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The Schlieffen Plan: A Crazed War Plan Why did the Schlieffen Plan Fail? February 2024 Word Count: 2,198

Section 1 The historical investigation taking place will delve into a pivotal moment in military strategy during World War I which is the Schlieffen Plan. Within the paper the question of why did the Schlieffen plan fail will be answered. This will reveal the factors which contributed to the plans shortcomings and why its ambitions had not been actuated. The first source relevant to my investigation is the journal article excerpt (pages 207-212) called “The Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII: A Short Critique” by Philip M. Flammer. This argues the perspective regarding structural flaws in the plan itself created by Moltke forming critical errors when changing parts of the plan as well as executing it. The second source which will be analyzed is another journal article excerpt (pages 262-305) by Terence Zuber called “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered”. This source provides accounts regarding the Schlieffen plan specifically regarding the origin of the plan and lack of consideration of outside factors which affected the plan. The first source written by Philip M. Flammer called “The Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII: A Short Critique” (pages 207-212) provides value due to its origin. This is because Flammer is an expert of history teaching at Brigham Young University who has received his PhD from Yale which can provide further insight than a regular historian. The purpose for writing this was to educate other historians and like-minded thinkers who are analyzing intricacies within the Schlieffen plan. The source is valuable because it offers consideration on the side that had the plan been critiqued in the right ways, the outcome of the war would have been altered. The source is valuable because of the information offered surrounding Moltke shedding light on one perspective but limited from its analysis of a singular perspective. The second source written by Terence Zuber called “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered” (pages 262-305) is valuable in its origin because Zuber is an expert historian who specialized in

the field of WW1 and done significant work on the Schlieffen plan. However, Zuber had also served in the military leading to potential bias from pre-conceived notions about opposing sides. The purpose was to challenge and re-evaluate the traditional interpretations of the Schlieffen plan by looking through different lenses such as decision making and context of the plan. The content in the source is valuable because of consideration of historical context taking place during the plan but is a limitation in the sense that it deviates from widely accepted interpretations of the plan. The political, military, and socio-economic factors that influenced the decision-making all had complexities which contributes to a more thorough understanding of the events, creating new idea or interpretations.

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Section 2 The Schlieffen Plan, an intricately formulated strategy developed by the German General Staff in the lead-up to World War I, sought to secure a rapid and conclusive triumph by first defeating France, followed by a pivot towards the east to confront Russia. However, this ambitious plan ultimately faltered due to a convergence of critical factors like logistical challenges, unexpected resistance from Belgian forces, and the dynamic nature of warfare that stopped its success. Historians have debated why the plan failed from the perspectives of military execution and external factors which relate to inadequate coordination, Belgian resistance and British intervention, French defensive tactics, and Russian mobilization. The other perspective is the structural flaws in the plan itself which is supported by the overambitious nature of the plan, rigidity of the plan, failure to capture Paris, and absence of strategic reserves. Overall, the essay will analyze the two perspectives, military execution/external factors and structural flaws in the plan itself, of why the Schlieffen plan had failed. Structural flaws within the Schlieffen plan can go as far back as when the plan was proposed for the upcoming invasion. The Schlieffen plan proposed an attack in 1914 on France through Belgium and Luxembourg so they could outflank the enemy who had forts from Belfort to Verdun. 1 Phillip M. Flamer called the plan a bold initiative and it was on a rigid, strict schedule. 2 The plan was debated between Helmuth von Moltke and Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen and is have said to been altered by Moltke because he said that Germany should attack through Belgium with only 34 corps while Schlieffen said they would need at least 48.5 corps to 1 Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 193. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307. 2 Philip M. Flammer, “The Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII: A Short Critique,” Military Affairs 30, no. 4 (1966): 208. https://doi.org/10.2307/1985401.

be successful. 3 This would make the right wing to left-wing force ratio 3:1 while in Schlieffen’s original plan it would have been 7:1. 4 Schlieffen passed in 1913 and his successor Moltke altered and adopted the plan in 1914 where Schlieffen couldn’t have given a counterpoint to Moltke’s strategy. It should be noted that Schlieffen was so confident in his plan’s success that he viewed it as a surplus, but this confidence came from a strict following of a military strategy. 5 When new risks arose, Schlieffen chose to underestimate them like the impact of modern weapons on his military strategy. 6 This also contributes reason to why Moltke’s idea on the plan wasn’t argued against. Historians such as Gerhard Grob and Annika Mombauer argue that the difference in numbers is not something of importance because both Schlieffen and Moltke believed that the German army was far superior in quality than in reality. 7 However, Terence M. Holmes counters this by talking about how Moltke stated that “wars are not decided by numerical strength alone.” 8 This is furthered by Holmes who talks about Moltke’s idea being that “the quality of an army might prove decisive in the event, that effect could never be calculated in advance and therefore it should never influence war planning.” 9 Moltke advanced the idea that numbers were most important. It is seen in articles of Moltke warning the chancellor to increase the size of the army in order to preserve what they currently have in Germany. 10 Overall, Schlieffen’s approach 3 Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 193. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307. 4 Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 194. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307. 5 Philip M. Flammer, “The Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII: A Short Critique,” Military Affairs 30, no. 4 (1966): 211, https://doi.org/10.2307/1985401. 6 Philip M. Flammer, “The Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII: A Short Critique,” Military Affairs 30, no. 4 (1966): 211, https://doi.org/10.2307/1985401. 7 Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 198. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307. 8 Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 198. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307. 9 Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 198. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307. 10 Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 198. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307.

