Mergers . Sometimes in a weighted voting system two or more players decide to merge-that is to say, to combine their votes and always vote the same way. (Note that a merger is different from a coalition-coalitions are temporary, whereas mergers are permanent.) For example, if in the weighted voting system [ 7 : 5 , 3 , 1 ] P 2 and P 3 were to merge, the weighted voting system would then become [ 7 : 5 , 4 ] In this exercise we explore the effects of mergers on a player’s power. a. Consider the weighted voting system [ 4 : 3 , 2 , 1 ] . In Example 2.9 we saw that P 2 and P 3 each have a Banzhaf power index of 1 / 5 . Suppose that P 2 and P 3 merge and become a single player P ∗ . What is the Banzhaf power index of P ∗ ? b. Consider the weighted voting system [ 5 : 3 , 2 , 1 ] . Find first the Banzhaf power indexes of players P 2 and P 3 and then the Banzhaf power index of P ∗ (the merger of P 2 and P 3 ). Compare. c. Rework the problem in (b) for the weighted voting system [ 6 : 3 , 2 , 1 ] . d. What are your conclusions from (a), (b), and (c)?
Mergers . Sometimes in a weighted voting system two or more players decide to merge-that is to say, to combine their votes and always vote the same way. (Note that a merger is different from a coalition-coalitions are temporary, whereas mergers are permanent.) For example, if in the weighted voting system [ 7 : 5 , 3 , 1 ] P 2 and P 3 were to merge, the weighted voting system would then become [ 7 : 5 , 4 ] In this exercise we explore the effects of mergers on a player’s power. a. Consider the weighted voting system [ 4 : 3 , 2 , 1 ] . In Example 2.9 we saw that P 2 and P 3 each have a Banzhaf power index of 1 / 5 . Suppose that P 2 and P 3 merge and become a single player P ∗ . What is the Banzhaf power index of P ∗ ? b. Consider the weighted voting system [ 5 : 3 , 2 , 1 ] . Find first the Banzhaf power indexes of players P 2 and P 3 and then the Banzhaf power index of P ∗ (the merger of P 2 and P 3 ). Compare. c. Rework the problem in (b) for the weighted voting system [ 6 : 3 , 2 , 1 ] . d. What are your conclusions from (a), (b), and (c)?
Solution Summary: The author explains the Benzhaf power distribution, which gives a complete distribution of the contribution of every player in the voting system.
Mergers. Sometimes in a weighted voting system two or more players decide to merge-that is to say, to combine their votes and always vote the same way. (Note that a merger is different from a coalition-coalitions are temporary, whereas mergers are permanent.) For example, if in the weighted voting system
[
7
:
5
,
3
,
1
]
P
2
and
P
3
were to merge, the weighted voting system would then become
[
7
:
5
,
4
]
In this exercise we explore the effects of mergers on a player’s power.
a. Consider the weighted voting system
[
4
:
3
,
2
,
1
]
. In Example 2.9 we saw that
P
2
and
P
3
each have a Banzhaf power index of
1
/
5
. Suppose that
P
2
and
P
3
merge and become a single player
P
∗
. What is the Banzhaf power index of
P
∗
?
b. Consider the weighted voting system
[
5
:
3
,
2
,
1
]
. Find first the Banzhaf power indexes of players
P
2
and
P
3
and then the Banzhaf power index of
P
∗
(the merger of
P
2
and
P
3
). Compare.
c. Rework the problem in (b) for the weighted voting system
[
6
:
3
,
2
,
1
]
.
d. What are your conclusions from (a), (b), and (c)?
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, subject and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Introduction: MARKOV PROCESS And MARKOV CHAINS // Short Lecture // Linear Algebra; Author: AfterMath;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qK-PUTuUSpw;License: Standard Youtube License
Stochastic process and Markov Chain Model | Transition Probability Matrix (TPM); Author: Dr. Harish Garg;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sb4jo4P4ZLI;License: Standard YouTube License, CC-BY