BostonMarathonBombingCase Study (1)
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Jan 9, 2024
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Case Study
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Background
Following the devastating Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, numerous organizations and sectors had to act quickly and cooperatively. The coordination and collaboration between various sectors and organizations were instrumental in handling the crisis and improving the community's ability to pool resources and plan coordinated responses. Marathon event preparation involves a collaborative network of public, private, and nonprofit organizations representing the medical, law enforcement, and emergency management fields. Decades of collaborating on the marathon event have led to institutionalizing a collaborative culture among these agencies, in which they train and work together before, during, and after the marathon (DHS, 2013). The Boston Marathon is an annual city event that draws tourists and marathon runners from all over the world. The 2013 event marked the marathon's 117th year. Approximately 24,000 runners representing 92 countries and each U.S. state participated in the 26.2-mile course through the city's heart (MEMA, 2014, After Action Report for the Response to
the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings).
Twenty-seven thousand runners registered for the race that day (MEMA, 2014); when no more runners were to pass by security and medical staff vacated their stations as the runners finished the course. An explosion shook the finish line at 2:49 p.m. Another explosion happened about 180 yards up the course 13 seconds later (MEMA, 2014). IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, were the source of these explosions. They had been hidden in backpacks in the areas designated for spectator viewing along the course. Following the second explosion, it was discovered that 264 people had been hurt, 16 of whom needed amputations, and three people had
died (MEMA, 2014). In the days that followed the emergency response at the scene, law enforcement had pictures of the people they believed to be the attackers. Following the public
release of these images, a press conference was arranged to address the public and urge them to come forward with any tips they may have for law enforcement (MEMA, 2014). This information sparked the ensuing manhunt for the two brothers who carried out the bombing.
After the bombings, the two brothers attempted to steal a police officer's weapon and killed him. Following this, they carjacked a resident of Boston's Allston neighborhood. After managing to get away, the victim reported the carjacking to the police. The victim was aware of the brothers' plans to carry out a second bombing in a different city (MEMA, 2014). Subsequently, the stolen SUV parked on the side of the road was identified by the Watertown Police Department. One brother started shooting as the police drew near the car, while the other brother threw bombs at them. During this gunfight, one of the brothers was shot; the other brother, who was unharmed, drove the stolen SUV toward the group while the police tried to capture him. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was run over and dragged by the SUV while the police officers managed to get away from the car (MEMA, 2014).
On Friday, April 19, at 1:06 a.m., the injured brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, was declared deceased (MEMA, 2014). This prompted efforts to find Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the other brother. A resident was inspecting his boat at 6:42 p.m. when he discovered a body and a blood-stained tarp
inside. Police officers were dispatched to the scene as soon as the resident called them. Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev was captured after a brief gunfight with the police in which he emerged from the boat. Following that, he was taken to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center because of the multiple injuries he had received during the shootout with police. In order to reduce the likelihood that a catastrophic event like this one will occur again in the future, this case study aims to
1.
Identify and assess the key issues that significantly influenced the critical incident management plan to respond to the bombing,
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2.
Outline the lessons learned from the analysis and offer recommendations for better critical incident management execution and
3.
Offer and assess the valuable applications from the analysis.
Key Issues
Even with everything that went well during the bombings, certain things still needed to be improved. The absence of an integrated public safety plan was the first of these. Although each of the specialized teams had separate plans in place to handle possible calamities, these plans needed to be integrated into one, resulting in the absence of a shared operational framework (MEMA, 2014). Assistance may be delayed because of this lack of a shared operational picture since organizations will need to consult with one another to identify parts of the plan that could have been examined in advance. Although the level of law enforcement presence at previous events was adequate, it could be increased going forward. Increasing the number of law enforcement officers may discourage would-be terrorists from carrying out attacks. Future research will also examine what can be brought to specific locations during the race, such as big backpacks close to the finish line (MEMA, 2014). Despite the goal of keeping the event family-friendly, both participants and spectators need to have a certain level of security.
