Principles Of Economics, Ap Edition, 9781337292603, 1337292605, 2018
8th Edition
ISBN: 9781337292603
Author: Mankiw
Publisher: Cengage Learning (2018)
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Chapter 22, Problem 7PA
Subpart (a):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Subpart (b):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Subpart (c):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Subpart (d):
To determine
Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
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In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia
Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X.
The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
Chapter 22 Solutions
Principles Of Economics, Ap Edition, 9781337292603, 1337292605, 2018
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