The market demand curve for a pair of Bertrand duopolists is given as P= 34 - 3Q, where Q= Q+ Q2 The constant per unit marginal cost is 16 for each duopolist. Find the Bertrand equilibrium price, total quantity, and total profits. (Round your answers to 2 decimal places (e.g., 32.16). Enter zero wherever required.) Equilibrium Price: Quantity: Profits:

The market demand curve for a pair of Bertrand duopolists is given as P= 34 - 3Q, where Q= Q+ Q2 The constant per unit marginal cost is 16 for each duopolist. Find the Bertrand equilibrium price, total quantity, and total profits. (Round your answers to 2 decimal places (e.g., 32.16). Enter zero wherever required.) Equilibrium Price: Quantity: Profits:

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

a) Suppose that the two firms engage in Cournot competition. Find the equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the profits πANE and πBNE, for each firm. b) Suppose the marginal cost for firm B increases from $20 to $140, while everything else remains unchanged. Find the new equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the new equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the new profits πANE and πBNE for each firm. c) Suppose that, in addition to the marginal cost increase from $20 to $140 from sub question b), firm B also has a fixed cost of $2500, out of which $2100 may be recouped if it shuts down; everything else remains unchanged. In this case, what will firm B’s optimal output be? (Justify your answer.) What will firm A’s profit be?
Suppose that firm Alphabet is the only company that sells all-inclusive vacation packages in the UK. It faces two markets with demand curves given by P₁ = 200 - Q₁ and P₂ = 100-Q2. Assume that Alphabet's total cost function is C = 400 + 200 1) What is the market structure of the all-inclusive vacation packages in the UK? Is firm Alphabet a price taker or price maker? Explain. 2) If Alphabet can price discriminate and could tell which consumer belongs to which market before the purchase happens, what is the type of price discrimination that Alphabet is practising? Explain. Give another example of the same type of price discrimination. 3) If Alphabet can charge different prices at those two markets, what price should it charge in each market in order to maximise profits? What are the quantities it should produce in each market? 4) What if he cannot price discriminate? Then what price should he charge? What is the quantity produced?
Many home improvement retailers like Home Depot and Lowes have low-price guarantee policies. At a minimum, these guarantees promise to match a rival’s price, and some promise to beat the lowest advertised price by a given percentage.Do these types of pricing strategies result in cutthroat Bertrand competition and zero economic profits? If not, why not? If so, suggest an alternative pricing strategy that will permit these firms to earn positive economic profits.
suppose Rosaria is a simple monopolist who sells rose water measured in ounces. her marginal costs are constant and equal to $1, regardless of who she sells to, and she has no fixed costs to consider. the market for rose water has only two consumers, Ying and Kay. Ying's deman is Q^y = 10 - 2P, while Kay's deman is Q^k = 2 - P Rosalina is able to practice third degree price discrimination. Her total profits are
There are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for paving services is ?= 2040 ―20? where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price is measured in dollars per job. Assume Asphalt, Inc. has a marginal cost of $100 per driveway and Blacktop Bros. has a marginal cost of $150. Answer the following questions: Determine each firm’s reaction curve and graph it. How many paving jobs will each firm produce in Cournot equilibrium? What will the market price of a pave job be? How much profit does each firm earn?
Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200− Q A − Q B where Q A and Q B are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are TC A =1,500+55 Q A + Q A 2 TC B =1,200+20 Q B +2 Q B 2 Assume that the firms form a cartel to act as a monopolist and maximize total industry profits (sum of Firm A and Firm B profits). In such a case, Company A will produce units and sell at . Similarly, Company B will produce units and sell at . At the optimum output levels, Company A earns total profits of and Company B earns total profits of . Therefore, the total industry profits are . At the optimum output levels, the marginal cost of Company A is and the marginal cost of Company B is . The following table shows the long-run equilibrium if the firms act independently, as in the Cournot model…
Continuing with inverse demand p = 50 - Q, if each firm has marginal cost of 0, what is the difference between the equilibrium price under Cournot competition and under Bertrand competition? The Cournot price is higher than the Bertrand price by 50. The Cournot price is lower than the Bertrand price by 25. The Cournot price is higher than the Bertrand price by 50/3. Equilibrium prices under Cournot and Bertrand are the same, so the difference is zero.
Please no written by hand solution
please explain in steps
There are two soda firms Pepsi and Coke in Bertrand completion . They face demand with the following features: If their price is the lowest Q = 40-.5P, if their price is the same they face demand of half of the market, and if their price is the higher they face demand of zero. Both firms have a marginal cost of 10. Describe each firms reaction functions and the equilibrium price and quantity for each firm. Show your work and clearly mark your answers. Request: Please provide a graph if applicable and don't provide the handwritten answer. Thank you! Your help is much appreciated!
Suppose the inverse demand function for a monopolistically competitive firm's product is given by P = 100 – 20 and the cost function is given by CQ) = 5 + 2Q Determine the profit-maximizing price and quantity and the maximum profits.
A homogeneous product duopoly faces a market demand function given by p = 300 - 3Q,where Q = q1 + q2. Both firms have constant marginal cost MC = 100. What is the Bertrand equilibrium price and quantity in this market?