Another critical issue related to the bombing was the level of intelligence received about the two suspects. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) provided information about the brothers to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Tamerlan Tsarnaev had left the country to go to Dagestan in order to associate with people who raised suspicions among Russian intelligence. The FBI registered him in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database following warnings from Russian intelligence, but they took no further action
(Gunaratna & Haynal, 2013, p. 3). Regardless of the political affiliation of those providing the information, the intelligence should have at least been acted upon and followed up on, even in light of the evident political tensions between the U.S. and Russia. Linkage blindness occurred among states as well as external stakeholders. When Tamerlan was present at mosque events, members of the local Muslim community felt uneasy about his radical views. Because the mosque was too moderate for their tastes, neither brother attended it frequently (Gunaratna & Haynal, 2013, p. 54). However, because the brothers were infrequent attendees at the mosque, those who did attend often felt that their inconsistent behavior did not warrant a formal FBI report. This highlights the significance of the local communities in apprehending domestic terrorists, also known as "lone wolves." Those who live in the area are in the best position to identify individuals who, in certain situations, are acting abnormally. Perhaps if the FBI had been
notified of these problems earlier, along with the Russian intelligence, the brothers might have been apprehended before launching their attacks. Analysis
This case study is being analyzed as part of a class assignment. I have no direct stake in the results or conclusions of this analysis. Several agencies and sectors collaborated to guarantee a prompt and efficient reaction to the bombing, resulting in a highly coordinated response. This involved organizing the medical response, the investigation, and the assistance given to the victims and their families (Hu et al., 2014). The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Headquarters in Farmington was home to the MACC at the beginning of the race. It was fully operational and manned by over 80 personnel from a variety of agencies, including the American Red Cross, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), local police and fire departments, and the Fusion Center (MEMA, 2104). The interorganizational coordination was used to address the crisis, as a variety of organizations collaborated, including law enforcement, healthcare, and nonprofits. To investigate the incident and capture the suspects, for example, the Boston Police Department collaborated closely with the FBI and other law enforcement organizations. Healthcare providers and hospitals collaborated to treat injured patients and support their families (Hu et al., 2014). This was a fantastic use of an incident command system—not just for responding to a disaster or attack, but for a major event as well. It also showed excellent departmental and agency coordination and interoperability at the local, state, and federal levels. There was a plan in place to manage the reaction before the attack happened. Additionally, because of the previously mentioned preparations, the reaction to any emergency would happen quickly. Since 9/11, bystanders have also adopted a new mindset that prioritizes helping those in need and intervening in situations sooner rather than later. It is impossible to predict when a terrorist attack might escalate (e.g., when a plane is used as a missile) or what kind of harm might be inflicted (e.g., collapse of entire buildings). As soon as the explosions started, onlookers
hurried to help those who needed it. Within thirty minutes of the attack, at a nearby hotel, a Unified Command Center (UCC) was set up. It coordinated first responders effectively, streamlined task execution, gathered vital information, and collaborated with the MACC (MEMA, 2104). Teams tasked with disposing of explosive ordnance were sent out quickly to start looking through any suspicious bags or packages. In less than 30 minutes, the National Guard was repositioned to guard the incident area (MEMA, 2104). To inform the public and prevent chaos, the UCC and MACC collaborated to send out regular, well-planned public messages (MEMA, 2104).
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Lessons Learned and Recommendations
When assessing the Boston Marathon Bombing's success or failure, preparedness and readiness stick out as successful aspects. The incident also helped to reveal the actual state of homeland security following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The city's residents displayed exceptional bravery when the bombs went off; many raced to the scene to help the victims. The injured victims' lives were saved when the citizens used a variety of practical techniques to stop the bleeding. With haste, a field station was established to provide emergency care for the victims. Additionally, the police, ambulance services, and medical facilities responded quickly and took the initiative. There are several things to take away from this experience. Homeland security operations
are, in fact, localized; they begin at the local level and require prompt action from the provincial authorities. Coordination between individuals with shared knowledge is necessary for an effective response to counteract unforeseen events. Furthermore, it was necessary to note that the
state's management functions can be executed more effectively when competent and problem-
focused improvisation is applied. It also became abundantly evident that proper and effective homeland security must be implemented across all governmental levels, from local to federal, and that interagency and intergovernmental relationships are essential. This includes the tidbits of knowledge from the nation's ordinary citizens. The Boston Marathon event has highlighted the
need for close coordination between federal, state, and local officials in the wake of terrorist attacks and in bolstering the values and principles of community contributions from all segments of society, including the public. The secret to success in this case study was teamwork.
Practical Applications
The 9/11 Commission report has two relevant sections to this case study. The first is the suggestion that "...through broad international cooperation, we should do more to exchange terrorist information with reliable allies and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term" (Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). As was previously mentioned, even though Russia is not an exceptionally reliable ally, they were giving FBI agents information about alleged terrorist activity. The intelligence community mainly disregarded the data and did not take any action on it, even though it was reported that Tamerlan Tsarnaev had been meeting with extremist groups while traveling.
Lives could have been saved if this intelligence had been used. The 9/11 Commission also recommended that "Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge" in relation to information sharing. (Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). As was previously mentioned, there was ineffective information sharing not only between countries but also locally with neighbors who attended the same mosque as the brothers. If there had been incentives for information sharing or greater public awareness of the threat, maybe information could have been released sooner, enabling law enforcement officials to take proactive measures rather than waiting for a crisis to strike.
Conclusion
During the Boston Marathon bombing, cross-sector, and inter-organizational coordination
and collaborations improved the community's ability to handle the crisis. To effectively manage
the crisis and provide support for the victims and their families, it made it possible to coordinate response efforts and share resources in an efficient manner. Three areas for improvement were identified despite the achievements. First, expanding the law enforcement presence and being more watchful of what is brought into the race-viewing areas might help prevent such attacks. Additionally, even though the agencies had been collaborating effectively prior to the incident, there was a slight reduction in response time due to the lack of a shared plan, which slowed down communication and execution. Finally, U.S. intelligence agencies received information about the brothers but did nothing with it. If these three areas are improved going forward, everyone involved in an attack will react even faster.
References
Gunaratna, R., & Haynal, C. (2013). Counterterrorism Intelligence Collaboration: Lessons from the Boston Bombing and VIA Rail Plot. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 5(5), 5.
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Retrieved February 2, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/26351147 Gunaratna, R., & Haynal, C. (2013). Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the Boston Bombings. Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(3), 44-63. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/26296939
Hu, Q., Knox, C. C., & Kapucu, N. (2014). What Have We Learned since September 11, 2001? A Network Study of the Boston Marathon Bombings Response. Public Administration Review, 74(6), 698–712. doi: 10.1111/puar.12284
MEMA. (2014). After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings. Boston: Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency; Massachusetts Department of Public Health; City of Boston; City of Cambridge; Town of Watertown; Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Transit Police Department; Mass. National Guard; Mass. State Police. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf