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Study Questions for AP502: World War II through Vietnam
1. How did WWI influence the thinking of early airpower theorists?
Guilio Douhet – “a quick victory could be won by early air attack on the enemy’s vital centers, while surface forces work to contain the enemy on the ground” Key Aspects to Douhet’s Theories
Major Assumptions:
Air power is inherently offensive; the bomber will always get through
All future wars will be total wars
Civilian morale can be diminished by direct attack
The dominance of the defensive form of ground warfare is permanent
Thoughts on Targeting:
The first step is command of the air; the next step is destroying vital centers and civilian morale targets. Thoughts on Air Exploitation:
Once command of the air is won, it must be used to punish the civilians so that they will coerce their own government to come to terms in order to end the suffering. This will happen so rapidly that total suffering will be less than that in the trenches. Implications to Douhet’s Theories:
Organization for war:
In order to bring about victory over the enemy before your own civil morale collapses, you must organize air power under a separate air force
Role of other armed forces:
Other armed forces will only stand on the defensive until the air force offensive has been decisive.
Force Structure:
The army and navy will be structured to achieve economy of force;
all the mass possible will be built into the air force. Technology Requirements:
Only one type of airplane is required – the battle plane. It will be of moderate speed, long range, and heavily armored for self protection. If escort protection is required, battle planes will be made part of the strike package armed with only self defense weapons. Everything not put into the battle plane is a diversion that weakens the main effort and reduces the probability of success. Battle planes will have a combination of high explosive, incendiary, and gas bombs to have a synergistic effect. Influence in Italy:
His influence on Italy was quite significant, in that helped bring about the development of an air ministry and separate air force under Mussolini. Col Billy Mitchell shared many of Douhet’s beliefs and also corresponded with Count Caproni (who was closely associated with Douhet in articulation of his theory) on air power employment. The communication between many of the early theorists promoted a vital dialogue in formulating vital ideas on air power. Influence on the US:
His influence on the US was somewhat indirect. Douhet’s contemporary, Count Caproni, was trying hard to sell his bomber to the US, and he closely associated with Douhet in the articulation
of his theory. Col Edgar Gorrell, an early advocate for strategic bombing, met with Caproni and later had an influence on the initial
structuring of the Air Service strategic bombing theory.
Several US air power theorists shared Douhet’s view on strategic bombardment. It can be assumed that Douhet had an influence on the formation of air power thought during that period. Portions of his book Command of the Air were translated and incorporated into the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) curriculum. The ACTS
would produce the air power architects of the strategic bombing campaign of WWII.
Trenchard – Victory can be achieved by bombing enemy vital centers and thus breaking the enemy’s will to fight. Expanded Thesis:
Victory can be achieved by bombing enemy vital centers and thus breaking the enemy’s will to fight. Trenchard seemed to suggest that civilian morale could be undermined by attacking industrial and communications targets and the loss of will would cause civilians to their government into making terms. Major Assumptions:
The bomber will always get through; it does not need an escort
Civilian morale is fragile; the effect of bombing on morale is more than the physical effects
The offensive is the stronger form of war
Night navigation, target acquisition, and bombing accuracy are manageable problems
Air superiority is a prerequisite for all other military operations
Thoughts on targeting:
Trenchard’s ideas of targeting against morale were vague but did allow that international law be followed, collateral damage be limited, targets in urban areas be selected for their military significance, and vital centers in the infrastructure and production systems be attacked.
Thoughts on air superiority:
Seeing only limited success with airfield attacks during WWI, Trenchard believed that at least part of the struggle for air superiority should take place in the air. Thoughts on air exploitation:
Both Trenchard and Douhet aimed at the collapse of civilian morale. However, Trenchard wanted to do it indirectly through the
destruction of infrastructure targets, while Douhet wanted to attack
the people directly.
