Bundle: Principles of Economics, Loose-leaf Version, 8th + LMS Integrated MindTap Economics, 2 terms (12 months) Printed Access Card
8th Edition
ISBN: 9781337607735
Author: N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Question
Chapter 17, Problem 6PA
Subpart (a):
To determine
Payoff matrix of classmates.
Subpart (b):
To determine
Payoff matrix of classmates.
Subpart (c):
To determine
Payoff matrix of classmates.
Subpart (d):
To determine
Payoff matrix of classmates.
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You and a classmate are assigned a project on which you will receive one combined grade. (You each want to receive a good grade, but you also want to avoid hard work. In particular, here is the situation:• If both of you work hard, you both get an A, which gives each of you 40 units of happiness.• If only one of you works hard, you both get a B, which gives each of you 30 units of happiness.• If neither of you works hard, you both get a D, which gives each of you 10 units of happiness.• Working hard costs 25 units of happiness.
a. Fill in the payoffs in the following decision box:
REFER IMAGE
b. What is the likely outcome? Explain your answer.c. If you get this classmate as your partner on a series of projects throughout the year, rather than only once, how might that change the outcome you predicted in part (b)?d. Another classmate cares more about good grades: She gets 50 units of happiness for a B and 80 units of happiness for an A. If this classmate were your partner (but your…
You and a classmate are assigned a project on which you will receive one combined grade. You each want to receive a good grade, but you also want to avoid hard work. In particular, here is the situation:
•
If both of you work hard, you both get an A, which gives each of you 40 units of happiness.
•
If only one of you works hard, you both get a B, which gives each of you 30 units of happiness.
•
If neither of you works hard, you both get a D, which gives each of you 10 units of happiness.
•
Working hard costs 25 units of happiness.
Complete the following payoff matrix given the previous information. In each cell, your classmate's payoff is on the left and yours is on the right.
Your Decision
Work
Shirk
Classmate's Decision
Work
,
,
Shirk
,
,
The likely outcome is that your classmate and you .
If you get this classmate as your partner on a series of projects throughout the year, rather than only once, you are…
specialize in producing radios? Compasses?
Problem 2
Gary and Diane must prepare a presentation for their economics class. As part of their presentation, they
must do a series of calculations and prepare 50 PowerPoint slides. It would take Gary 10 hours to do the
required calculation and 10 hours to prepare the slides. It would take Diane 12 hours to do the
calculations and 20 hours to prepare the slides.
How much time would it take the two to complete the project if they divide the
calculations equally and the slides equally?
a.
How much time would it take the two to complete the project if they use comparative
advantage and specialize in calculating or preparing slides?
b.
If Diane and Gary have the same opportunity cost of $5 per hour, is there a better
solution than for each to specialize in calculating or preparing slides? Briefly discuss.
C.
1
Chapter 17 Solutions
Bundle: Principles of Economics, Loose-leaf Version, 8th + LMS Integrated MindTap Economics, 2 terms (12 months) Printed Access Card
Ch. 17.1 - Prob. 1QQCh. 17.2 - Prob. 2QQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 3QQCh. 17 - Prob. 1CQQCh. 17 - Prob. 2CQQCh. 17 - Prob. 3CQQCh. 17 - Prob. 4CQQCh. 17 - Prob. 5CQQCh. 17 - Prob. 6CQQCh. 17 - Prob. 1QR
Ch. 17 - Prob. 2QRCh. 17 - Prob. 3QRCh. 17 - Prob. 4QRCh. 17 - Prob. 5QRCh. 17 - Prob. 6QRCh. 17 - Prob. 7QRCh. 17 - Prob. 1PACh. 17 - Prob. 2PACh. 17 - Prob. 3PACh. 17 - Prob. 4PACh. 17 - Prob. 5PACh. 17 - Prob. 6PACh. 17 - A case study in the chapter describes a phone...Ch. 17 - Prob. 8PACh. 17 - Prob. 9PA
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