MACROECONOMICS+ACHIEVE 1-TERM AC (LL)
MACROECONOMICS+ACHIEVE 1-TERM AC (LL)
10th Edition
ISBN: 9781319467203
Author: Mankiw
Publisher: MAC HIGHER
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Chapter 10, Problem 5QR
To determine

Fed deals with demand shocks better than supply shocks.

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1. Lisa has $48 per week set aside for coffees (x) and lunches (z). The price of coffee is $4 and lunches are $6. What is Lisa's budget line equation (with z on the left-hand side)? Graph the budget line, and show how it changes when the price of lunches rise to $8 (including intercepts). What is the new budget line equation? 2. Suppose utility for a consumer of movies (x) and golf (z) is U = 20x0.420.5. The consumer has set aside $1000 to consumer movies and golf for a year. a. If the price of movies is $20 and the price of golf is $40, what is the utility-maximizing consumption of movies and golf? b. Show the optimal consumption bundle on a graph, showing a budget line (with intercepts), a tangent indifference curve, and the optimal choice. 3. Sam has set aside $480 for entertainment this month, which is golf (x) and/or bowling (z). A round of golf is $40 and a night of bowling is $30. His utility function is U = 3x + 2z. a. What is his MRS? b. Solve for the optimal choice of golf…
Question Seven There are specific applications of the hidden-action or moral hazard model. Consider employment contracts signed between a firm's owners and a manager who runs the firm on behalf of the owners. The manager is offered an employment contract which they can accept and decide how much effort, e ≥ 0, to exert. Suppose that an increase in effort, e, increases the firm's gross profit, not including payments to the manager, but is personally costly to the manager and the firm's gross profit, Пg, takes the following form: Пg = e +ε, ε~N(0,2). Let s denote the salary, which may depend on effort and/or gross profit, depending on what the owner can observe, offered as part of the contract between the owner and manager. Suppose that the manager is risk averse and has a utility function with respect to salary of the form: Aσ² U(W)=μ- 2 a) Derive the optimal result of the owner's expected net profit where there is full information and state what it implies. b) Suppose now that the…
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