How, If at All, States Can Escape the Security Dilemma. Revised.edited
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How, If at All, States Can Escape the Security Dilemma?
Introduction
In international relations (IR) theory, the issue of security problems is typically depicted as
an untamed loop of insecurity. Tang (2010) contends that the issue arises when sovereign nations
fail to define their vulnerabilities and communicate their reasoning for defensive positioning
inside the anarchic world order. The governments are not purposefully attempting to provoke
friction; nonetheless, the diplomatic efforts taken by many nations to maximize security benefits
may culminate in conflict escalation and the devastating prospect of war. The security problem is
framed as an inevitable truth from a conservative, realistic perspective. The truth is reliant on
states operating rationally and maintaining an actual thirst for influence, both of which are
required for a country to protect itself (Feis, 2015). This research is not going against
the conventional traditional realism approach; instead, it will demonstrate from an increasingly
sophisticated neo-realist viewpoint that the problem of security has become an inescapable
prophecy and that even though nations might not truly escape this truth, they can successfully
ameliorate problems surrounding the security paradigm. This point is addressed in three parts in
this article. The first section discusses the complexities of the security quandary to comprehend
the problem of insecurity. The subsequent part asserts that the problem of insecurity is a self-
fulfilling prophecy, whereas the last section argues that, contrary to the classical realists' stance,
avoiding the security dilemma is still conceivable.
The Security Dilemma
In 1950 John Herz emphasized the issue of doubt regarding the intent of nations under
weak global power. Countries' fear persists, creating views that offensive assault is a safe, better
plan to be implemented than collaboration. Such a terrible contradiction explains why wars occur
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notwithstanding all sides' aim for an amicable conclusion of disputes (Collins, 2014). Herz
(1959) defined the security dilemma as "a structural theory wherein countries' self-help efforts to
meet their security requirements tends, irrespective of purpose, to contribute to increased
insecurity for others as each views its actions as defensive and actions of others as possibly
dangerous" (as cited in Collins, p. 563).
Moreover, Robert Jervis contends that the problem of security is the key method of
recognizing how countries with essentially comparable goals, such as stability and their
existence, may end up in conflict, and extreme situations, violence. Jervis adds that the security
quandary is exacerbated by the reality that while a possibly adversarial state "is benign today, it
may turn malicious in the future" (Adams, 2003, p. 58). Because of this paradox, many regimes
anticipate the worst-case scenario and aggressively amass military capability for defense (p. 47).
Collins believes that the challenges surrounding the Cold War, post-Cold War Europe, and
American nuclear strategy are typical and frequently quoted examples exhibiting the security
conundrum (p.565).
Earlier realism scholars argued that nations had to be tough to exist. Thomas Hobbes, an
especially gloomy early realist philosopher, felt that the powerful will always control the weak
and that without substantial strength, the poor are unable to stop this dominance from happening
(Feis, p. 17). About fifty years later, John Mearsheimer argues that governments seeking solely
survival usually have no choice but to diminish the overall authority of nations viewed as
potential threats (Black, 2007). Going beyond human nature as intrinsically hostile, Herz
contends that the major reason for warfare is a nation's drive to exist, as a result, it seeks greater
authority.
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In comparison, Charles Glaser says that nations are primarily concerned with security and
that their efforts to protect security can jeopardize the independence of others. Collins believes
that only when states are uninformed of the motivations of others does a security risk arise.
Whereas this defensive realist viewpoint seems to contradict the realist premise of nations
pursuing power, it nonetheless recognizes the security issue as a self-imposed reality. According
to Roe (2004), Glaser recognizes the theory's use within IR for researchers striving to analyze
several world-changing past events. Denying the security problem is denying a realistic
assessment of human nature.
