confusingly (I see now), I adjusted their target to the Moral Ground version of DCT without explicitly noting the adjustment I had made. The reason I made that adjustment is because the 'robot implication' seems to me to be really obvious in the case of the Moral Ground version... here's what I was trying to say: If God(s) was causally responsible for the status of moral truths as 'true' (as is the claim made by the Moral Ground version), then there would be no possible way of using reason to determine what the moral truth is; the only thing we could do would be to talk to God(s) and ask them, and even then we couldn't guess what they would say since, on this account, the omnipotence of God(s) would also imply that they could change the rules of logic and the rules of math (since He/They is/are ALL powerful). And if we can't use reason to guide our actions, and we should always do the right thing, we must just be like lions, or tigers, or bears (oh my!). Or more hyperbolically, according to G&H, the moral ground version of DCT implies we are, and can only be, robots (after writing it out, this might not be as obvious as I'd thought... but it was the point I was trying to make). If this was the claim you were asking about, then I think the response to your observation about our inability to identify objective moral principles would be a relatively straightforward: No. And the reason is, as Waluchow noted, according to the Moral Ground version, moral rules are entirely arbitrary and therefore are not the sorts of things that could ever be identified prior to their being articulated by God(s). So how, you might be asking, is G&H's claim that the Moral Index version of DCT leads to an understanding of moral agents as robots supposed to work? Their idea involves a narrow,
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precise, and possibly/likely uncharitable understanding of DCT, i.e., the only reason we should ever accept an action as either right or wrong is because it is a command of God(s), and we should never try to understand the reasons that lead God(s) to give any specific command (even though, as a version of the Moral Index account of DCT, such reasons must exist). I take it they're presenting a version of the Moral Index that contrasts 'faith' with 'reason' in a way that makes them mutually exclusive. That is, the Moral Index version of DCT leads to a characterization of moral agents as 'robots' if, and only if, the commands of God(s) are merely to be accepted on the basis of faith, irrespective of what reason tells you. That is why, presumably, they included the excerpt from the Story of Abraham... he didn't question the command he was given, but merely acted according to the direction he was given (like a robot, I guess?). If that's what you are asking about with your observation that we've as yet not been able to identify objective moral principles, I'm still not sure that that addresses the point G&H are trying to make, but it has potential in a way that it doesn't when directed at the Moral Ground version. They are arguing that, according to their version of DCT, you shouldn't even try to identify moral principles, e.g., that Abraham would've been doing something wrong had he asked God to justify his command. The fact that we haven't identified 'objective' moral truth (though I don't actually think that is a fact) after 2500 years of trying may weigh in favour of the claim that we cannot identfy those truths... but more would need to be said to explain why that's the case. Why, for example, is 2500 years the 'magic' number, i.e., the point at which we agree that reason will never provide access to fundamental objective moral truths, meaning we stop using reason and resort to faith? And what is it about our understanding of moral truths that implies they are not accessible to us by means of reason (assuming, of course, that they are meaningful)? This has turned in to an exceedingly long reply... sorry about that. Let me end by emphasizing the narrowness of DCT as presented by Waluchow/G&H/me... it asserts that the word of God(s) provides the sum total of moral rules humans will need to coexist in close quarters, all of which are justified on the basis of a single reason (i.e., God(s) said so), a reason that cannot itself be justified. I take it that that characterization represents the connection between religion and morality some people of faith accept, but it's not actually a really widely held understanding of that relationship (e.g., it was rejected by St. Thomas Aquinas in 1260); most theists maintain that God(s) provide some moral guidance, but not all of it. PLATO’S EUTHYPHRO God is the standard, there are no other rules, these are the only rules, and we only know these rules by referencing to gods If god did not say smth, then its not a rule Actions of god are holy arbitrary The Euthyphro
