Ten firms compete in a market to sell product X. The total sales of all firms selling the product are $1,500,000. Ranking the firms' sales from highest to lowest, we find the top four firms' sales to be $375,000, $305,000, $245,000, and $ 195, 000, respectively. Calculate the four - firm concentration ratio in the market for product X.

Ten firms compete in a market to sell product X. The total sales of all firms selling the product are $1,500,000. Ranking the firms' sales from highest to lowest, we find the top four firms' sales to be $375,000, $305,000, $245,000, and $ 195, 000, respectively. Calculate the four - firm concentration ratio in the market for product X.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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