We do not consider randomization. The relationship between a Nash equilibrium and an equilibrium in dominant strategies is that: an equilibrium in dominant strategies is a special case of a Nash equilibrium. O a Nash equilibrium is a special case of an equilibrium in dominant strategies. O they are the same. O a Nash equilibrium always exists, but an equilibrium in dominant strategies may not exist.

We do not consider randomization. The relationship between a Nash equilibrium and an equilibrium in dominant strategies is that: an equilibrium in dominant strategies is a special case of a Nash equilibrium. O a Nash equilibrium is a special case of an equilibrium in dominant strategies. O they are the same. O a Nash equilibrium always exists, but an equilibrium in dominant strategies may not exist.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Which of the following accurately describes a player's strictly dominant strategy? O It is a strategy that is better than all the player's other strategies, no matter what the other players do. There is always at least one player who has one in every game.. O It is the strategy a player uses in the Nash equilibrium of a game. Since a Nash equilibrium always exists, players always have a strictly dominant strategy. O It is a strategy that is better than all the player's other strategies, no matter what the other players do. A player may or may not have one. O It is a strategy that is better than all the player's other strategies, no matter what the other players do. Every player has a dominant strategy in every game.. O It is the strategy a player uses in the Nash equilibrium of a game. Since a Nash equilibrium may not exist, players may not always have a strictly dominant strategy.
In the game below, there are two equilibriums: both players play conserve or both players play plunder. If the game is repeated multiple times, players can maintain equilibrium in which conserve is played if: Player 2 Player 1 Conserve Plunder Select one: Conserve Plunder (100,100) -100,50 50,-100 (0,0 Game is repeated few times and discount rates are low Ob Game is repeated many times and discount rates are high O c. Game is repeated many times and discount rates are low O d. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are high
The extensive form of a game is drawn when O a) the players move sequentially. Ob) the players move simultaneously. O c) there is no Nash equilibrium. O d) there are multiple Nash equilibria. O e) the game is often repeated.
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Little Kona is a small coffee company that is considering entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price: Little Kona True True or False: Only Little Kona has a dominant strategy in this game. False Big Brew High Price Low Price Enter $2 million, $3 million $2 million, $1 million Don't Enter 50, 58 million $0, $3 million Which of the following outcomes represent a Nash equilibrium in this case? Check all that apply. Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters. Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters. Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, "If you enter, we're going to set a low price, so you had better stay out." Thin True or False: Little Kona should believe the threat.
Wal-Mart's dominant strategy is to pick a price of $. Target Price = $30 Price = $17 %3D What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? $6,000 $1,500 O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $17 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $30. Price = $30 $6,000 $11,000 O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $30. Wal - Mart C. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $30 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $17. $11,000 $4,500 Price = $17 %3D $1,500 $4,500 O D. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $17. South OE. O E. A Nash equilibrium does not exist for this game.
B's profit B invests B does not invest 100 80 100 -40 -40 10 80 10 Which of the following statements are correct? Select one or more: O a. If A invests, B's best strategy is to not invest since A will take all the profit O b. Whoever invests first gains a first-mover advantage O c. The co-ordination game exhibits two Nash equilibria. O d. If B chooses to not invest, A's best strategy is also to not invest. A's profit A does not invest A invests
P1 9,3 U D 2 a. Derive the best response of P1 when P2 takes the pure strategy and the best response of P2 w strategy. b. Show all the Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. L 30, 40 5, 15 c. Find the Mixed-strate energy Nash Equilibrium. What is the probability that Pareto efficiency w equilibrium? F 0,0 1 8,5 P2 M R 20, 10 45, 35 d. Convert the above game tree to a normal form game. e. Show all Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. a. Show the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. G K N 0,0 2 0,0 M
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