- This is one of Plato's 'Early Dialogues and as such, it is believed to be Plato's record interpretation of a conversation Socrates had during his life. Plato was Socrates' student, and because Socrates never wrote anything down, we rely on Plato's 'Early Dialogues for insight into Socrates's philosophical position. - Euthyphro - Is one of Plato’s ‘Early Dialogues’; is believed to be Plato’s interpretation/record of an actual conversation that socrates had during his life - SOcrates never wrote anything down so we rely on PLato’s Dialogues for insight on his philosophical position - He thought writing things down “hindered the capacity of humans to acquire knowledge” - His Early Dialogues are considered to also be Socrates’ teachings - Socrates and Euthyphro - Plato was student of Socrates - Plato never included himself in these dialogues; he used Socrates who is the assumed mouthpiece (he represents his own position) - It's odd to attribute a single 'thesis' to any of the 'Early Dialogues because they were primarily intended to identify and articulate the depth of a problem without providing any clear/specific resolution. There is, however, one claim Socrates defends twice such that we can (speculatively) characterize it as ' The Point - An objective standard of morality is "objective" in the sense that it is mind- independent, independent even from the minds of Gods; the Gods love moral actions owing to some characteristic they possess that is independent of the fact that, and explains why, they are loved by the Gods. In other words, the Moral Ground version of DCT cannot possibly be true. - The Socratic Method - Is an account of the rhetorical strategy Socrates uses in every one of Plato’s Dialogues 1. You get the person with whom you are debating to state their position with as much precision and clarity as they can a. You get them to articulate the situation as much as they can 2. You ask a series of questions intended to test the hypothesis, questions that elicit ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers 3. By the end of the series of questions either the hypothesis must be rejected and/or modified, or the discussion has revealed some truth about the universe - Read these dialogues like a dramatic exchange between individuals; Socrates is a bit of a dick and it comes out in the way that he interacts with Euthyphro - He is also self-aware that he is a jerk - Euthyphro dilemma - Question: do the gods love and action a person because the action is pious or is the action pious because it was loved by the gods? - Argument: DCT cannot possibly be true.
- Plato is saying that morality is mind independent in the sense that it is mind independent of the gods - Gods love moral actions, love piety, love holy actions - Gods love people who are moral bc of some feature of those actions - Gods love that the morality of people is independent from god and recognize that they did not cause people to act that way - The Euthyphro opens with Socrates waiting outside the Athenian Assembly building in order to face charges brought by Meletus (his charge is that Socrates has corrupted the Athenian youth by inventing new gods and not recognizing the old ones) - Socrates went around engaging in philosophical conversations with anyone who would listen to him (as far as we know) - The Sophists were professional arguers at the time of Socrates, and people would pay them to pull up to parties and to engage in the dialogue that Socrates engages in for free - They wanted to be paid, they didn’t care about the truth, so legend says that Socrates didn’t care about the money he cared about the truth, so he lived a life of poverty - “It’s a little weird this old guy went around talking to young people” - Over the course of their discussions with Socrates, the young people realized that the account of the gods of Greek mythology is wrong - Meletus actually succeeds and Socrates is put to death (RYAN TEACHES THE DEATH COURSE) - Socrates discovers in talking to Euthyphro that he is at the Assembly to prosecute his own father for murder - His father had tied up a worker after the worker and murdered one of his fellows, and he let him die while waiting for advice from religious authority - “Clearly, this is a wrongful killing and my father needs to be prosecuted accordingly; at least in as much as religious law is concerned” says Euthyphro - “How can my dad be a murderer if he murdered a murderer” - So Socrates is like “you’re so committed to what you think you know the gods require that you’re willing to prosecute your dad?” - “If you can tell me what piety (morality) is according to the gods, then that would provide me a basis for not being indicted by Meletus so I can avoid the death penalty” THEN - Socrates asks Euthyphro to become his teacher in religious matters (bottom of p. 65) so he can overcome Meletus' indictment against him. What, asks Socrates, do the Gods find pious holy? - Socrates = “what do the gods find holy?” - Euthyphro = “prosecuting wrongdoers is holy, failing to prosecute is unholy, irrespective of their relationship to the prosecutor”
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- My dad did something wrong, but I’m obligated to pursue a charge against him because if I didn’t then I Would be doing something wrong - Socrates = “but this is only one example; I want to know the essence of ‘holiness’” - What are the features that explains why every action we would characterise as holy s actually holy - Prosecuting wrongdoers is a morally required behaviour, but it is not an account of what it is that makes all moral actions so - Euthyphro = “what pleases the gods is holy, what displeases them is unholy” - Euthyphro is basically asking are things holy bc the gods believe it is holy or is there other reasoning - S = “are ‘holy and unholy’ opposites? - E = “yes” - S = “but what of the fact that the gods disagree and fight over which actions are just, and