Suppose there are no fixed costs and marginal cost is a constant $40. a. What are the perfectly competitive price and output? Price: $ Output: b. What are the cartel (monopoly) price and output? Price: $ Output: c. If there are only four firms in the cartel, what are the price and output of each firm, assuming equal shares? Round your answers to 1 decimal place. Price: $ Output

Suppose there are no fixed costs and marginal cost is a constant $40. a. What are the perfectly competitive price and output? Price: $ Output: b. What are the cartel (monopoly) price and output? Price: $ Output: c. If there are only four firms in the cartel, what are the price and output of each firm, assuming equal shares? Round your answers to 1 decimal place. Price: $ Output

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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