Jervis proposes the offensive-defensive hypothesis to cover both of the opposing realism
notions on a country's unfriendly or defensive character. The concept, according to Collins,
concentrates on contests conducted between powerful nations, in which aggressive states
constantly seek more strength and defensive ones just desire enough power to be secure. His
approach encompasses four concepts of varying behavior, with varied amounts of insecurity
accumulation measured between stages. He contends that, whereas the global system's anarchic
structure is unalterable, the security challenge itself may shift through time and geography. This
influences the appeal of states to employ a more collaborative or competitive method for
exposing state vulnerabilities (Adams, p. 52). The most harmful behaviors in his concept cause
great powers to shift and become hostile over time. This can result in the accumulation of arms
to counteract each other, in addition to the creation of an atmosphere with little to no
cooperation, validating the argument of this research.
Self-fulfilling Prophecy
Robert Merton holds that a self-fulfilling prophecy is "a faulty characterization of the
circumstance prompting new behavior that renders the initially wrong notion come to pass"
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(Dickie, Gozdecka, and Reich, 2016). Whenever a nation is unsuccessful in effectively
identifying its security position inside the anarchic global system, the security issue self-fulfills.
Although the nation's behavior may be viewed domestically as reasonable concerning the actions
of a different nation, it may needlessly lead another country into a buildup of armaments,
culminating in the exact risk it wanted to avoid.
The internalized insecurity conundrum, argued by Richard Copeland, occurs as a
consequence of rational people within the state apparatus operating on worst-case premises
(Collins, 2014). This perspective underlines the central thesis of this piece because contending
governments that consistently exhibit hard-line, 'rational' conduct is acting recklessly and
causing security issues. This, he argues, is irrational counterbalancing that can give rise to
ongoing disputes and is hard to rectify via organizational structures. Rising Soviet defense
investment before 1955, for example, generated the perception that the USSR was becoming an
armed might capable of capitalizing on any US shortcomings throughout the course of the Cold
War. However, as Jervis notes, the Soviets' massive expenditure and military procurement may
have reflected a real fear of the United States (p.562). Regardless of how Russian intentions were
supposed to be taken, the US assumed the worst and increased its already huge military structure.
This appearing self-fulfilling prophesy of counter-balancing is dangerous. Tang argues
that if a nation undermines its opponent's safety while boosting its own, the deed can backfire,
rendering both less safe than beforehand. The two countries are far less safe now that they have
fostered mutual hostility and increased military might. A nation ought not to seek strategic
superiority that stems from a misinterpretation of the intentions of a potential adversary. The
such unnecessary military expansion puts countries in a power competition. Every attempt to
strengthen one's defenses in an anarchist, self-help society simply serves to motivate others to
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increase their armed forces, leaving nobody more secure than previously. As a consequence, if
other countries get fearful and increase their respective power, the international structure
transforms into a system-wide weapons competition to protect every nation's goals, turning
substantially less protected than it was before.
Remedies to Security Dilemma
The variables that worsen the security challenge also propose potential solutions. First,
depending on whether weapons are exclusively defensive or offensive, it may be able to discern
between an actor ready to attack and one prepared to defend. Fortresses are often defensive, but
they must be staffed by soldiers who can readily be sent on the attack if required (Roe, 2004).
Several types of artillery might be dug in, but the majority is now mobile. As a result, it's
difficult to imagine solely defensive weaponry. On the other hand, pure offensive ones are easy
to imagine: tanks, and nukes. Even though, as we have shown, it is not difficult to present a
reasoned justification for them to play a defensive role (through their influence on deterrence).
Second, another approach would be to depend only on the relative simplicity of defense.
This is known as the offensive-defense balance: when the offense is dominant, it is simpler to
attack and win than it is to defend (Garfinkel and Dafoe, 2019). This can be owing to
technological advances (e.g., tanks with air support against trench warfare in WWI) or ideology
(e.g., the offensive cult that controls most forces, according to which the greatest defense is a
good offense). Before WWI, the French, like virtually everyone else, believed in this cult, which
may have been one of the causes they threw masses of men into the Nazi meat grinder.