which are unjust? Does this not mean that some acts will be both unholy and holy according to your definition” - - E: so it would seem - The gods are always fighting, and there are multiple actions that simultaneously please and displease the gods - So it can’t be the case that what pleases the god is the definition of holiness (morality) - S = “so we need to adjust our hypothesis; those actions upon which all gods agree are either holy or unholy, and if there is disagreement, then the act is neither holy nor unholy” - E = “sure. Yes but there are some acts that all the gods agree are either holy or unholy - Eg. all those guilty of unjust killing must pay the penalty” - Basically there are some actions that gods all agree are wrong and there are actions that have mixed emotions (some say right some sya wrong) - S: All seem to accept the principle that those guilty of unjust killing need to be punished; disagreements arise in establishing guilt in particular cases, both for humans and for Gods. You therefore need to show that all the Gods would agree that your dad unjustly killed in order for your prosecution to be 'holy' - S says that he doesn't know why these are the standard but all the gods agree so that is that - So if E wants to prosecute his father, he needs to get all the gods to agree that is correct - S: There's a bigger problem... that would only show that the Gods love your specific prosecution. So we need to adjust our hypothesis; lets simply accept that those actions upon which all Gods agree are either holy or unholy, and if there is disagreement, then the act is neither holy nor unholy or both holy and unholy.
- “Are loveable things so because they are loved, or because they have a certain feature that makes them loveable?” - S: So now answer this: do the gods love actions because they are holy, or are actions holy because they are loved by the gods? - E= “clearly - on this account, the Gods love an action because that action is holy, but because they love it” - But what is the essence of holiness - E = “holiness is that part of justice that consists in ministering to the gods” - S = “what does it mean to minister to the Gods? Does anything humans do actually have an impact on the gods” - E = “yeah, human actions either please or displease the gods” - S = “but this is the same as saying that holy acts are those that the gods love, which as we have already seen, is an untenable position” - There are some actions that are believed to be morally right, that are independent from what the gods thought - That is favourable to the gods and that explains why the gods love those actions Gods are not causally responsible for the standard of morality, at best they have access to them that is difficult for humans to have THE STORY OF ABRAHAM The Story of Abraham - Is a test set out by God to test Abraham’s faithfulness to him - Involves God telling him to sacrifice his only son to him; Abraham is like all ready to do it (take in he’s been trying to conceive with his wife for years) - At the very last moment, an angel appears and is like “yo sike don’t sacrifice your kid, here’s a ram and also you and your descendants will have many offspring” - Killing his son bc god told him to supports DCT - Doesnt question god he just says ok ima kill mah son - Despite his faith in the “all-knowing power of God”, was Abraham acting morally when he lied to his son and arranged to murder him? - If you say no, then you cannot support DCT - Lied abt killing a lamb - gets materials for it but is acc killing son - “Merely turning to the commands of God for morality is unlikely to be sufficient” G&H INTRODUCE ETHICAL EGOISM Week 6: Ethical Egoism
Readings Egoism and Morals by Contract, Geirsson & Holmgren pp. 83-107 - Waluchow text pp. 121-142 (83-107?) - I’m gonna do pp. 83-107 because those are the pages on ethical egoism in this text - Once the fear of ramifications (consequences) is removed, many people find they are more inclined to commit immoral acts (like stealing) - Ethically speaking, people like this are egoists - Psychological vs. ethical egoism - Is an empirical thesis - Psychological egoism is the thesis that we are so constituted by nature that we always seek what is to our own advantage - Hobbes argues that in each person’s best interest to enter into a contract with others stipulating that everyone will comply with certain rules of conduct, and then to appoint a ruler to ensure that everyone complies with the contract - According to this view, psychological egoism is compatible with social cooperation - “Each of us can pursue his or her own advantage and at the same time, cooperate with others” - Psychological egoism can be used to support arguments of ethical egoism - “A person always ought to seek his or her own advantage” - Some say that if psychological egoism is true, then our moral principles must also be based on the pursuit of our own good - Some also say that because psychological egoism is true, that it is unreasonable to construct a moral theory that does not acknowledge or take it into account - Take the example of giving a homeless person food; psychological egoists would argue that you chose to do so because it made you feel good, and not doing so would have made you feel bad (self-serving) - “Even though the psychological egoist is able to redescribe your motives in such a way that she gives them an egoist interpretation, you alone know the true motivation for your act” - Her description is not verifiable - Ethical egoism is based off of self interest - Highlights enforcement problems - G&H on Egoism A. Intro to Egoisms (G&H, pgs 83 - 87) There are two types of Egoism: 1. Psychological Egoism (P.E.): A descriptive claim about human motivation and behaviour, i.e., as a matter of fac t, individuals act only in their own self-interest. a. It's about people's psychology