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Implications of Trenchard’s Theories:
Organization for war:
Originally Trenchard was opposed to both the creation of an air arm and strategic bombing. His reason for the opposition was that the British Expeditionary Force in France was the key to the British role in the war; therefore, the priority for the Royal Flying Corps was support of the ground forces. After the war, Trenchard became more committed to the ideas of a separate air force and the
concept of strategic bombing. He became preoccupied with defending the Royal Air Force from opponents in the army and navy who retained the idea that airpower should remain a support arm. Role of other armed forces:
Trenchard was well indoctrinated in ground warfare. While WWI was still being fought, he was firm in his commitment to ground support and only allowed excess aircraft to be dedicated to independent operations. However, after the war, he argued that the
role of army and navy forces was secondary and that RAF strategic
attack was primary. Force Structure:
After the war, Trenchard gave a very high priority to bomber units.
This prioritization reflected his ever growing belief in the importance of strategic bombing. Technology Requirements:
Arguments have been made that the British squandered a huge lead
in aviation technology after 1918. This was not entirely Trenchard’s fault, however. All the services were held to very tight budgets until after the rise of Hitler. Bomber command was not on-line until 1936, and when war came in 1939, all of its bombers were two engine aircraft of unimpressive performance. Fighter command did succeed with some technological triumphs in
the late 1930’s, but some have argued that was in spite of Trenchard and his disciples. Trenchard’s Impact
Royal Air Force:
Trenchard’s influence on his own service was enormous. He laid down its initial institutions and doctrine. He remained in office for
a decade during a period of theoretical flux and was said to have an
enormous impact on his officers.
Trenchard’s ideas of colonial control through air power had a great
appeal for Britain’s politicians, in that austere period because of their promised economy. They were most successful in Mesopotamia where, indeed, colonial control was maintained at a low cost, but in some other areas they were a disappointment.
Trenchard is in a large part responsible for making the RAF into a strategic attack force with a strong preference for the offensive. However, he did not advocate attacking the civilian population directly to affect morale. United States:
Through the Army Air Service and Army Air Corps, Trenchard helped to stimulate the commitment to strategic bombardment and to reinforce the arguments for an independent air force in America
Trenchard fortified the America Navy’s arguments for keeping naval aviation within the Navy through a negative example; the combining of the royal army and navy air into the RAF was alleged to have been disastrous for the Royal Navy. WWII:
Once the Battle of Britain was over, the RAF returned to its preference for strategic attack but was assisted in doing so by the political leadership. From June 1941 onward, a major concern was
keeping the USSR in the war against Hitler. Stalin complained about the absence of a second front, which did not become possible
until the invasion of Africa in 1942 – or in Stalin’s eyes until OVERLORD in June 1944. In any event the combined bomber offensive against Germany from June 1941 until November 1942 was the only way the allies could attempt to prove their commitment to help the USSR in the defeat of Hitler. We cannot know exactly how much impact this had on Stalin’s thought. Even
more imponderable, was the impact on the German people. One of
the declared goals of the allies in WWII was the extermination of German militarism. Since the burning of Dresden, pacifism has been as strong in Germany as anywhere else in Europe and that outcome may have come from that experience.
William “Billy” Mitchell – Expanded Thesis:
Airpower organized into a separate, and equal autonomous air force under a unified department of defense, could serve as the most effective and economical means of defending the continental US. Even if it came to fighting an overseas enemy, airpower could
decisively attack enemy vital centers without first defeating enemy
armies and navies. Airpower is best generated by nations with populations that are “airminded,” and the US has great potential, but it needs to be developed. Major Assumptions:
The advent of aviation was revolutionary in military terms
Command of the air is a prime requirement
Air power is inherently offensive; The bomber will always get through
Anti-aircraft artillery is ineffective
Airpower can defend the continental US more economically than the navy. Naval warfare is obsolete.
Airmen are a special and elite breed of people, and they alone can understand the proper employment of airpower.
Future wars will be total; the ascendancy of the ground defensive will persist; everyone is a combatant.
Civilian morale is a fragile thing.
