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Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 1 Strategy A B Player 2 Y 12, 12 6,-30 -30, 6 30, 30 a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. ?(-30, 6) ? (12, 12) ? (6.-30) ? (30, 30) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? O (30,30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12) O (6.-30) b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? OA OB What outcome do you think would occur as a result? O (12, 12) O (-30, 6) O (30,30) (6,-30) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? O (6.-30) O (30, 30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12)

Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 1 Strategy A B Player 2 Y 12, 12 6,-30 -30, 6 30, 30 a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. ?(-30, 6) ? (12, 12) ? (6.-30) ? (30, 30) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? O (30,30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12) O (6.-30) b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? OA OB What outcome do you think would occur as a result? O (12, 12) O (-30, 6) O (30,30) (6,-30) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? O (6.-30) O (30, 30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12)

Essentials of Business Analytics (MindTap Course List)
Essentials of Business Analytics (MindTap Course List)
2nd Edition
ISBN:9781305627734
Author:Jeffrey D. Camm, James J. Cochran, Michael J. Fry, Jeffrey W. Ohlmann, David R. Anderson
Publisher:Jeffrey D. Camm, James J. Cochran, Michael J. Fry, Jeffrey W. Ohlmann, David R. Anderson
Chapter15: Decision Analysis
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 6P
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Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 1 Strategy A B Player 2 Y 12, 12 6,-30 -30, 6 30, 30 a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. ?(-30, 6) ? (12, 12) ? (6.-30) ? (30, 30) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? O (30,30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12) O (6.-30) b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? OA OB What outcome do you think would occur as a result? O (12, 12) O (-30, 6) O (30,30) (6,-30) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? O (6.-30) O (30, 30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12)
Transcribed Image Text:Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 1 Strategy A B Player 2 Y 12, 12 6,-30 -30, 6 30, 30 a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. ?(-30, 6) ? (12, 12) ? (6.-30) ? (30, 30) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? O (30,30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12) O (6.-30) b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? OA OB What outcome do you think would occur as a result? O (12, 12) O (-30, 6) O (30,30) (6,-30) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? O (6.-30) O (30, 30) O (-30, 6) O (12, 12)
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