Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
12th Edition
ISBN: 9780134078779
Author: Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 19, Problem 6.2P
To determine
Identify the concept of voting paradox.
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Let's see whether quadratic voting can avoid the paradox of voting that arose in Table 5.3 when using 1p1v in a series of paired-choice
majority votes. To reexamine this situation using quadratic voting, the table below presents the maximum willingness to pay of Garcia,
Johnson, and Lee for each of the three public goods. Notice that each person's numbers for willingness to pay match her or his
ordering of preferences (1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd choice) presented in Table 5.3. Thus, Garcia is willing to spend more on her first
choice of national defense ($400) than on her second choice of a road ($100) or her third choice of a weather warning system ($0).
TABLE 5.3 Paradox of Voting
Preferences
Public Good
Garcia
Johnson
Lee
National defense
1st choice
3d cholce
2d cholce
Road
2d cholce
1st choice
3d cholce
Weather warning system
3d choice
2d choice
1st choice
Election
Voting Outcomes: Winner
1. National defense vs. road
National defense (preferred by Garcia and Lee)
2. Road vs.…
In a congressional district somewhere in the U.S., a new representative is being elected. The voters all have one-dimensional political views that can be neatly arrayed on a left-right spectrum. We can define the ”location” of a citizen’s political views in the following way. The citizen with the most extreme left-wing views is said to be at point 0 and the citizen with the most extreme right-wing views is said to be at point 1. If a citizen has views that are to the right of the views of the fraction x of the state’s population, that citizen’s views are said to be located at point x. There are two candidates for the congressional seat and they are forced to publicly state their own political position simultaneously on the zero-one left-right scale.
1.a Suppose voters always vote for the candidate whose stated position is nearest to their own views and suppose each candidate cares only about getting as many votes as possible.
In equilibrium, what will be the two candidates’ positions?…
Please help me with this question ASAP
Chapter 19 Solutions
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
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- 4arrow_forwardSuppose that Katie and Kelly each expect to receive $500 worth of marginal benefits from a proposed new recreation center, whereas Kerry expects to receive only $100 worth. If the proposed tax levied on each for the center would be $450, a majority vote will Multiple Choice pass this project. defeat this project and resources will be underallocated to it. defeat this project. pass this project and resources will be efficiently allocated to it.arrow_forwardwith largest remall 6. In Table 13.15, we again show the same results from the Oslo district in the 2005 Norwegian elections. Answer the following questions. As before, you should ignore the "others" category. a. Copy Table 13.15. Imagine that the seventeen seats in Oslo are to be allocated according to the d'Hondt divisor method. Show the different quotients that are calculated when you divide each party's vote total by the d'Hondt divisors in your table. How many seats does each party obtain? b. Now repeat the process using the Sainte-Laguë divisor method and then the modified Sainte-Laguë divisor method. Note that you will need to change the integers used to estimate the quotients. How many seats does each party obtain under these divisor systems? c. Are there any differences if you examine the seat allocations from the two quota systems and the three divisor systems? Does one method produce a more proportional or fairer outcome in your opinion than another? TABLE 13.15 Legislative…arrow_forward
- I need help with this one pleasearrow_forwardExplain how affirmative and negative majority votes can sometimes lead to inefficient allocations of resources to public goods. Is this problem likely to be greater under a benefits-received or under an ability-to-pay tax system? Use the information in Figures 17.1a and 17.1b to show how society might be better off if Adams were allowed to buy votes.arrow_forwardAnswer and give proper reason of your choice . We will rate accordingly with 3-4 votes.arrow_forward
- 16. You are an assistant to a senator who chairs an ad hoc committee on reform- ing taxes on telecommunication services. Based on your research, AT&T has spent over $15 million on related paperwork and compliance costs. Moreover, depending on the locale, telecom taxes can amount to as much as 25 percent of a consumer's phone bill. These high tax rates on telecom services have become quite controversial, due to the fact that the deregulation of the tele- com industry has led to a highly competitive market. Your best estimates indi- cate that, based on current tax rates, the monthly market demand for telecommunication services is given by Q = 250 - 5P and the market sup- ply (including taxes) is Q = 4P 110 (both in millions), where P is the monthly price of telecommunication services. The senator is considering tax reform that would dramatically cut tax rates, leading to a supply function under the new tax policy of Q = 4.171P-110. How much money would a typical consumer save each month…arrow_forwardArrow's impossibility theorem states that under certain assumptions about preferences, no voting system exists that satisfies all of the following properties: • Unanimity • Transitivity • Independence of irrelevant alternatives • No dictatorsarrow_forward4.10. A social choice function satisfies the weak Pareto criterion if,whenever every voter places one candidate above another, say rankingcandidate A over candidate B, then candidate B cannot be the uniquewinner. (This differs from the Pareto property owing to the words “theunique”.)(a) Explain why any method that satisfies Pareto also satisfies weakPareto.(b) Explain why the antiplurality method satisfies weak Pareto.(c) Explain why the agenda method violates weak Pareto.arrow_forward
- = Chegg Depict The Fiscal Characteristics Of Two School Districts In A... 1. The following data depict the fiscal characteristics of two school districts in a metropolitan area, each composed of identical single family houses with pupil per house. The voters who have chosen to live in both districts desire and select $10,000 of educational spending per pupil and collect property taxes to finance it. Because B has small (low value) houses, the tax rate in B is much higher than in A. a. Would a voter in district B prefer to live in a big ($200,000) house in district A? Why? (2 points) b. Suppose that there is a third school district to choose from with an equal number of big and small houses so that the average per pupil value is $150,000. What tax rate is required in this district to spend $10,000 per pupil? If small houses also cost $100,000 in this district, are consumers of small houses better off here or in B? If big houses also cost $200,000 in this district, are consumers of big…arrow_forwardIf low-income families pay 10% of their income in taxes while high-income families pay 20% of their income in taxes, the tax system is which of the following? Group of answer choices Unfair Regressive Excessive Proportional Progressivearrow_forwardPlease no written by hand "No voting system is perfect." What does it mean by economist K. Arrow? Give a brief account on Condorcet Voting Paradox. A public school district is voting on the school budget and the resulting student-teacher ratio. A poll finds that 20 percent of the voters want a ratio of 9:1, 25 percent want a ratio of 10:1, 15 percent want a ratio of 11:1, and 40 percent want a ratio of 12:1. What outcome would you expect the district toarrow_forward
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