When the model y = Bo+Bir+₂+u, was estimated, the 95 percent confidence inter- val for ₂ was (-0.12, 1.32). Based on this evidence, the hypothesis that a has no effect on O a can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level O b. we can draw no conclusion about the hypothesis without doing at test Oc cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level. O d. can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level.

When the model y = Bo+Bir+₂+u, was estimated, the 95 percent confidence inter- val for ₂ was (-0.12, 1.32). Based on this evidence, the hypothesis that a has no effect on O a can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level O b. we can draw no conclusion about the hypothesis without doing at test Oc cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level. O d. can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

5 Suppose in a test of hypothesis the probability value (p-value) is 0.0788. Then you should, a not reject H₀ at α = 0.10. b reject H₀ at α = 0.05. c reject H₀ at α = 0.05, but not reject H₀ at α = 0.10. d reject H₀ at α = 0.10, but not reject H₀ at α = 0.05.
A master student interested in pursuing a PhD is deciding between two courses: advanced game theory x = A and introduction to game theory x = I. The student can be one of two types: 0 = L or 0 = H. The PhD admission officer can observe the courses chosen by the student x = {A, I} but not the type of the student 0. Before observing the course chosen by the student, she believes both types are equally likely. She admits students only if she is sure that they are type 0 = H (that is if she believes P(0 = H|x) = 1). The student gets 10 units of utility from being admitted to a PhD and 0 units if not admitted, and pays costs c(0) if she chooses advanced game theory and costs 0 if she chooses introduction to game theory. We assume that c(H) = 0 < c(L) = 15. 1) What is a separating equilibrium? What does it mean in the game above? 2) What is a pooling equilibrium? What does it mean in the game above?
pls help asap on both
The leaders of the Planetary Council have different preferences about the strength of punishment for Earth for destroying the Solar System. They have the following numbers of votes: Tarantoga 7, Trurl 3, Pirx 12, Tichy 4, and vote using a simple majority. From this information only, you can infer that (many answers may be correct): O Pirx and Tarantoga form a minimal winning coalition O The minimum weight winning coalition has 14 votes O There is no minimal size winning coalition with two leaders O Trurl and Pirx form a minimal connected winning coalition O Trurl and Pirx form a minimal range winning coalition O Tichy is not a member of any minimal connected winning coalition O There are four minimum winning coalitions O Tichy and Trurl do not form a minimal winning coalition
Suppose a researcher is interested in a new treatment plan for increasing CD4 cell count in immune-compromised patients with HIV. In order to investigate the new drug, the researcher gathers a group of 48 individuals with a mean CD4 count of 317 cells/mm3 after treatment with a standard deviation of 24.6. Test the hypothesis that the mean CD4 count has increased above the goal of 275 cells/mm3. Write out your hypotheses and correctly interpret your pvalue. (Use an alpha level of 0.01)
Suppose that the box-and-whisker plot below represent quiz scores out of 25 points for Test 1. Test 1 - 02 O 0 01 0 O 3 + How many outliers are there in the data set? 2 4 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2.33 • 上一页
We do not consider randomization. The relationship between a Nash equilibrium and an equilibrium in dominant strategies is that: an equilibrium in dominant strategies is a special case of a Nash equilibrium. O a Nash equilibrium is a special case of an equilibrium in dominant strategies. O they are the same. O a Nash equilibrium always exists, but an equilibrium in dominant strategies may not exist.
assume there are two types of workers, low- and high-ability, andlet 0 = 0.25 be the proportion of high-ability workers in the population. Assume their marginalproductivity and, therefore, their wages are wh = $20 and wl = $16, and that both types canuse college education to signal high ability. The cost of college education for low-ability workersis cl = $5 whereas the cost for high-ability workers is ch = $2. Consider the wage for both types of workers and the high-ability workers’ college cost, ch. For which values of 0 (the proportion of high-ability workers in the population) do the high-ability workers prefer the separating equilibrium over the pooling equilibrium? (a) Any 0 > 1/2(b) Any 0 < 1/2 (c) Any 0 < 3/4(d) Only when 0 = 1