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b. What motivates all human action is self interest c. Is there only one source of human motivation 2. Ethical Egoism (E.E.): A normative theory about how people should act, i.e., individuals should only act in their own self-interest. a. Gives a normal about how ppl should act b. The RIGHT thing for you do is to act in ur own self interest You can make mistakes, and even though its bad for you generally, it could be in ur self interest Example: smoking Can make mistakes on what you think it the best for yourself P.E. has been relied upon to support E.E For example, we might argue that because P.E. is true, morality should be based on the pursuit of our own self-interest. P.E. has also been relied upon to support the weaker claim that if it is true then, at the very least, our moral system ought to take self-interest into account. Is P.E. true? This is an empirical question about individual motives. Some have argued that all motives can be re-described egoistically. While these sorts of re-descriptions are possible, their mere possibility does not show that they are true... especially given that they are empirically unverifiable. Moreover, any re-description of motives that can be offered by a proponent of P.E. could also be offered by a proponent of psychological altruism... again, the possibility of re- description does not show its true. Idk smth smth but he basically says like with PE you can make yourself technically believe smth is in your best interest E.E. may be true even if P.E. is not. Should only be motivated through self interest not motivated by others E.E. is often said to be self-contradictory because it cannot be recommended for others; but it is possible that all of us acting out of self-interest might enter into a mutually beneficial arrangement (and this is what Gauthier will argue in D below). EE is not universally true, its only true to you Self contradictory: EE states that you should not be motivated by others however if you think doing stuff in the best interest of others is in your own self interest then yah it works Aka your self interest is taking into account other peoples self interest Likely the biggest problem with E.E. is that it fails to capture our intuitions about things like justice, fairness, and friendship.. Biggest problem: intuitions EE contradicts our understanding of the universe COLLECTIVELY We don't typically think we should take advantage of friends who are 'down-on-their-luck' even if it's to our advantage to do so. Similarly, we think that justice ought not be determined by individual advantage.
Glaucon and Adeimantus Defend Egoism B. Plato - Egoism in The Republic (G&H, pgs 88 - 96) **JUSTICE AND MORALITY ARE INTERHCANBEL This section of The Republic presents one definition of justice, one that tries to show self-interest ought to be (E.E.) that which motivates action. The Point : The pursuit of self-interest at the expense of the weaker is, and ought to be regarded as, the means by which to secure the most beneficial life. Glaucon and Adeimantus (Plato's brothers) defend an altered version of Thrasymachus' position that 'might makes right (i.e., justice is whatever works to the advantage of those with the power to decide what's right). Articulates a more common view, widely shared view Agrees with acting based off self interest - includes satisfying and acting on the basis of satisfying yourself and what is the most beneficial for you The ideal view is injustice, not caring about others and only doing things in ur best self interest even if it hurts others Which makes it skeptical bc u dont care about other people Note: they are only explaining wah people think is the best view not their perspective Explains the “just life”?? The nature and origin of justice according to Glaucon is simply that most individuals are too weak to avoid the negative consequences of doing wrong or being wronged, and so must submit to the laws of society. Bc they dont want to suffer the consequences of being caught for doing the wrong thing Getting caught is like an inconvenient thats interfering with you satisfying yourself interest Justice is, on this view, a compromise between 'the best outcome (doing whatever you want with impunity) and the worst outcome (suffering wrong without the power to retaliate). No one is interfering with what you want to do but u are also not a slave to anyone abt doing good What if two men had Gyges ring, one who was unjust, one who was just? Gyges ring - invisibility ring and gives it to One who wanted to follow the rules One who didn't want to follow the rules The ring basically allows u to do what u want and get what u want without getting caught bc u are invisible Saying that if you have the opportunity to act in the best interest, you would seize it and not ignore it Even the just man would succumb to the temptations of wrongdoing with total immunity from bad consequences (P.E.).
