suppose voters A, B, and C have preferences in two dimensions, x and y. Each voter's indifference curves are perfect circles about their ideal points. 1. Suppose that the ideal points are (x, y) = (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3) for voters A, B, and C, respectively. Draw a graph showing these preferences. Suppose the status quo policy is S = (1, 3). What, if any, policy P would you expect to to result? 2. Suppose preferences are like in part (1). Add two new voters, D and E to this diagram, but add them in such a way that they do not change P and where policies D and E are not on the line connecting policies A, B, and C. Explain.

suppose voters A, B, and C have preferences in two dimensions, x and y. Each voter's indifference curves are perfect circles about their ideal points. 1. Suppose that the ideal points are (x, y) = (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3) for voters A, B, and C, respectively. Draw a graph showing these preferences. Suppose the status quo policy is S = (1, 3). What, if any, policy P would you expect to to result? 2. Suppose preferences are like in part (1). Add two new voters, D and E to this diagram, but add them in such a way that they do not change P and where policies D and E are not on the line connecting policies A, B, and C. Explain.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4CQQ

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