Suppose there are just two firms, 1 and 2, in the oil market and the inverse demand for oil is given by P = 60- C marginal cost for each firm is €24. What price should Firm 1 charge at the Cournot equilibrium?
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- Suppose there are just two firms, 1 and 2, in the oil market and the inverse demand for oil is given by P = 60 – Q. The marginal cost for each firm is €30. What price should Firm 2 charge at the Cournot equilibriumQuestion 3 The inverse market demand for fax paper is given by P=100-Q. There are two firms who produce fax paper. Firm 1 has al cost of production of C₁= 15*Q₁ and firm 2 has a cost of production of C₂=20*Q₂. 1) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compute simultaneously in quantities. What are the Cournot quantities and prices? What are the profits of firm 1 and 2? 2) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compete simultaneously in prices. What are the Bertrand quantities and prices? What are the profits of firm 1 and 2? 3) Suppose that firm play a Stackelberg game. First firm 1 sets the quantity in t=1, then, knowing which quantity firm 1 has set, firm 2 chooses the quantity in t=2. What are the Stackelberg quantities and prices? What are the profits od firm 1 and 2? Compared to part a) which firm benefits and which firm loses?2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 0.5q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5 - p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 0.5 (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…
- Two firms (called firm 1 and firm 2) are the only sellers of a good for which the demand equation is Here, q is the total quantity of the good demanded and p is the price of the good measured in dollars. Neither firm has any fixed costs, and each firm’s marginal cost of producing a unit of goods is $2. Imagine that each firm produces some quantity of goods, and that these goods are sold to consumers at the highest price at which all of the goods can be sold. A Cournot equilibrium in this environment is a pair of outputs (q1, q2) such that, when firm 1 produces q1 units of goods and firm 2 produces q2 units of goods, neither firm can raise its profits by unilaterally changing its output. Find the Cournot equilibrium. Determine whether the price at which the goods are sold exceeds marginal cost.consider a market with inverse demand P(Q) = 10 − Q and two firms with cost curves C1(q1) = 2q1 and C2(q2) = 2q2 (that is, they have the same marginal costs and no fixed costs). They compete by choosing quantities. Suppose that Firm 1 chooses quantity first and is able to credibly commit to this choice. Then firm 2 choose its quantity after observing firm 1’s quantity. In the SPNE of this game, what is the price faced by consumers?- p = 3- p = 4- p = 5- p = 6- p = 7Suppose the iceberg lettuce industry is a Cournot duopoly with two firms: Xtra Leafy (a) and Yummy Farms (y). Xtra Leafy produces q units of output and Yummy Farms produces qy units of output. Aggregate market output is Q = x + y. The (inverse) market demand schedule is: p = 176 - 2Q Both firms have identical cost structures: MC = MC₁ = ATC₂ = ATC₁ = $12 Find Xtra Leafy's Cournot reaction function of the form: 9x = a + bay Where "a" is the reaction function's intercept and "b" is its slope. Note: Please review the formatting instructions above. If any value is negative, be sure to include its negative sign. a. a= b. b = Hint: One of your answers will be negative. Think about why.
- 1.7. In Section 1.2.B, we analyzed the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products. The case of homogeneous productswo firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms. Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity). Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999]. Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following models: (a) Cournot Model error_outlineHomework solutions you need when you need them. Subscribe now.arrow_forward Question Two firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA =…if there are two firms both have the same MC= 30$. the inverse market demand P=150- (q1 +q2). what is the quantity equation for each firm and what is their profit at equilibrium?
- Two firms Intel and AMD in the CPU market have combined demand given by Q = 100 - P. Their total costs are given by TC Intel = 4 Q Intel + 2 Q Intel^2 and TC AMD = 4 Q AMD + 2 Q AMD^2. If they successfully collude, the market price will be??Suppose the inverse market demand for manufactures is P(Q) = A – Q, where P and Q denoteprice and total goods produced and the parameter A denotes the size of the domestic market.Suppose any firm has a cost function, c(q) = cq, where A > c. Suppose there are two firm in themarket which produce q1 and q2, where Q = q1 + q2.a. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium levels of output (Q*), price (P*) and markups.b. What is the impact of an increase in market size, A, on Q*, P* and markups when there are twofirms? Provide some intuition for these predictions.c. Suppose a third firm enters so that Q = q1 + q2 + q3. What is the impact of entry on Q*, P* andmarkups? And why? Explanation and math work for all three parts please!!2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 1 2 q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5-p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 1 2. (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…