The problem of adverse selection in insurance markets means that it is generally a bad deal for companies to offer insurance at the same price for all potential customers. Why then do we observe some insurance companies (such as those selling “trip insurance” that refunds money to people who purchase trips that they are unable to take) do exactly this?

The problem of adverse selection in insurance markets means that it is generally a bad deal for companies to offer insurance at the same price for all potential customers. Why then do we observe some insurance companies (such as those selling “trip insurance” that refunds money to people who purchase trips that they are unable to take) do exactly this?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter19: The Problem Of Adverse Selection

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6MC

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