Garfinkel and Dafoe feel that location, in addition to technology, can assist relieve part of
the security challenge. According to Ahn (2019), belligerents can construct demilitarized zones –
areas of land designated free of hostile forces. The goal is to keep the opponents apart to limit the
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hazards of surprise attacks and events that might spark reprisals and large-scale violence.
Nowadays, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) divides North and South Korea (Ahn, p. 1047Another
DMZ was formed between Israel and Egypt following the 1956 Suez War when the Sinai
peninsula was demilitarized and guarded by UN forces until Nasser ordered them to depart on
the eve of the Six Day War (p.1055).
The buffer zones are larger-scale geopolitical structures that serve a similar purpose.
These are zones that divide hostile troops, similar to DMZs, although they do not have to be
demilitarized (Westing, 2010). Often, whole states serve as buffer zones between prospective
adversaries. For example, after Napoleon was eventually defeated by the Fourth Coalition in
1815, France was surrounded by the cordon sanitaire, a network of buffer states created to ring
the restless kingdom (Wivel, 2011). It stretched from Belgium in the north to Italy via a network
of German states. The Concert system's designers, who devised it during the Congress of Vienna,
were fairly specific about the role these powers would play in preventing future French
aggression.
Arms control is another option. That is, an agreement to restrict weaponry, maybe even to
make them less hazardous (and costly levels). While it is difficult to eliminate weapons, it is not
so far-fetched to imagine that they may be restricted in some constructive way. There have been
some major triumphs in this field, most notably the many anti-nuclear treaties — test bans, non-
proliferation, nuclear-free zones, armament reductions — chemicals and biological weaponry
treaties, and even conventional military reduction treaties (Ikenberry, 2004). These deals, on the
other hand, are impeded by the difficulty to verify compliance and the typically voluntary nature
of being a party to them. North Korea, as we have seen, violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty
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(NPT), to which it was a signatory. Israel has never ratified the NPT and is largely assumed to
possess nuclear weapons.
Collective security is another technique that is fantastic when it works but fails much too
often to be trusted. The goal is to build a coalition of governments based on the notion that an
assault on one is an attack on all, necessitating a coordinated response to the aggressor (Wivel,
2011). The alliance members also pledge not to target each other. The notion is that such a
system would significantly improve the security of its members over a self-help anarchical
system in which each actor must rely exclusively on his resources for protection. Furthermore,
unlike deterrence, which is based on threats and may increase the security problem, collective
security systems foster collaboration rather than competition, lowering the chance of conflict.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, this security conundrum has grown into an inescapable prophecy, and
although governments are unlikely to be able to completely escape this fact, they might
successfully lessen security-related anxieties. While ambiguity is key in understanding why a
security issue might arise between states that initially did not aim to harm one another, what fuels
animosity is a false conviction about the other's intentions and motives. The sole assurance that
states hold, argues Mearsheimer, is uncertainty. To obtain comparative security, they have to
anticipate the worst and aim for dominance. This viewpoint does not allow for the security
dilemma but rather requires all countries to pursue a course of action that results in the security
predicament and eternal, inevitable security competition. To that end, while governments might
maintain defensive postures in an attempt to alleviate the negative repercussions of the security
dilemma, this merely postpones the inevitable. But, there is a way out of the security quandary.
As previously stated, the variables that worsen the security challenge also propose potential
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solutions. To avoid a security dilemma, member nations must implement methods such as
offense-defense balance, buffer zones, weapons limitation, and even collective security. As
previously stated, such measures can go a long way toward lowering, but not necessarily
eradicating, security concerns.
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References
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deterrence balance. International Security
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Ahn, C. (2019). Disrupting War: Women Cross the Korean DMZ. American Quarterly
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Black, J. (2007). Great powers and the quest for hegemony: the world order since 1500
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Collins, A. (2014). Escaping a security dilemma: Anarchy, certainty, and embedded norms.
International Politics
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Dickie, M., Gozdecka, D., & Reich, S. (2016). Unintended consequences: the impact of
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