Thoughts on Targeting:
Mitchell favored breaking civilian morale through the destruction of other vital centers of industry, infrastructure and even agriculture. Mitchell’s intellectual heirs and the ACTS refined and
synthesized his ideas by using the industrial triangle of the US as the model for the development of the precision bombing theory and doctrine. Thoughts on Air Superiority:
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Mitchell believed that air superiority was a prerequisite for all other military operations. He argued that this would be achieved largely by air battles; however, attacks on enemy airpower on the ground were also in his repertoire. He distained the effectiveness of AAA. Interestingly, Mitchell’s doctrinal descendants at ACTS in the 1930’s may have tended to down play the achievement of air
superiority through air battles, which many say led to a neglect of pursuit and attack aviation in favor of strategic bombing. Thoughts on Air Exploitation:
Once air superiority is established, it can be exploited at will in varied operations against vital centers. Sometimes vaguely described, vital centers were seen as industry, infrastructure, and agriculture which, when destroyed, would lead to the collapse of civilian morale. Implications of Mitchell’s Theories:
Organization for war:
Mitchell argued for separate and equal, but independent air force and for a unified department of defense. Role of other armed forces:
The air force would be the primary force in warfare, with the navy playing a secondary role and an even lesser role for the army. The defeat of an enemy’s army and navy is a false objective; the true objective is the will of the enemy, which can be reached without defeating the enemy surface forces. Force Structure:
Mitchell, at first, advocated a preponderance of pursuit units, but then increasingly emphasized the need for more bomber units. Technology Requirements:
No single type of aircraft was adequate; pursuit aircraft for the command of the air were a paramount requirement, and at least in the 1920’s he stipulated a need for both attack and reconnaissance aircraft. His supporters in the ACTS (and much of the rest of the air arm of the 1930’s) were persuaded that technology had arrived to validate Mitchell’s theories. Modern, high altitude bombers with modern targeting systems would make the bomber a decisive
weapons system that would be difficult to counter with enemy defensive systems. 2. How were aircraft originally viewed/used as a military tool?
Observation and reconnaissance 3. Summarize the theories of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell.
See Above
4. Summarize the significance of the Air Corps Tactics School, General Headquarters Air Force, and Air War Plans Division (AWPD) 1. The Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) was foundational in the first doctrine of the Air Force. The President of the United States (POTUS) had requested from the war department and the department of the Navy a report showing the requirements to face the potential enemy. Within the 30 days given, ACTS & GHQ AF designed a plan called the Air War Plans Division Plan No
1 (AWPD-1). This plan was the first time that escort aircraft were identified as a need and also used principles of war to identify, prioritize and weaponize targets based on objective. None of it would have been possible without the work of the previous ten years, lobbying for a bomber force and current events of the time. 5. What was significant about the July 1943 Army Field Manual 100-20?
It laid the basic elements out that still exist in AFDD-1. 6. Summarize the key doctrinal concepts that were firmly in place by the end of WWII.
Independent operations for air forces
Centralized control for air forces
Efficacy for strategic bombing
7. What affect did the National Security Act of 1947 have on the US military?
The passage of the National Security Act of 1947, and with it the birth of the Air Force, presented an opportunity. To Symington this amounted to a “green light” for further action, rather than an excuse for “resting on our laurels.” September 1947 marked “a first chapter, not a book.” USAF needed to build a record of accomplishment. It looked as if, during a period of austerity, building a strong Air Force would be difficult.
8. How did AWPD 1 become the concept of US bombardment operations in WWII?
AWPD-1 envisaged a global air offensive, initially against Europe, subsequently against the Far East. The plan was finished barely in time to go to the Government Printing Office for
reproduction and inclusion in the War Departments answer. It was submitted to the President as War Department doctrine, and it set the entire stage for the development of the Army Air Forces and the conduct of air warfare. AWPD-1 was made possible only by the years of preparation of air doctrine, a large part of which was evolved here at what was then the Air Corps Tactical School.
9. Briefly describe how AWPD 1 was designed to defeat Germany.
a.
To wage a sustained air offensive against the German military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute toward that power. b.