And what's more, if the just man were to fail to take advantage of his situation, "people would think him a miserable fool" (p. 90) (E. E.). What if we imagine two men, one who was perfectly unjust, one who was perfectly just? How could we expect their lives to go? In the case of the perfectly unjust man, his life would go really, really well; he would get to do whatever he wanted without consequence and live a life with the reputation of a just man. Bc they would appear as a good person but still get what they want and can basically do bad things but they won get caught Cares abt own interset The perfectly just man, by contrast, would live a miserable life of pain and suffering; he wouldn't be able to do what he wanted, and would suffer from a bad reputation (because if not, the purity of his just motives would be in doubt). Bc if you always doing the right thing, a good rep was never a concern for you so youd be miserable Cares about others interest and not their own It follows that it’s better to live a life of injustice (E. E.). EE proves that self interest is a priority Adeimantus then jumps in to refine/complete the argument... Society recommends a life of justice. In every case, it is because the life of justice provides a better reputation, both in the eyes of society and of the gods. The life of being concerned with others is actually being motivated by an unappeal to self interest Bc caring abt others interest is important to you and that is ur own self interest (caring abt others) If justice is merely a means of establishing a good reputation, you ought to put on a 'show' publicly, but in private you ought to pursue what is good for you irrespective of negative consequences to others. Show good to others but when ur alone u can do bad ? What's more, the poets say that the Gods can be placated after life by asking for forgiveness, praying, and making burnt offerings. Gods will eventually forgive you as long as you have a good rep To refute this position, Socrates, requires you show the benefits of a life of justice outweigh those of the life of injustice (or, alternatively, that the harms of injustice are greater than the harms of justice). Rachels on Egoism C. James Rachels - Down with Egoism(s)! (G&H pgs. 97 - 106) The Point: There are at least 2 assumptions made by common-sense morality (i.e., other people's interests are morally relevant, and we can be motivated to act by moral
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reasons) that are inconsistent with either version of egoism, rendering both implausible (if not entirely false). Both PE and EE are implausible bc they are at odds of shared moral experience/ our shared general understanding of the way in which rules are intended to guide and or evaluate the rightness or wrongness of our behaviour - at least towards others Rachels thinks PE is wrong What are those 2 common sense assumptions? Section 1 : Moral assumptions. Assumption 1: Other humans and their interests matter when I try to decide which actio I ought to pursue. Other people matter Contradicts with EE bc EE suggests that other people's feelings does not matter and is irrelevant Assumption 2: Sometimes people do act in the interest of others. If either P.E. or E.E. is true, then these assumptions are unfounded, meaning morality is not what we thought it was. Morality typically assumes that you DO give a crap abt people, not just yourself Section 2: Arguments for P.E., and their Problems Premise 1 or P1: All actions are performed voluntarily All actions that people undertake are performed as a result of their own choices P2: Voluntary actions are representative of what an agent wants to do Voluntary actions usually refer to self interest - satisfying their own desire Critique: Therefore, any action done because an agent wants to do it must be selfish. Their motivation is self interest 1st objection: P2 is false since i. Some actions we don't want to perform are undertaken as a means to an end, and ii. We perform some actions because we feel we are obligated to perform them, even if we don't want to. Bc the fact that we choose to do smth doesn't actually mean we want to do the thing Example: mowing your lawn for gma even if u didnt want to do it There are lots of time weact a certain way evne if we dont want to 2nd objection : Even if we grant both premises, it does not follow that because I want to do something, I am acting selfishly. There's a difference between satisfying a desire and acting in a selfish manner. Self interest and selfishness is not the same thing Selfishness refers to getting what you want, satisficing your self interest, in a way that disregards others Example for doings thats that are not in your self interest but still doing it anyways bc u consider others Paying for a chocolate bar even if you don't want to but it would be in the best interest of the shop owner if you paid so u pay
