Case Brief 2

Case Citation: Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ____ (2019). Parties: Terance Martez Gamble, Petitioner, United States Facts: Terance Martez Gamble was convicted of second-degree robbery in 2015. Subsequently, he was stopped by a local police officer in Mobile, AL where the officer reportedly smelled marijuana. During a search incident to apprehension, the officer found a loaded firearm. Gamble then pleaded guilty to ex- felon in possession of a firearm under Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-11-72(a). Federal prosecutors then brought charges against him as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Procedural History: In 2016, Gamble pleaded guilty in an Alabama state court for ex-felon in possession of a firearm. He was then charged for being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm under federal law, 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). Gamble again pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the decision on his motion to reverse his conviction. He appealed to the 11 th Circuit on the grounds of violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution. The 11 th Circuit denied his appeal, to which Gamble and his team petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and upheld his federal conviction in a 7-2 decision. Issue: Whether to overrule the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Holding: No. Gamble did not present sufficient evidence to change the way that the dual-sovereignty doctrine of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause has been interpreted. Reasoning: a. The court reasoned that the Dual Sovereignty Clause is what has allowed successive prosecutions from both state and federal court for the “same offence.” In the text of the 5 th Amendment, “the same offence” is defined as “an offence or transgression of the laws.” Fox v. Ohio 1 established that two different sovereignties have two separate laws, thus, two separate offenses. From that came the foundation that both a state and a federal court had the ability to try the same person for the same offense. Further, the two different courts would have different vested interests in this single offense. Gamble references the drafting history of the 5 th Amendment, a provision in which Congress supposedly intended to bar successive prosecutions regardless of the jurisdiction. The Court calls this evidence “shoddy,” and implies that it would “count for little.” Gambled cited three different pre-war cases that defined the double sovereignty doctrine. In those, the Court determined again that the nature of the crime or its effect on public safety could or would constitute separate punishments. The Court continued down its path of cementing the precedent of the dual sovereignty doctrine for nearly 170 years. b. The next issue that Justice Alito expounds on for the majority opinion is that of Stare Decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis has long stood in the courts of the United States as an understanding that courts would follow precedent and remain predictable in that fashion. Gamble must give great reason to dismantle nearly 200 years of precedent behind the dual sovereignty doctrine. To do that, he cites several old English cases, with which accompanies little to no information detailing them. He draws a parallel by claiming that common law of the time demonstrated an established rule barring domestic prosecution for the same act under a foreign jurisdiction – but in reference to an acquittal, not a conviction.

Gamble cites a case from 1677, involving a man named Hutchinson who went on trial in a foreign country for murder and was then accused of that same crime in England. Beyond a bail request denial, there is little information available, save for a supposed decision to bar this subsequent prosecution. The rest of the old English cases used in this argument by Gamble only mention Hutchinson in some loose way, serving to weaken his argument. A reference to Hutchinson stated that foreign court’s decisions were not binding in England, but the Court found that this was likely only in the interest of expediency, rather than law. Justice Alito goes on to say that these English cases only muddy the waters, and the evidence shown by them is inadequate at best. c. Gamble gives reference to State v. Brown 1 , a case in which Brown stole a horse and thereafter, his defense claimed that it would be “against natural justice” for a man to be tried in two separate territories for this same crime. The Court’s answer to Brown was that a rejected judgement in one court could not bar a separate prosecution in another court. Additionally, Gamble claims that with incorporation, the risk of being prosecuted for overlapping state and federal laws is heightened, thus, a closer look at the precedent must be taken – implying that the doctrine of dual sovereignty was an error from the start. Doing away with the dual sovereign doctrine would not do much to hold back the federal government’s proverbial “long arm.” Furthermore, Justice Alito’s opinion continues, doing away with the dual sovereign doctrine would likely not stop concurrent prosecutions of the same crime unless the Court overruled Blockburger 2 , establishing a new definition of the “same offence,” which Gamble did not ask the court to do. Decision: The judgement of the 11 th Court of Appeals was affirmed. Comments: Gamble v. United States 3 served to further cement the doctrine of dual sovereignty, along with dozens of other cases spanning over almost two hundred years. Justices Ginsburg and Gorusch filed dissenting opinions. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg asserts that she believes the Double Jeopardy Clause does bar consecutive prosecutions in different courts for the same offense, citing Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle 4 . Next, she asserts that the decisions in Abbate v. US and Bartkus v. Illinois are “ill advised.” Justice Ginsburg wishes to redefine “offence” as in Blockburger 2 . The fact that the US is all one country and that the states to the US are parts to a whole, per The Federalist Papers. Ergo, the federal and state governments need not attempt to accomplish together what they could not do alone. Further, the reason behind establishing state governments in addition to a federal government was to double-protect these innate human rights. Justice Ginsburg references a failed amendment that wished to allow a prosecution by the federal government but was initially failed at by the state. Although the amendment failed, the fact that the Court has previously enforced precedent which the amendment attempted to allow. Finally, Justice Ginsburg maintains that stare decisis in this scenario is not “inexorable” to overturn. In Justice Gorusch’s dissent, he affirms many of the points that Justice Ginsburg lays out, namely that one court should not be allowed to seek prosecution for a crime that the other has failed at carrying out. If the government is able to continue trying a man until it reached its desired outcome, not much would be left of his liberty. Justice Gorusch shows that the early English common law was to bar prosecutions from two sovereigns, and the 5 th Amendment was America’s effort at enforcing that into its Constitution. The Court’s way of avoiding double jeopardy was insisting that the term “same offense” did the work in its definition alone; the dual sovereignty clause allowed separate sovereigns to do what one could not do alone, twice. He ponders that if both the state and federal governments may prosecute the same offense, what is stopping many other governments from doing the same thing? Justice Gorusch now mentions