To support a final offensive if it becomes necessary to invade the continent. c.
In addition to conduct effective air operations in connection with Hemisphere defense
and a strategic defensive in the Far East. o
Bombardment Objectives:
Electrical power
Transportation
Petroleum and synthetic oil
Morale
10. What was the significance and outcome of the 1943 Casablanca Conference?
The invasion of France was once again postponed in favor of the invasion of Sicily. Two other strategic decisions were also made. The first reaffirmed the importance of the massive bombing offensive against Germany, which was just getting under way in earnest. The air offensive had been plagued by diversions from strategic to tactical targets (support for North African landings, for example) and controversy between British and American airmen over the advisability of the daylight, precision-bombing attacks preferred by the Americans. Plans were laid for the combined bomber offensive in which the Americans would bomb by day using precision techniques and the British would use area-bombing techniques at night. The second, and more famous, decision was announced at the concluding news conference, when Roosevelt stated that the allied goal was “unconditional surrender” of the Axis powers. 11. Discuss the direct and indirect effectiveness of strategic bombing by US forces during WWII.
Direct – Attacked the war making production of the German military, defeated the Luftwaffe on the ground, enabled the invasion of France, softened the resolve of the public, and in Japan ultimately ended the war.
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Indirect – Allowed a third front to open in order to give Russia some breathing room and allowing them to push the Germans all the way back to Berlin. 12. How and why were airpower operations conducted differently in the European and Pacific theaters during WWII?
Daylight precision bombing with British night area bombing was the plan for Europe, but in the Pacific, this idea was abandoned quickly due to weather, the jet stream, long flight distances, the distribution of the Japanese industry, and Japanese opposition. This convinced airmen that night low level attacks using incendiary munitions on the highly flammable Japanese cities was the best way to go. 13. What were some of the major technological developments that occurred during WWII?
Armored Warfare (Blitzkrieg) / Mechanized warfare / Tactical Airpower / Reliable Radios / Electronic warfare / RADAR / Atomic Bomb 14. How did the advent of nuclear weapons influence airpower thought following WWII?
Over the next 4 decades, strategic became synonymous with nuclear. The idea was that the strength and deterrence of nuclear warfare should stop the bigger wars and likewise the smaller ones. 15. Summarize the Berlin Airlift and comment on its significance.
The Berlin Airlift was a huge success for the West as it developed round the clock supply shipping by air. It also constituted a warning to American leaders that war with Russia was a very real possibility. Overall, it supplied the British, French and American sectors of Berlin with
enough supplies to wait out the Russian blockade. 16. Summarize and comment on the effectiveness of USAF airpower operations during the Korean War.
At the outset of the war, the USAF was able to establish air superiority and reduce the North Korean AF into near non-existence. They also attacked key strategic targets as well as aided ground forces. This period led to the massive building of the USAF into a premier, nuclear arm of the US military and foreign policy. 17. Summarize the major bombing campaigns of the Vietnam War-ROLLING THUNDER, LINEBACKER I and II-and why they were or were not effective.
The Johnson-McNamara ROLLING THUNDER campaign started as a tit-for-tat campaign to send “messages” to Hanoi. There were too many restrictions and short sighted policy making by
politicians to make the campaign effective. The military repeatedly requested to attack key defensive targets and were denied. This was echoed by the CIA’s director, McCone, and he was
likewise shutdown by the administration. ROLLING THUNDER was a disaster in execution and policy, for it did not reduce the enemy’s capability or will to fight, it strengthened it. LINEBACKER I, while in large part, was much more of a success than ROLLING THUNDER, it had setbacks as well. Technological advances and relaxed Rules of Engagement (ROE) gave planners and executers much more flexibility to be more effective at accomplishing campaign goals and overall strategic goals. Fewer losses occurred as a result and the North suffered heavy losses. However, due to the raging war in the South, vulnerable lines of enemy communication networks were not struck, which made for serious limitations to LINEBACKER I. LINEBACKER II was much more successful in that it was a coordinated effort. The persistence of the bombing force in the form of B-52’s, was so crushing and overwhelming that the North’s IADS was rendered useless by its end. Some setbacks were encountered at the beginning due to poor planning by SAC, but were quickly fixed after several heavy losses of B-52’s. LINEBACKER II ultimately was successful due to its coordinated efforts, its ROE, and overall persistence of select targets aimed at ending the war. It achieved the goal of bringing the North to the negotiating table and allowing the US to get its concessions. 18. Discuss the significance of airpower support to Khe Sanh in 1968 including Westmoreland's and Momyer's roles.
Airpower was the lynch pin which saved Khe Sanh. Due to the crippling attack, the loss of the high ground and the large number of hostiles, the besieged outpost had to be re-supplied by air. This became quite dangerous as, for a time, over half of the supply aircraft that landed at Khe Sanh suffered battle damage. CAS, interdiction, and airlift were practiced extensively at Khe Sanh. At the height of the battle, Gen Westmoreland designated the Seventh Air Force/CC as the
sole manager of air operations at Khe Sanh. This came in the form of Gen Momyer. All the way
up to this point, the Air Force had petitioned for a unified air component commander. This was not fully realized until after the battle of Khe Sanh, but was in practice for the defense of Khe Sanh. 19. List significant technological developments during the Vietnam War.
Precision guided munitions (PGM). C2 was also improved. Jamming Pods/formations. Chaff Corridors. Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARM). Aircraft equipped with laser designators. Cluster bombs. Night attack capability, and terrain following radars. 20. Cite specific examples of how the USAF strayed from its doctrinal heritage between 1947 and 1986.
Beginning of Cold War – AFMAN 1-2 – The beginning of excursion away from the doctrinal principles set forth at the end of WWII and on a path of nuclear deterrence. Eisenhower’s policy of MASS RETALIATION. – Resulted in continuing the efficacy of strategic bombing, but emphasizing nuclear rather than conventional capabilities.
Kennedy’s policy of flexible response to include conventional responses and relying less on nuclear capabilities. Between 1953-1975, there was a significant void in doctrine between unconventional warfare and all out nuclear warfare. Korean conflict went against the centralized control of airpower doctrine. Vietnam – leading up to this conflict, the 1964 AFMAN 1-1 had out of date and out-and-out incorrect doctrine, leaving the AF ill prepared for a conventional air war. AF doctrine did not reflect on the Vietnam experience and continued on the nuclear deterrence path; however, the army then coined airland battle which was the result of studying the effects of
Vietnam and how best to fight the war in Europe should it come. AirLand Battle – became the defacto doctrine for the AF for employing airpower in the post Vietnam era. It relegated the AF to a role similar to that prior to 1930. The Army did not see the
potential or requirement for airpower in a strategic role. It did promote unity between the AF and Army, but it only utilized one element of the versatile abilities of airpower. Since the AF had accepted supporting the ground commanders and nuclear still = strategic, the AF had not outlined the operational level of airpower in warfare. Operation Eagle Claw – Iran – raised serious doubts in the ability of the AF and other services to
effectively integrate into a truly joint team. / Operation Urgent Fury – 3 years later – had the same problems, although a success. In both operations the services entered the operations doctrinally unprepared because they did not address joint operability in their service doctrines. The problems that arose from both operations spurred doctrine writers to address these issues. Gold-Water Nichols Act 1986 – “Army” centric joint doctrine, but got the AF away from doctrinal excursions toward employment as a decisive element of joint operations. 21. Describe how thought, technology, and organization influenced the evolution of air and space
power from 1903 through the Cold War.
22. Describe the route package system used in Vietnam. There was no centralized control of the Vietnam war and thusly there were at least 7 air wars occurring simultaneously. This led to the route package system, since no agreement could be reached on how best to employ airpower. The route package system allowed the Navy to fly to areas 2, 3, 4, and 6B, while the AF had responsibility for areas 5 and 6A. This detracted from the inherent flexibility and synergistic effects of airpower.
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