Another argument P1: Unselfish acts produce a sense of self-satisfaction. P2: Self-satisfaction is pleasurable. C: Therefore, unselfish actions are actually selfish because they produce pleasure. Doing things for other people increases our sense of well being Being nice to others, makes us feel good esp if we are noticed Problems with it 1st objection : The fact that I get pleasure from altruism shows I want to be altruistic, not that I am selfish. U want to do smth good for someone else bc it gives you self pleasure That is what is motivating your self interest 2nd objection: My altruistic motivation must precede the pleasure I gain from acting altruistically. Wouldn't be able to get pleasure form acting altruistically if i didn't have acting altruistically in the interest of other people Its only bc i have this preexisting concern for the intestines of other people that experience pleasure when i act in way that acc satisfies the interest of other people So why does anyone support PE..? Because it is a simple and universal explanation of human motivation. Its always about self interest Three Broad problems with PE: 1. There is a difference between selfishness and self-interest 2. The arguments create a false dichotomy between self-interest and altruism as mutually exclusive, and exhaustive, sources of motivation for action i. That there are only two options (which is wrong) 3. It is false to maintain that an appeal to personal welfare is incompatible with a desire for the personal welfare of everyone to be secured Section 3: Arguments for E.E., and their Problems There is no reason that I should take the interests of others into account when I act, hence I should not act for any reason other than my self-interest The biggest argument against E.E. is that it is inconsistent on the grounds that it cannot be universalized. It goes something like this: Based off of rachel P1: An action is right if and only if it applies to all in the same circumstances. People who dont accept EE, reply on this Moral rules need to apply to everyone and everyone has to agree is what its saying Killing is bad for you and killing is bad for hte next person P2: The egoist cannot universalize (i.e., cannot require that everyone be an egoist) because doing so would undermine the satisfaction of the egoist's self-interest.
If they extend that rules of “u should act on ur best interesting” they extend to everyone else and might not always be consistent with the egoist? P3: If the egoist did universalize, each individual would receive instructions that they know their fellows received, instructions that would require violating the interests of their fellows (and ultimately their own interests). If he puts forth the idea of always doing stuff for ur self interest and everyone follows that instruction, at some point someone will act against that instruction C: therefore EE necessarily leads to internal inconsistency Bc it says that you are either an EE or not an EE Rachels does not believe that this argument works because E.E. only asserts that each individual needs to act however is necessary to promote their own self-interest: that's consistent with advocating that others be altruists. EE should basically keep their thoughts to themselves So E.E. cannot be shown to be logically impossible. The only possible response is that human life is important in morality because human life is important... it's an attitude that is fundamental to moral life. EE need to have a very firm view for them to acc articulate their views Very rare Prob someone who has no friends or family and rly just doesn't care about anyone As an attitude, it is a pre-argumentative value. This value is so fundamental, it is really hard to imagine a proponent of E.E. who does not accept it. PLATO “THE MYTH OF GYGES” THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY D. Rational Agreement on Moral Principles. Waluchow, pgs. 121 - 142 The Historical Social Contract The Social Contract theory of morality is inspired by early attempts by political philosophers to articulate a theory of legitimate government authority grounded in a 'social contract; government authority is legitimate because each individual citizen accepts that authority. Govt makes us do things that we wouldn't independently do on our own They use force Why is it legitimate why is it permissible Divine right of king Bc king said so bc god said so
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This is where democracy comes from Dominant western view and understanding of the legitimacy of govt authority and thats 5 distinct features of human existence that need to be taking into account of why ppl choose to restrict their freedos and listen to govt 1. basic equality (in terms of needs and desires, and our capacity to fulfill them) a. Were all equal b. All have the same needs, need to eat and water c. If we are not equal there would be chaos 2. best means of survival is with other persons, under a system of laws a. We have to live with other people b. There’s social cooperation c. Example: if u were a hermit, youd need to farm for food etc etc i. But living in society, you can drive to buy groceries ii. There are people who make food d. There are clear rules that prevent bad things from happening