1. You have been hired by a manager of a firm (entrant) to choose the location of a company branch along an avenue. A rival firm (incumbent) is located at one end of the avenue. Consumers face transportation costs according to td, where t represents transportation costs and d; the distance. The entire length of the avenue is assumed to be 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the avenue. It is assumed that firms choose their respective location and then compete à la Bertrand. Marginal costs are zero for both firms. a) Find equilibrium prices in the second stage of the game. b) Find the optimal location for the entrant firm.

Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)
16th Edition
ISBN:9781305506893
Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson
Publisher:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson
Chapter11: Price-searcher Markets With High Entry Barriers
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 12CQ
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1. You have been hired by a manager of a firm (entrant) to choose the location of a
company branch along an avenue. A rival firm (incumbent) is located at one end of
the avenue. Consumers face transportation costs according to td, where t represents
transportation costs and d; the distance. The entire length of the avenue is assumed
to be 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the avenue. It is assumed that
firms choose their respective location and then compete à la Bertrand. Marginal costs
are zero for both firms.
a) Find equilibrium prices in the second stage of the game.
b) Find the optimal location for the entrant firm.
Transcribed Image Text:1. You have been hired by a manager of a firm (entrant) to choose the location of a company branch along an avenue. A rival firm (incumbent) is located at one end of the avenue. Consumers face transportation costs according to td, where t represents transportation costs and d; the distance. The entire length of the avenue is assumed to be 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the avenue. It is assumed that firms choose their respective location and then compete à la Bertrand. Marginal costs are zero for both firms. a) Find equilibrium prices in the second stage of the game. b) Find the optimal location for the entrant firm.
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