created a plan that assumed everything would go perfectly which in a war is extremely unlikely and his plan needs great fortune to succeed making it extremely risky. The military execution and external factors played a significant role in the failure of the Schlieffen plan. Through historian Hans Delbruck’s eyes, the greatest obstacle in the plan was maintaining control of Belgium which involved military execution. 11 He furthers this idea by saying had Germany attacked in the east and defended in the west, they could have swiftly defeated the Russian armies and maintained respect for Belgian neutrality. 12 In doing so, the British would have had less “motif to seek an entente”. 13 Annika Mombauer talks about the ideas of Moltke and he made minimal efforts to address the challenge posed by Germany's weakening position in the war. 14 Ultimately, it highlights Moltke's failure in military execution, as he fails to adapt the plan to changing circumstances that significantly impact the plans execution. 15 The idea of military execution can be combined with external factors in Holger H. Herwig analysis. The general staff’s third section had warned the army that they wouldn’t be able to quickly defeat the French. 16 The ill planning of Schlieffen’s “first strike” plan wouldn’t be able to complete the objective they had in 40 days. 17 Due to this planning, when the troops were sent out in accordance to the plan, they only had enough ammunition for a 40-day war. 18 Moreover, the 11 Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History 6, no. 3 (1999): 263, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26013926. 12 Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History 6, no. 3 (1999): 264, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26013926. 13 Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History 6, no. 3 (1999): 264, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26013926. 14 Martin Kitchen and Annika Mombauer, “Review of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War,” War in History 10, no. 2 (2003): 242, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26061649. 15 Martin Kitchen and Annika Mombauer, “Review of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War,” War in History 10, no. 2 (2003): 242, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26061649. 16 Holger H. Herwig, “Germany and the ‘Short-War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?,” The Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (July 2002): 689, https://doi.org/10.2307/3093355. 17 Holger H. Herwig, “Germany and the ‘Short-War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?,” The Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (July 2002): 691, https://doi.org/10.2307/3093355. 18 Holger H. Herwig, “Germany and the ‘Short-War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?,” The Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (July 2002): 681, https://doi.org/10.2307/3093355.

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external factors Mombauer includes are those like Moltke’s ignorance and belief that a swift campaign in the west was still possible following the dropped plan for the offensive against Russia. 19 Since he hoped for a swift campaign, no preparations were made to account for a long campaign as well as no communication with their closest ally, Austria-Hungary. 20 All of this demonstrates how the external factors and military execution were not properly addressed leading to a total failure of the plan. In conclusion, the Schlieffen Plan's failure can be attributed to its internal flaws and the military execution/external factors. The plan had its issues right from the start, including disagreements about the number of troops required and its rigid nature, relying on everything going perfectly, which was a risky assumption to make during war. Furthermore, managing Belgium posed difficulties, and failure to adapt to changing circumstances was a major problem. The plan suffered from poor planning and ill preparation which led to failure in execution. Ultimately, the Schlieffen Plan's historical failure can be traced back to a combination of structural problems within the plan and the armed forces and external circumstances. This highlights the importance of flexibility and adaptability in military strategy. 19 Martin Kitchen and Annika Mombauer, “Review of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War,” War in History 10, no. 2 (2003): 243, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26061649. 20 Martin Kitchen and Annika Mombauer, “Review of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War,” War in History 10, no. 2 (2003): 243, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26061649.

Section 3 Overall, in my investigation of historians, various methods they utilized have been revealed. For example, through the analyzation of different statistics, the historian is given data which allows them to further support the argument they are making. Historians also compare and contrast sources by analyzing them to allow for new perspectives to be created as well as supporting existing ideas. Through this comparison of multiple sources, primary and secondary, finding common differences and similarities the historians are also able to verify information within the sources allowing for ideas to be factually supported. Within my experience of writing and editing my paper, I was able to further understand the hardships historians face. An instance is seen with the sources utilized involving a variety of different perspectives and opinions on the topic making it hard to decipher the main cause. It creates potential instances is bias due to the exclusion of information such as papers regarding Schlieffen and why he left Moltke as his successor knowing that he would alter the plan he created. Furthermore, all historians face the challenge of wanting to replicate and incident in history to find a definitive answer however that is a major problem because history is a subject that is un-replicable. I faced this issue with specific details such as what Moltke’s motif was for altering the plan. Throughout my investigation of history, I found out that historian’s struggle finding sources with relative information supporting their conclusion due to a differing opinion at times. This also alters the validity of the evaluation because the historian may have a bias and excludes information due to the lack of support it has for their argument.

With all of these methods and issues taken into account, I have realized with what caution and detail historians must approach topics and evidence when coming to a conclusion about an idea. This investigation has fostered my historical analysis growth because it showed me the difficulties historians face and challenges, I may face.

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Sources 1. Flammer, Philip M. “The Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII: A Short Critique.” Military Affairs 30, no. 4 (1966): 207-212. https://doi.org/10.2307/1985401 . 2. Herwig, Holger H. “Germany and the ‘Short-War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?” The Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (July 2002): 681. https://doi.org/10.2307/3093355 . 3. Holmes, Terence M. “Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914.” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 193–213. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098307 . 4. Kitchen, Martin, and Annika Mombauer. “Review of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War.” War in History 10, no. 2 (2003): 242–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26061649 . 5. Zuber, Terence. “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered.” War in History 6, no. 3 (1999): 262–305. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26013926 .

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