to you 3. moderate scarcity a. We need to compete for resources but not to a degree where we need to kill each other b. Not in a state of absolute abundance and not in a state of absolute scarcity c. There is moderate scarcity 4. limited altruism a. Its not that we dont care abt other people vice versa b. Neither devil's nor saints 5. practical (i.e., self-interested) rationality a. Rational The first "Social Contract theorist was Thomas Hobbes, and his view tends to be the most influential on those who defend a Social Contract theory of Morality. Set up social contract Hobbes's starts by articulating what life would be like without government or laws, i.e., in the 'State of Nature'... it would be really, really, really bad. Isn't trying to justify political authority Ppl agree to be bound by governmental authority based off what life is without govt Scary There would be nothing without authority and just a constant fear of deat and the life of man - poor nasty its bad It would, in particular, prevent all of us from securing our own self-interest, because it would be a constant 'war of all-against-all'; no one could trust they wouldn't be attacked by their neighbors. Rationality creates these nasty thoughts that everyone is against you Only way to secure interest is to do bad things – killng peopl e
The only way to secure our self-interest would be to leave this condition, and the only way to do that would be to sign away our liberty to all things to a sovereign, who would provide us with security against our fellows. Hobbes says only rational thing to do is to all collectively give up ur freedom and listen to this authority It was in our best self interest to do this trade off What makes Hobbes a P.E. is his claim that we do all act in our own self-interest in preservation motivates action; that's what makes the state of nature bad (self-interest is not secured) and makes life under the sovereign look good (self-interest is secured). Modern Social Contract Theory of Morality (SCM) Moral rules are not enforced Individuals have to choose to conform to those rules A set of standards that would be accepted by rationally self-interested individuals able to recognize the benefits of living under those standards. The most significant proponent of SCM is David Gauthier... his view is a variant of E.E. because on his theory, the only reason you ought to accept a moral code is that it protects self-interest. The advantages of such a view are: 1. Morality works on behalf of, not against, my interests. a. Doing the right thing is the best for me b. Rachel tries to explains that its just inturnitve c. Doing the right thing is some kind of sacrifice 2. All we need for a moral theory are accounts of the basic desires and practical rational faculty of individual humans. 3. We can accommodate relativism because 'core' moral standards are universal and objective, but also admits of great variation across cultures based on changing circumstances. a. Morals can change based off of desires and the perspectives of individual In this scenario - 2 thieves - they need to do a job and if they are arrested do agree not to rat each other Social contract - not to rat each other They are arrested and both separated and asked a series of questions Police says if you confess to this crime that you and your partner do i will give u 1 year and the other guy gets 10 years
Vice versa If neither confess then both get 2 years If you both confess its 5 years each Refers to rationality and how self interest could go astray Best outcome is 2 years each only IF you both dont confess But due to self interest - someone gonna rat someone out bc 1 year is the best What Gauthier points out is that structural problems only arise if we adopt a strategy of 's traightforward maximization ' - the problem can be easily avoided if we adopt the position of the 'constrained maximizer" The prisoners are both maximalists They're not seeing the bigger picture, they are only focused on themselves The problem with c onstrained maximization is that it will only work if others are willing to cooperate by adopting a similar strategy. On this view, there is no morality prior to an agreement- morality is merely a rational response to our pre-contractual situation. That is the problem That is the skepticism And rationality is the basis on which we can rely on the promises of others to abide by the agreement. Those unwilling to cooperate will be excluded from the benefits of cooperation and will therefore develop a constrained maximizer position in the end. How do we choose actual Moral principles on Gauthier's account? We select that set of principles that minimizes the maximum relative concession that needs to be made by any of the contracting parties in order for the agreement to exist. By forcing us to recognize possible alternative states of affairs, we can imagine alternate moral worlds and so the possibility of real moral progress is almost mathematical on this view.. morality improves as individuals become more rational.
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