There are two hunters, each trying to bring meat back to their village. The hunters individually choose to either hunt a stag or hunt a They know that if they both choose to hunt a stag, they can kill it and bring back 20 pounds of meat each for the village. They also know that no hunter can kill a stag alone, so that any hunter who pursues a stag without the other will come back to the village empty-handed. A hunter can certainly hunt a rabbit individually. Any hunter who pursues a rabbit will bring back 1 pound of meat for the village. a) Let’s say the hunters go out at the same time without communicating what their plans Represent this one-shot, simultaneous move game using the normal form. b) Is there a dominant strategy for either player? Why or why not? c) What is the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium in this game? Keep in mind the possibility of multiple Nash Equilibria. d) What is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game?
There are two hunters, each trying to bring meat back to their village. The hunters individually choose to either hunt a stag or hunt a They know that if they both choose to hunt a stag, they can kill it and bring back 20 pounds of meat each for the village. They also know that no hunter can kill a stag alone, so that any hunter who pursues a stag without the other will come back to the village empty-handed. A hunter can certainly hunt a rabbit individually. Any hunter who pursues a rabbit will bring back 1 pound of meat for the village.
a) Let’s say the hunters go out at the same time without communicating what their plans Represent this one-shot, simultaneous move game using the normal form.
b) Is there a dominant strategy for either player? Why or why not?
c) What is the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium in this game? Keep in mind the possibility of multiple Nash Equilibria.
d) What is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game?
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