**Estimating the Probability of Advanced Civilizations Becoming Intergalactic***Suppose that there is a 2.2% chance a planet will develop life, a 3.1% chance that the life will evolve into complex organisms, a 6.1% chance that complex organisms develop into advanced civilizations, and an X% chance that the advanced civilizations become intergalactic.***Given Data:**- Total number of planets: 1,351,006 - Observed intergalactic civilizations: 1**Task:** Determine the expected value of X, the chance that advanced civilizations become intergalactic.**Note:** - X is in percentage form (e.g. 30.51 not 0.3051). - Round to two decimal places, but do not round until the final answer.---To find the expected value of X, follow sequential probabilistic steps based on the given percentages and final observations.Use these guiding probabilities and observed values to solve for X%, ensuring that you maintain precision until the final rounding step.

Probability represents possibility. It is a branch of computation that contracts with the event of a…

Suppose that there is a 2.2% chance a planet will develop life, a 3.1% chance that the life will evolve into complex organisms, a 6.1% chance that complex organisms develop into advanced civilizations, and an X% chance that the advanced civilizations become intergalactic. If there are 1,351,006 planets, and we observe only 1 intergalactic civilization, what is the expected value of X? Note that X is in percentage form (e.g. 30.51 not 0.3051). You can round to two decimal places, but do not round until your final answer!

Suppose that there is a 2.2% chance a planet will develop life, a 3.1% chance that the life will evolve into complex organisms, a 6.1% chance that complex organisms develop into advanced civilizations, and an X% chance that the advanced civilizations become intergalactic. If there are 1,351,006 planets, and we observe only 1 intergalactic civilization, what is the expected value of X? Note that X is in percentage form (e.g. 30.51 not 0.3051). You can round to two decimal places, but do not round until your final answer!

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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