MICROECONOMICS-ACCESS CARD <CUSTOM>
11th Edition
ISBN: 9781266285097
Author: Colander
Publisher: MCG CUSTOM
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Question
Chapter 20.1, Problem 4Q
To determine
The strategy of A and B when try to make them safe.
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Consider a game between 2 payers (Ann and Bill) where each chooses between 3 actions (Up, Middle and Down).
1) Create a payoff matrix that reflects this.
2) Fill in payoff numbers that makes this game a Prisoner's Dilemma.
3) Explain why your game is a Prisoner's Dilemma.
Is the solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game a Nash equilibrium? Why?
The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is a Nash equilibrium because no player can improve his or her payoff by changing strategy unilaterally.
The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is not a Nash equilibrium because players do not end up in the best combination for both.
The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is not a Nash equilibrium because both players can improve their payoffs by cooperating.
The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is a Nash equilibrium because it is a noncooperative game in which both players have to expect that the other is purely selfish.
Use the following payoff matrix to answer the questions below.
Cooperate
Defect
1
Cooperate
100, 100
40, 125
Defect
125, 40
50, 50
Which player (if any) has a Dominant Strategy?
[ Select ]
What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? [ Select ]
Does this game satisfy the definition of a prisoner's dilemma? [ Select ]
Chapter 20 Solutions
MICROECONOMICS-ACCESS CARD <CUSTOM>
Ch. 20.1 - Prob. 1QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 2QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 3QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 4QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 5QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 6QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 7QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 8QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 9QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 10Q
Ch. 20.A - Netflix and Hulu each expects profit to rise by...Ch. 20.A - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QECh. 20 - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 3QECh. 20 - Prob. 4QECh. 20 - Prob. 5QECh. 20 - Prob. 6QECh. 20 - Prob. 7QECh. 20 - Prob. 8QECh. 20 - Prob. 9QECh. 20 - Prob. 10QECh. 20 - Prob. 11QECh. 20 - Prob. 12QECh. 20 - Prob. 13QECh. 20 - Prob. 14QECh. 20 - Prob. 15QECh. 20 - Prob. 16QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 2QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 3QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 4QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 5QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 6QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 1IPCh. 20 - Prob. 2IPCh. 20 - Prob. 3IPCh. 20 - Prob. 4IPCh. 20 - Prob. 5IPCh. 20 - Prob. 6IPCh. 20 - Prob. 7IP
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